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ABSTRACT 
 
Institutional racism in the United States has evolved into a “racial state” that situates the 
state as a reproducer of the inequalities of the past in terms of resource allocation, social 
consciousness, and political power, but which is often operationalized under more subtle guises. 
One of the primary mechanisms of this contemporary disenfranchisement centers around value 
capture through property disputes, and can be traced back to the evolution of urban renewal 
policies, and the integral early coalitions between local political actors and real estate capital 
interests. Urban renewal has been the focus of extensive research and debate, and one of its 
defining characteristics has been the deleterious and disproportionate impact on African 
American residents of central city neighborhoods. The evolution of urban renewal policy 
represents a powerful manifestation of state-led land revalorization and socio-spatial 
stratification with such disparate impacts that the program earned the nickname “Negro 
Removal.”  
Using Pagano and Hoene’s (2010) theory of fiscal policy space, I analyze a case study in 
Champaign, Illinois that illustrates how a local redevelopment plan’s use of eminent domain 
represents a new form of urban renewal that reproduces the unequal racial and spatial outcomes 
of a previous historical era. This case uses interviews with local political actors, financial 
managers, and civic subjects in addition to archival newspaper and city records research to 
determine how the decision space and strategy of the local government is shaped by local fiscal 
constraints (context, economic base, local fiscal controls, and local politics) that create the 
justification for actions predisposed to differential impacts on low-income and minority 
residents. In this paper, I chart the evolution of urban renewal policy since mid-century, provide 
a historical analysis of affordable housing issues and mid-century urban renewal in Champaign, 
and use an inductive instrumental case study method to investigate the continued unevenly racial 
outcomes of stated-initiated forced residential displacement as embodied by the implementation 
of the housing and land use goals of the currently ongoing Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan.  
The findings from this work contribute to debates on transforming the use of eminent 
domain statutes as applied to low-income communities of color in order to more justly facilitate 
urban growth and development processes driven by political-capital interest coalitions. This will 
help us to better understand a place-specific economic and political racial project through the 
applied theory of fiscal policy space, with implications for analysis in other municipalities and at 
different scales of analysis. This will also contribute to recent fair housing litigation progress in 
evaluating disparate impact claims. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The persistence of racial segregation, and the profound physical isolation between 
neighborhoods across the United States, is stunning. When neighborhoods continue to reflect the 
persistent color divide, then so do schools, churches, workplaces, friendship circles, and 
marriages. White and black Americans effectively lead physically separate lives. This has 
repercussions in the political sphere, because when political jurisdictions are racially 
homogenous, there is no opportunity for blacks and whites to join together to press for common 
goals, and this physical separation encourages the view of racial politics as competitive. The 
segregation of neighborhoods reinforces racial divisions in politics, which reinforces further 
separation in other areas of society and government, leading to the existence of institutionally 
defined and supported racial segregation that is simply no longer explicitly stated as such. We 
have moved beyond the pre-Civil Rights era of racial politics defined by Jim Crow laws to a new 
period characterized by less overt institutionally enforced inequality, one that is reliant on more 
subtle forms of entwined economic and social disenfranchisement of minority groups.  
Historically, the state has played the roles of both architect and enforcer of racial 
difference. If a racial project is the link of idea and action to control resources along racial lines, 
then the first major racial formation project was the conquest by Europe of the Americas, and the 
beginning of the largest, most economically and socially complex racial state in existence. The 
social structures in which race operated went from colonial military conquest to nation building, 
but racial taxonomy based in inequality was threaded so thoroughly within the new legal 
structures that the emergence of the new state was indelibly intertwined with race-based abuse 
and economic disparity. 
Institutional racism in the United States has taken many forms in our history, often a 
Janus-faced representation of the liberal democratic ideals espoused by the early American state, 
which from its very inception was required by its already established practices of slavery and 
economic dependence to take a definite stand on racial classification in order to legitimize and 
protect itself. In the United States today a “racial state” exists that places the contemporary state 
as a reproducer of the inequalities of the past in terms of resource allocation, social 
consciousness, and political power, but operationalized under more subtle guises.  
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One of the primary mechanisms of this contemporary disenfranchisement centers around 
value capture through property disputes, and can be traced back to the evolution of mid-century 
urban renewal policies, and the integral early coalitions between local political actors and real 
estate capital interests that they spawned. Urban renewal has been the focus of extensive research 
and debate, but one of its defining characteristics was the deleterious and disproportionate impact 
on African American residents of central city neighborhoods. Urban renewal displaced an 
estimated one million people from the time of its enactment in 1949 to 1965 (Anderson, 1964) 
and the impact on African American communities was so disproportionate that the program 
earned the nickname “Negro Removal” from novelist James Baldwin (Goetz, 2013). 
However, while many scholars have reached consensus about mid-20th century urban 
renewal (hereafter referred to as “Old Urban Renewal”) as a forced displacement racial project, 
they have not yet translated these historical narratives onto more contemporary experiences of 
the less rhetorically repulsive “community development” and “economic development” 
initiatives which continue to reproduce many of the same unequal racial and social outcomes 
across urban spaces, but which use different and often more subtle institutional and political 
justifications to accomplish. Forced displacement of already marginalized (and often minority) 
citizens is a persistent observed outcome of government intervention in land use regulations and 
practices since the 1950s. Thus, despite a rhetorical shift and revamping and redefinition of tools 
available to local governments in managing different land uses (zoning, intergovernmental 
agreements, economic development tools like TIFs and Enterprise Zones, etc.), their ultimate 
outcomes are still dictated by the neoliberal market-based logics of the contemporary U.S. 
capitalist property context. And these market-based logics are firmly rooted in America’s unique 
historic form of unequal access to capital and legal barriers based on racial designations.  
Richard Foglesong labels this primary area of struggle the “property contradiction,” 
defined as “the contradiction between the social character of land and its private ownership and 
control,” explaining land in its functionality as “not only a commodity but also a collective 
good” (Foglesong, 1986). The creation of “private property” made land simply another 
exchangeable private commodity on the market (albeit an immobile one), but it was also needed 
to house and reproduce labor, and ensure both efficient circulation of goods and collective spatial 
coordination of the physical infrastructure designed to optimize mobile commodity circulation. 
This conflict between the static commodification of land and its communal value thus creates an 
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“in-between” space defined by the conflict it breeds in debates over highest order uses. The 
central task for land use law as it has developed over the years in the United States is to resolve 
conflict between the interests of private property and the interests of the general public as 
manifested by the government’s regulation of land. 
These conflicts have in the U.S. context historically been governed by legal statutes 
including eminent domain and other decisions deriving from the Fifth Amendment, which states 
that “no person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Both federal and state 
governments must satisfy the two requirements of “public use” and “just compensation” in order 
to exercise the power of eminent domain. While the Supreme Court has provided a reasonably 
clear definition of “just compensation,” holding that it is essentially equivalent to fair market 
value,1 a precise definition of “public use” has proven more elusive. In addition to traditional 
public uses of property such as schools, roads and other public works that involve the public 
actually using the property, the Supreme Court has long denied deliberate and specific 
interpretation that defines “public use” beyond a “public purpose” or “public benefit.”2 
Regardless of such historical non-specificity, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated since 1798 
that the government does not have the power to take property from one individual and give it to 
another for a use that is “purely private,” historically describing such takings as “against all 
reason and justice” (Kokot, 2011). 
There is a long history in property takings jurisprudence debating the appropriate uses of 
eminent domain, but the most recent and most significant change, an undeniable example of how 
entrenched neoliberal economic philosophy has become to the modern American state, was the 
controversial June 23, 2005 Kelo v. City of New London Supreme Court decision. This decision 
held that states could use their power of eminent domain to condemn private property and 
transfer it to private developers for the purpose of “economic development.” Despite many states 
passing eminent domain reform bills in the aftermath of this decision to try and limit its power, 
many bills were undermined by broad exceptions for “blight” clearance, which the Supreme 
Court upheld as a constitutional “public purpose” in its 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ref. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); see also J. Kelly, 2006. 
2 Lavine & Oder, 2010; see also Mount Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 
30, 32 (1916): “The inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test is established.” 
	   4 
In Berman the Supreme Court held that eliminating “miserable and disreputable housing 
conditions” was within the scope of Congress’ police powers (the government’s authority to 
regulate or otherwise restrict the use of private property) and thus satisfied the public use 
requirement.3 It also declared that the legislature, not the judiciary, has the power to determine 
how best to address the “public use.” In this way, it did not matter to the Court whether the 
plaintiff’s property was itself “blighted” because it ceded to Congress the authority to “attack the 
problem of the blighted parts of the community on an area rather than on a structure-by-structure 
basis.”4 Thus the Supreme Court upheld private-to-private takings on the grounds that any 
resulting private benefit was ancillary to the public purpose of blight clearance (Kokot, 2011). 
The very structure of the common law system and the principle of legal precedent, or 
stare decisis, means that once a court has formulated a legal principle to resolve a particular 
factual dispute before it, it is committed to adhering to that legal principle when it is called upon 
to resolve a similar factual dispute in the future. Stare decisis operates in both a horizontal and 
vertical fashion within the American court system, in that lower or inferior courts are bound by 
the legal precedent established by those higher or superior courts above it, which is precisely 
why the Kelo decision was so controversial – its potential effects were, and remain, incredibly 
far-reaching, both temporally in terms of the cases it will effect in the future, and hierarchically 
in terms of lower courts bound by a legal precedent set in the highest court. 
In Kelo, the Court argued that because “economic development is a traditional and long-
accepted function of government,” the redevelopment plan proposed “unquestionably serve[d] a 
public purpose,” despite the fact that the area was not confronted with the need to clear blight. 
Simply the fact that “the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic 
rejuvenation” was enough. In this unprecedented decision, the Court not only refused to 
distinguish economic development from other recognized pubic purposes, but also failed to 
require that the city in question prove with “reasonable certainty” that the hoped-for benefits 
would actually occur. This statement of position by the highest court in the American judiciary 
on what constitutes the “highest and best uses” of land, and who gets to decide, has resounding 
implications for the future of our representative democracy, particularly for those most 
marginalized citizens disproportionately affected by the use of eminent domain-justified takings 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 31. 
4 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 34. 
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historically, as Kelo dissenting Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas all agreed.  
Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion stated:  
Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to 
being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded -- 
i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial 
to the public -- in the process.  
 
Thus, in O'Connor's view, “[t]he specter of condemnation hangs over all property,” because 
“who among us can say she already makes the most productive or attractive possible use of her 
property?” She continued, saying: 
The fallout from [Kelo] will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those 
citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including 
large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now has 
license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more (Kelo, 
545 U.S. at 494-505: O’Connor J., dissenting).  
 
Justice Thomas echoed these sentiments, saying: 
So-called “urban renewal” programs provide some compensation for the properties they 
take, but no compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands to the 
individuals displaced and the indignity inﬂicted by uprooting them from their homes. 
Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, 
but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial 
goal guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those 
communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and 
best social use, but are also the least politically powerful (Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2687: 
Thomas J., dissenting).  
 
He also noted that over 97% of the individuals forcibly removed from their homes by the 
“slum-clearance” project upheld in the Berman decision were African-American 
These comments echo widespread sentiments among legal and civil rights scholars 
published since 2005 about the potentially highly unequal combined racial and economic 
ramifications of this decision. The Director of the NAACP, Hilary O. Shelton in the wake of 
Kelo stated, “the history of eminent domain is rife with abuses specifically targeting racial and 
ethnic minority and poor neighborhoods,” and in a brief supporting the petitioners of Kelo, 
several civil rights organizations pointed out that  
The economically disadvantaged and, in particular, racial and ethnic minorities and the 
elderly ...  have been targeted for the use and abuse of the eminent domain power in the 
past and there is evidence that.., these groups will be both disproportionately and 
specially harmed by the exercise of that expanded power (Brief for NAACP, et al. as 
	   6 
Amici Curiae, Supporting of Petitioners, at 7, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S., 125 
S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108)). 
 
Because local governments are susceptible to the influence of wealthy private and 
corporate developers who may promise more jobs and tax revenue, private parties can potentially 
use their superior legal sophistication and financial resources to co-opt the eminent domain 
process for their private advantage. This is a process that has now been made easier with the 
Kelo decision. Disparities in legal and financial resources often “create the opportunity for the 
private exploitation of the economically disadvantaged and the politically disfavored” (D. Kelly, 
2006). Despite the majority of state legislatures enacting post-Kelo reform laws, only two states, 
Florida and New Mexico, have prohibited blight takings entirely (Kokot, 2011), and the 
effectiveness of the reform bills passed after the Kelo decision in actually preventing economic-
development-style takings has largely depended on how those state legislatures define “blight.”  
 In myriad ways, legal and state legislative apparatuses have colluded since the Civil 
Rights era to create outcomes that disproportionately impact minorities and low-income urban 
communities, with local governments serving as market mediators whose fiscal priorities are 
increasingly driven by profit-seeking private “partners” who help to broaden definitions of the 
“public interest” to suit their own motives. In this research, I use a single instrumental, embedded 
case study design to answer the following research questions: 
 1. How does the City of Champaign’s Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan reflect historical 
urban renewal trajectories and outcomes? 
 2. To what extent do new municipal fiscal priorities influence the plan’s rationale for the 
use of eminent domain? 
 3. To what degree are new fiscal priorities underscoring disparate impacts of 
redevelopment on minority communities? 
In general, case studies are best when such explanatory questions are posed, as they allow 
operational links to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence, which would 
be better suited to traditional scientific method-based experiments, surveys, or histories. Case 
studies are most often used when “a how or why question is being asked about a contemporary 
set of events over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin, 2009). Instrumental case 
studies are used when the intent is to understand a specific issue or problem (here: the disparate 
racial outcomes of stated-initiated forced residential displacement) (Stake, 1995).  
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To answer these questions, I use an approach that is inductive, interpretive and historical, 
developing subjective knowledge (from interview content), and contextual historical knowledge 
(from newspapers and other local historical sources) in understanding the fiscal policy space of 
the City of Champaign. Using Pagano and Hoene’s (2010) theory of fiscal policy space (FPS), I 
analyze a case study in Champaign, Illinois that illustrates how a local redevelopment plan’s use 
of eminent domain in a neighborhood planning process represents a new form of urban renewal, 
one that reproduces the unequal racial and spatial outcomes of a previous historical era, but via 
different and often more subtly complex interactive mechanisms.  
FPS encompasses (1) the state or intergovernmental context; (2) the economic base of the 
municipality; (3) municipally and locally imposed fiscal controls and policies; (4) service 
responsibilities; and (5) the political culture of the city (Pagano & Hoene, 2010). Local 
governments are increasingly driven by fiscal parameters and constraints that are imposed from 
state and federal levels of government, but are translated and applied through local politics. 
Previous scholarly work using the FPS framework has primarily focused on (1), examining the 
state government limitations on local government finances, focusing on spending volatility as 
part of a broader strategy for managing uncertainty (Pagano & Hoene, 2010; Hendrick & 
Crawford, 2014). In this case study, I will only attempt to explicate (3) - (5) via qualitative 
interview data, published planning documents, newspaper records and local reports. I will not 
attempt to fully explore the state context. The purpose of examining (3) is to describe the city-
imposed controls on the plausible behavior of fiscal policy makers, the purpose of (4) is to 
describe changing service demand in municipalities and citizens’ and firms’ willingness to pay 
for services by taking citizens’ demand, need, and preferences for services into account. The 
prevailing political culture of a community, embedded in its unique history, directly influences 
and often constrains the “plausible” set of fiscal management options available to decision-
makers. Thus, the purpose of examining (5) is to identify the difference between the “plausible” 
FPS and the potential “actual” fiscal management tools available to local government actors. The 
sum of the analysis of (3) – (5) will provide insight into the “constrained” fiscal policy space of 
the City of Champaign.  
The FPS framework for understanding how local governments manage revenue and 
spending volatility, and financial problems more generally, is much more comprehensive than 
what has been presented in previous studies that usually focus on one feature of government 
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fiscal structure, such as the fund balance or revenue diversification. Understanding the locally 
perceived and explicitly stated service responsibilities and the effects of the local political culture 
in influencing and shaping decision-making spaces (posited here as the interactions of (3) – (5)), 
provides a better, more holistic lens through which to understand “the decision-making 
opportunities and constraints on the space within which key elected and appointed city officials 
operate” (Pagano & Hoene, 2010). Not every city starts from the same set of options and 
capacities, and a model of cities’ “constrained” FPS provides a more policy-relevant and realistic 
understanding of the actual decision-making options available to local government actors. It does 
this by providing a multifaceted structural lens through which to understand the local cultural, 
political and historical trajectories facing decision-makers in local political and financial 
decisions that go beyond traditional revenue and expense accounting to shape neighborhood 
outcomes. 
This case uses interviews with local political actors, financial managers, and civic 
subjects in addition to archival newspaper and city records research to determine how the 
decision space and strategy of the City of Champaign’s local government is shaped by local 
fiscal constraints that create the justification for actions predisposed to differential impacts on 
low-income and minority residents. This approach to analyzing fiscal imperatives in political and 
community decision-making spaces is a unique lens that has not been applied in traditional urban 
renewal literature to answer the “how” and “why” questions behind historically documented 
uneven racial outcomes. I use this combination and type of evidence to explore the constrained 
FPS of the City of Champaign in the creation of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan and Bristol 
Place Master Plan as a way to identify new financial imperatives and government process 
mechanisms leading to unequal outcomes not captured by traditional Old Urban Renewal 
literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   9 
CHAPTER 2 
EVOLUTION OF URBAN RENEWAL POLICY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The forced removal of a household from its home is one of the most intrusive exercises of 
state power – indicative of what sociologist Johan Galtung in 1969 termed ‘structural violence.’ 
The disruption of families is significant and the sense of loss - of home, of community, of a sense 
of identity and belonging - can be profound in cases where people have developed strong place 
attachment. Forced displacement can also have negative effects on self-sufficiency and well 
being regardless of place attachment, simply from the disruption of social support networks and 
survival strategies designed and employed by people, especially those living on the economic 
margin.  
It is difficult to overstate the impacts that the loss of a home has on an individual: 
psychologically, emotionally, physically and materially – and even more difficult to accurately 
quantify and aggregate those impacts to give an accurate portrayal of the subsequent life 
repercussions post home-loss. Whether that loss is the result of personal action or inaction or 
something completely out of an individual’s control has different effects as well.  
 The lived experience of “home” and the policy dimensions discussed in relation to 
“housing” are often divergent. Analysis of “housing” in the U.S. has emphasized individual 
market choice limited by economic capacity (Glazer, 1975), and is most often discussed through 
the lens of neoclassical economic theory and a false assumption of a self-regulating free housing 
market. The emphasis on individual choice rather than factors affecting economic capacity is an 
unbalanced treatment of the subject that lacks nuance and denies the complexity of systemic 
context. The institutional structures that shape economic choice, primarily housing industries and 
political lobbies, must be take into account along with local government. These industries 
include contractors, home builders, lenders, insurers, appraisers, real estate agents, and others. 
These groups all contribute to the availability and cost of housing in any given community. The 
central structural base of housing includes the process of private capital accumulation, urban 
restructuring, and political responses at local, state and federal levels.  
In this chapter I trace the historical trajectory of urban renewal from its mid-century roots 
into subtler, more diffuse serial political decisions and practices. I then use this history to 
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describe the value of using urban renewal projects as a lens into the social, economic and 
political governance processes involved in the structural violence of housing provision in the 
U.S. This lens is particularly important in that it not only allows us to view “economic greed, 
ethnic enmity, class division, and political jockeying for power” (Teaford, 2014) in urban 
renewal policy applications, but also the intentional and unintentional ways in which urban 
planning has contributed to the reproduction of unequal spatial and social outcomes.  
 
2.2 Old Urban Renewal (1949-1973): Race trumps class - “Negro Removal” 
Residential segregation began in city life as a response to the growing population of free 
blacks migrating from the south in the post-slavery era. Before urban population increases, and 
“as late as 1910, negroes were less highly segregated from native whites than were Italian 
immigrants” (Spear, 1967). Spear describes that as the growing black population attempted to 
secure adequate housing, a pattern of resistance emerged on the part of white residents:  
When a Negro moved family moved into a previously all-white neighborhood, the 
neighbors frequently protested, tried to buy the property, and then, if unsuccessful, 
resorted to violence to drive out the interlopers. In many cases, the residents organized to 
urge real estate agents and property owners to sell and rent to whites only (Spear, 1967).  
 
It became commonplace for real estate agents to either refuse to sell to blacks in certain areas or 
to raise prices enough that even middle class black families looking for a place to live among 
people of the same socioeconomic standing were driven into black only zones of housing.  
A striking example of this occurred in southern Chicago in 1908, when the Hyde Park 
Improvement Protective Club, membership consisting of 350 of the wealthiest south-side city 
dwellers, proved to be an early very successful example of techniques that whites used to keep 
blacks out of “their” geographical areas of the city. These techniques included redlining, the 
then-widespread use of racially restrictive covenants, the neighborhood improvement association 
club, the community newspaper, the boycott, and as a last resort, violence (Massey & Denton, 
1993). This Hyde Park example is significant, because it occurred in a middle and upper class 
community, and its victims were middle and upper class black residents attempting to find 
comfortable homes among people of their own economic status. As Massey & Denton (1993) put 
it, “the housing problem for Negroes was not restricted to the poor; even the affluent were 
blocked in their quest for a decent place to live.” The economic disenfranchisement that took 
place as a result of this racism was far reaching, and included African Americans being “forced 
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to pay rents 10 to 15 percent higher” because they were so limited in their choice of housing. 
“One realty company inserted two advertisements for the same apartment in a daily newspaper: 
one read, “seven rooms, $25”; the other, “seven rooms for colored people, $37.50” (Massey & 
Denton, 1993). The first half of the twentieth century was full of racially significant social and 
cultural developments that culminated in the Civil Rights Movement, but that began with 
Reconstruction-era Jim Crow legislation and the first wave of the Great Migration, African 
Americans serving as WWI commanders, the Depression, the New Deal, widespread race riots, 
and the Harlem Renaissance.  
The 1937 Wagner-Steagall Act (formally the United States Housing Act of 1937) 
creating the United States Housing Authority (USHA), and together with the National Housing 
Act of 1934 which established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), introduced the very 
beginning of what historian Gail Radford calls a “two-tier” approach to American housing 
policy: “publicly subsidized, restrictive housing for inner city poor and an elaborate series of 
subsidies and tax breaks to producers and consumers of private, single-family suburban homes 
on top” (Zipp, 2013). This was in spite of the 1937 Act’s original draft, largely prepared by 
Catherine Bauer, which had intended the Authority to make grants and loans to nonprofit and 
noncommercial housing agencies to underwrite moderately priced shelter. Input from the private 
housing industry (whose constituent members wanted to ensure no federal program could 
threaten the market), and other reformers focused on slum clearance, and succeeded instead in  
…keeping construction cost ceilings minimal, excluded all but the poorest residents with 
restrictive income limits, eliminated nonprofits and cooperatives, gave authority to 
sometimes hostile local governments, and tied public housing to slum clearance with the 
so-called equivalent elimination clause that required new dwelling units to replace an 
equal number of slum units (Zipp 2012). 
 
With these restrictions, developers would not face urban fringe competition, and landlords would 
not be squeezed by higher supply, ensuring that they could continue to charge high rents for slum 
housing. Combined with the 1938 Underwriting Manual provided by the FHA which observed, 
“if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be 
occupied by the same social and racial classes - a change in social or racial occupancy generally 
contributes to instability and a decline in values” (Squires, 1994), the two-tiered American 
housing system laid its structural foundations. 
Urban renewal ethos evolved up until its initial policy implementation in 1949. Initially a 
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postwar modernist vision meant to transform the urban environment, early urban renewal 
visionaries wanted to completely eradicate the 19th century industrial landscape. This early era of 
city reconstruction was initially led by lofty ideals about how city-dwellers should live. A deeply 
flawed experiment in re-creating overcrowded industrial cityscapes, it centered around city 
planners’ confidence in scientific rationalism’s ability to create a better future for urban citizens 
through modifications to the built environment. Focused around downtown preservation and 
minority containment, “Old Urban Renewal” was a national effort to remove ‘blighted’ 
properties and poverty from areas around central business districts (CBDs) in postwar American 
cities. As Jon Teaford (2014) wrote:  
Like the protagonist in a Greek tragedy, urban renewal’s fall was at least in part owing to 
hubris. Renewal’s progenitors believed they had the answer to urban problems; unlike 
their parents they knew how to build cities. They were going to create the heavenly city, 
but too often the result was an urban renewal hell. 
 
 What I call here “Old Urban Renewal” officially began with the 1949 Housing Act, in 
which Congress declared that the national welfare required “housing production and related 
community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage,” to eliminate “sub-
standard and other inadequate housing,” and to realize “the goal of a decent home and a suitable 
living environment for every American family” (Bauer, 1951). Congress launched the federal 
urban redevelopment program in Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, and along with the 
subsequent Housing Act of 1954 provided billions of dollars in federal resources to local 
authorities to redevelop “blighted” areas (Hyra, 2012). Urban renewal advocates’ initial goals 
centered around clearing slums and rehousing the poor in public housing – combined responses 
to an international “modern housing” movement and years of campaigns against tenement 
housing (Zipp, 2013). Modernist construction aesthetics combined with socialist city planning 
ideals to try and “improve the welfare of slum families, to remove civic eyesores, to stabilize 
central property values, to make old areas available for profitable building enterprise, and to 
‘save’ cities from disintegrating forces of decentralization” (Bauer, 1951).  
Joel Schwartz says slum clearance in this period was guided by “machine-age 
assumptions” (Schwartz, 2015), essentially, that run-down areas close to the downtown cores 
with higher land values were the proper location for middle-income housing and commercial 
uses, and the working class and the poor should occupy the cheaper fringe lands. In New York, 
redevelopment preceded public housing and corrupted it from the start: “Amidst constant talk 
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about housing improvement,” Schwartz writes, Lower East Side realty interests and businessmen 
“kept sight on redevelopment that had no room for social justice” and “pounced on New Deal 
public housing as an expedient route to redevelopment.” He maintains that “housers” (early 20th 
century affordable low-income housing advocates) were largely complicit in what amounts to a 
kind of land grab. The process by which federal policy was transmuted onto the physical 
environments of individual cities varied across the U.S. by locality and was tied up in local 
politics, but there are universal themes that emerge in hindsight involving the land grabs of early 
real estate coalitions that emerge through historical review (Schwartz, 2015). 
Private real estate interests had begun to push for their vision of urban redevelopment as 
early as the 1920s, and planners and politicians in this era assisted in developing the 
jurisprudence of eminent domain for condemnation of “unproductive” property into private reuse 
ostensibly for public benefit. The “discourse of blight,” a term coined by University of 
Pennsylvania legal historian Wendell Pritchett, became central to urban renewal policy rhetoric. 
Blight was posed as a disease that threatened to turn healthy areas into slums. “A vague, 
amorphous term, blight was a rhetorical device that enabled renewal advocates to reorganize 
property ownership by declaring certain real estate dangerous to the future of the city” (Pritchett, 
2003).5 This positioning of “blight” as a potentially city-threatening disease allowed renewal 
advocates to change the meaning of the Public Use Clause through re-conceptualizing property 
rights (legally conceived as a “bundle of rights” including occupation, exclusion, use, and 
transfer rights). In 1954 the U.S. Supreme Court approved the use of eminent domain for urban 
renewal, interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause as applicable for “public purpose” 
when just compensation is provided (Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26). Berman severely restricted 
judicial review of cases involving eminent domain, where before this decision the judiciary 
played a significant role in reviewing government condemnations, with judges frequently 
declaring a particular taking not in the public interest (Pritchett, 2003).  
The significance of this initial case to later American jurisprudence cannot be overstated, 
as it not only affected how eminent domain cases were handled at the local level and provided 
Supreme Court precedent, but it also provided the common law basis for two subsequent historic 
rulings: that of 1984 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (9-0), and 2005 Kelo v. City of New 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 On property as rhetoric, see Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Private Property, 
in Constitutionalism and Democracy (J. Elster & R. Slagstad eds., 1988); and Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of 
Property, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 277 (1998). 
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London (5-4). Legal scholars have written much about the significance of these cases in creating 
the rules by which we manage government property takings today.6 In Midkiff, the government 
redistribution of land from some private parties to other (more numerous) private parties passed 
constitutional muster as a means of rectifying what the state legislature found to be an oligopoly 
in fee simple land titles. This case established precedent for government taking private property 
and transferring that property to other private owners, justified by the negative public welfare 
implications of a land ownership oligopoly in Hawaii at the time. In the highly controversial 
2005 Kelo decision briefly discussed in the Introduction to this paper, the Supreme Court 
extended the Berman ruling to allow takings of “unblighted” private property, solely for the 
broader economic benefit of the condemner-city (Eagle, 2009).  
With each of these historic cases, stare decisis (a doctrine of precedent) was set, police 
powers expanded, and the “public use” clause opened up incrementally further than the 
precedent set by each prior decision. While the doctrine of stare decisis, that courts should abide 
or adhere to set precedents, does not prevent re-examining and if necessary over-ruling prior 
decisions, a party attempting to over-rule a precedent faces significant legal burdens. Overruling 
precedent legally is often directly proportionate to the age of the precedent, the extent of public 
and private reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with other legal statutes or rules of 
law. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) stated: 
It is … a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually must 
be followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the 
current justices. This policy … ‘is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability 
and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties 
should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable 
assurance of the governing rules of law’ (Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. 
Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296).  
 
According to planner Catherine Bauer, urban redevelopment in the mid-20th century won 
congressional approval “because different groups of people, like the blind men feeling the 
elephant, made entirely different assumptions as to the essential nature and purpose of this 
legislation” (Gelfand, 1975, quoted from Teaford, 2000). The wording, however, permitted 
federal subsidies for projects that destroyed residential slums and replaced them with commercial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For further reading, see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property & The Constitution 190 n.5 (1977); Richard Epstein 
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 162 (1985); Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting 
Property 136-37 (1993). 
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development or leveled commercial slums and erected private residences. There was thus a 
loophole that developers of nonresidential properties could exploit. Even more important, 
nothing in Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 mandated the construction of low- or moderate-
income housing. The federal government paid two thirds of the net cost of clearing slum tracts, 
local authorities shouldered the rest, and the law permitted private developers who constructed 
new buildings on the cleared land to build high-rent structures. The 1949, 1954, 1959, and 1961 
housing acts permitted ever-increasing amounts of public urban renewal money in this period to 
be spent on constructing commercial projects, which facilitated the use of eminent domain-based 
urban renewal in expanding colleges, universities, and hospitals in city centers (Teaford, 2000). 
 
2.3 Old Urban Renewal Results: “diddling with the symptoms” 
 
“Like Fight Blight and Conservation campaigns in neighborhoods declining into slums, 
slum shifting fails because it tries to overcome causes of trouble by diddling with 
symptoms. Sometimes even the very symptoms that preoccupy the slum shifters are, in 
the main, vestiges of former troubles rather than significant indications of current or 
future ills.”         – Jane Jacobs, The Death & Life of Great American Cities 
 
Thus in Old Urban Renewal, the modernist planners’ vision, supported by “scientific” 
approaches to cutting out “blight” and other inefficient land uses, combined with the judiciary’s 
re-definition of what constitutes a public purpose in defining government takings to create the 
pernicious and unjust racial displacement legacies that urban renewal carries with it today. 
Parallel to Jim Crow legislation in the South, African Americans were limited in their choices of 
settlement to only entry communities that had housed previous generations of migrants to 
Northern cities. Often over-crowded, the housing stock was likely to also be substandard and 
worn down. Influenced by military experiences like the 369th Infantry Regiment nicknamed the 
“Harlem Hellfighters” in World War I, African American communities had begun to slowly 
prosper. While the Harlem Renaissance is the best-known example of this process, a similar kind 
of social and cultural awakening was evident in other cities at the time as well (Fullilove, 2001). 
Between 1950 and 1960 nearly a million and a half southern African Americans fled the 
Southern U.S. to various Northeast and Midwest American cities during the second wave of the 
Great Migration (Lemann, 1991). As Black Belts in still-segregated cities expanded towards the 
CBDs and stable manufacturing employment relocated out of the city, urban renewal backed by 
eminent domain became a redevelopment strategy used by housing industry and local urban 
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growth machine (Molotch, 1976) stakeholders.  
By its end in 1973, the total cost of ‘Old Urban Renewal’ likely exceeded $41 billion in 
current dollars (calculated from $30 billion value from 2000 listed in Hyra, 2012). Between 1950 
and 1974, urban renewal was associated with bulldozing an estimated 2,500 neighborhoods in 
993 cities (Fullilove 2005). In these 2,500 redeveloped neighborhoods, an estimated 400,000 
residential units were demolished (Weiss 1985). Most of these residential units were older 
tenements and single-family homes that typically housed African-Americans. In 1961, for 
example, African Americans were 10% of the US population, but 66% of residents of areas 
slated for urban renewal (Fullilove 2001). Urban renewal “slum clearance” did not clear slums at 
all – it merely relocated them within the city. In The Federal Bulldozer (1964), Martin Anderson 
estimated that by 1963 more than 609,000 people had been displaced because of redevelopment 
projects, and that once all pipelined projects were completed the figure would likely increase to 
1.6 million. Of the 609,000 people displaced by 1963, two thirds (406,000) were racial 
minorities, mostly African-Americans. 
Similar to the undeniable evidence of disproportionate impacts on African American 
communities, urban renewal projects also often succeeded in their machine-age goals of 
increasing property values near center-city areas, as well as in other areas where eminent domain 
was used to displace residents. Philadelphia’s redevelopment authority “renewed” the 18th-
century Society Hill neighborhood on the southeastern fringe of downtown in the mid-1960s. 
During the first 10 years of renewal, private investment in Society Hill totaled $180 million and 
tax receipts soared. Before renewal, the neighborhood produced $454,000 annually in property 
taxes; by 1974 it was generating $2.47 million (Garvin, 1996).  
Freedom of choice needs to be recognized in trying to understand the effects on 
individuals and communities of non-voluntary residential movement. Hartman et al’s classic 
1981 work “Displacement: How to Fight It” defines displacement as  
…occurring when any household is forced to move from its residence by conditions 
which affect the dwelling or its immediate surroundings, and which (1) are beyond the 
household’s reasonable ability to control or prevent; (2) occur despite the household’s 
having met all previously imposed conditions of occupancy; and (3) make continued 
occupancy by that household impossible, hazardous, or unaffordable (Hartman et al, 
1981).  
 
The key to understanding the severity and consequence of displacement impacts lies in 
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understanding the physical effects, certainly, but also the material (financial) and emotional 
effects on individuals, which when compounded across segregated social networks and political 
jurisdictions affect an entire population and an entire generation disproportionately. And because 
of socio-spatial compounding effects also transmit significant lost opportunity costs across 
generations of affected African Americans. 
 
2.4 Root Shock: permanently fractured communities 
 
2.4.1 Lack of opportunity for collective political bargaining; increased residential segregation 
 
In the disproportionate effects on low-income and African American populations, urban 
renewal strengthened residential segregation. In some localities, there was no vacant housing for 
the displaced African Americans, which forced families to share accommodations, creating 
severe overcrowding problems (Fullilove, 2001). Many of those displaced relocated to public 
housing, but that was only a partial solution to overcrowding problems, and did nothing to 
address the widespread residential segregation (Hirsch 1998; Holliman 2009; Zipp 2010). Often, 
replacement public housing was built in already predominantly African American residential 
areas, which means that urban renewal directly facilitated the creation of the “second ghettos” 
and the system of institutionalized segregation that many authors have written about since 
(Hirsch 1998; Massey & Denton, 1993; Turner, Popkin, & Rawlings 2009; Wolfinger 2009; Zipp 
2010). Urban renewal policies were not the only factors contributing to segregation and 
neighborhood poverty in this historical era; white flight (Massey & Denton, 1993) and shifting 
urban labor dynamics as a result of manufacturing job loss (Wilson, 1996) also contributed, but 
the role that federally subsidized urban renewal projects had on concentrating and 
institutionalizing African American neighborhood poverty cannot be overlooked (Clark 1965; 
Massey & Kanaiaupuni, 1993).  
As the newly created, often tightly knit communities built in the spirit of the Harlem 
Renaissance were scattered, vast social networks were simultaneously fractured. Even 40 years 
later, people reported that their social networks remained much smaller than they had been prior 
to urban renewal. Further, because of the compounding ruptures by class, people’s social 
networks also became less diverse, which was a loss for both those with higher incomes and the 
poor. The political costs of displacement occurred both in the loss of concentrated voting blocks 
and in the growth of intra- and intercommunity tension. Within the African American 
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community, those who wanted to hang on resented those who sold their homes early, and those 
who spoke out resented those who remained quiet (Fullilove, 2001). Urban renewal also 
generated hostility and suspicion toward the white establishment, in this paper seen as 
synonymous with American government and governance more generally. One Roanoke man was 
reported in the aftermath as saying, “I don’t own anything any more. I just lease it until the 
government comes to take it from me” (Fullilove, 2001). 
Because of the multilayered structures of social and spatial segregation, white Americans 
rarely visited African American communities then, and rarely visit them still – their knowledge 
is instead often informed by superficial inspection, rumor and frequently prejudice. If 
neighborhoods continue to reflect the persistent color divide, then so do schools, churches, 
workplaces, friendship circles, and marriages. When white and black Americans effectively lead 
physically separate lives there are serious repercussions in the political sphere. When political 
jurisdictions are racially homogenous, there is no opportunity for African Americans and whites 
to join together to press for common goals, and the separation encourages the view of racial 
politics as competitive. In this way, historical and contemporary segregation of neighborhoods 
reinforces racial divisions in politics, which reinforces further separation in other areas of 
American society and government, which has led us to the existence of institutionally created 
and supported racial segregation that is simply no longer as explicitly stated as such.  
Tensions over Old Urban Renewal were often mediated by local politics, and outcomes 
varied by locale. Sometimes class and race would intersect and collective bargaining would 
happen across racial lines in support of class differences, but more often in the aftermath of Old 
Urban Renewal the opposite was the case – evidence points overwhelmingly to the fact that 
racial divisions were more important than class lines in neighborhood outcomes. One exception 
to this occurred in the Hyde Park Chicago neighborhood, four decades after the Hyde Park 
Improvement Protective Club led the way in 1908 with its restrictive racial covenants and 
selective neighborhood association redlining. Arnold Hirsch is an advocate for the localization of 
all histories of urban renewal, and in Chicago, he demonstrated that private enterprise had 
insisted on a more aggressive government clearance and renewal campaign (Hirsch, 1998). 
By the 1960s, Chicago’s Hyde Park-Kenwood renewal project was winning national 
recognition for its success in preserving a middleclass neighborhood around the University of 
Chicago. During the early 1950s, many poor African Americans moved into the university area 
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and crime rates rose. The university faced increasing difficulty in attracting first-rate faculty and 
students. To help the university and its neighborhood, the City of Chicago embarked on a 
renewal scheme that involved combining rehabilitation with selective clearance (Rossi & 
Dentler, 1961). As in Society Hill in Philadelphia, buildings deemed unsalvageable were 
bulldozed, but the majority of others were repaired, and 80% of the area’s buildings actually 
survived renewal (Weicher, 1972). Through strict code enforcement, the city blocked the 
conversion of single-family dwellings into low-rent apartments and eliminated overcrowding by 
the poor in existing buildings. A combination of strict code enforcement, rehabilitation, and 
clearance thus preserved the university area and served as a model to other cities that did not 
want to rely solely on wholesale leveling of neighborhoods.  
But Chicago’s Hyde Park-Kenwood project also had its dark side. It won applause for its 
sensitivity to existing buildings, but it proved less considerate of disadvantaged human beings. 
Poor structures were to be rehabilitated, but poor persons were to be removed. To preserve the 
middle-class neighborhood, the poor were evicted, and there was a conscious policy to ensure 
that they did not encroach again on the university’s sphere of influence (Hirsch, 1983). African 
Americans were welcome in Hyde Park by mid-20th century, as long as they were middle class, 
but low-income newcomers from Mississippi and Alabama were not permitted to move too close 
to the faculty or students. As one comedian observed: “This is Hyde Park, whites and blacks 
shoulder to shoulder against the lower classes” (Beadle, 1964). Ironically, this became the 
framework for the next phase of urban renewal policy – neighborhood segregation effects less of 
a burden for middle-class African Americans, but with the worst effects remaining squarely on 
the shoulders of the most marginalized by income and race.   
But as stated above, overwhelmingly housing coalitions in Old Urban Renewal actually 
reinforced racially segregated residential areas. By the early 1960s, the creation of all-African 
American Title I housing in Cleveland such as Longwood and Garden Valley, which consisted of 
moderate-income apartments for African Americans together with low-rent public housing, did 
not sit well with a number of angry African Americans. Such projects perpetuated racial 
segregation by attempting to ensure that middle or moderate-income blacks remained in black 
neighborhoods, despite additional provision of decent, affordable dwellings. Urban renewal 
overall displaced poor city residents, did not adequately provide for their relocation, and seemed 
dedicated to enhancing the wealth of the central cities by getting rid of the less affluent through 
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forced residential displacement (Teaford, 2010).  
Ostensibly, after the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act and the 1968 Fair 
Housing Act were all passed, discrimination on the basis of race was illegal, but the undeniable 
facts are that African-Americans are still denied jobs, homes in mostly white areas, face 
harassment from police officers, and overly-enthusiastic security guards wherever they go. One 
of the primary goals of the Civil Rights Movement7 was real equal participation in the 
democratic political process, seen in the competition for favorable policy outcomes, not just 
fairness in the struggle for representation. For the individual in a minority group, a system that 
gives everyone a chance of having their political preferences physically represented or voiced is 
inadequate. Lyndon Johnson said in a 1965 address at Howard University:  
Freedom is not enough. You do not take a person who for years has been hobble by 
chains…bring him to the starting line of a race and then say, ‘you’re free to compete’ and 
justly believe that you have been completely fair (Kinder & Sanders, 1996).  
 
Residential segregation creates and amplifies economic inequalities, and citizens who do not live 
in the same neighborhoods do not easily come together, as they have fewer shared political and 
social concerns. 
 
2.4.2 Financial Hardship 
 
 Urban renewal also exacted a massive financial toll for those displaced. In Roanoke, one 
of the earliest cities to enact urban renewal efforts, homes and businesses were initially lost 
because of disinvestment in the area triggered by the prospect of urban renewal. People stopped 
investing in their homes because they thought the government would soon take them (Fullilove, 
2001). Even those who were not relegated to public housing often faced rent increases seldom 
justifiable by the extent of landlord reinvestment in a particular property, forcing residents to 
move again in order to find affordable rents (Hartman et al, 1981). Those who were homeowners 
received very little for their properties, rarely enough to pay for the more expensive homes that 
were the only housing available for them to buy post-displacement. People who had paid off 
their homes and had made substantial investments in renovations incurred new debt as a result of 
the displacement, often requiring many years of additional payments. People who were renters 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Defined here as 1954-1968, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education and ending with President Lyndon 
Johnson signing the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 
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often moved into public housing, which was a social situation inferior to the one they had left. 
Affected businesses had great difficulty relocating, and many closed. Churches also did not fare 
well in the transition, grounded by congregations often physically proximate to their structures 
(Fullilove, 2001).  
Urban renewal forced a small number of people to expend economic, social, and political 
capital on resettlement, thus placing them at a disadvantage relative to the rest of society. Put in 
neoclassical economic terms, those affected by Old Urban Renewal’s displacement collectively 
experienced massive opportunity costs that those who had not been displaced did not face. 
Including loss of investments made to owned structures, resources that were “spent” on 
resettlement could not be spent to buy advantages, such as the creation of new enterprises or the 
acquisition of education (Fullilove, 2001). Jane Jacobs disparaged urban renewal policy, saying:  
At best, it merely shifts slums from here to there, adding its own tincture of extra 
hardship and disruption. At worst, it destroys neighborhoods where constructive and 
improving communities exist and where the situation calls for encouragement rather than 
destruction (Jacobs, 1961). 
 
LeGates and Hartman found, contrary to the HUD Displacement Report released in 1979, that 
displacement is almost always accompanied by rent increases, forcing families into severe 
financial binds, the change in rental unit quality is irregular - even when replacement units are 
physically superior, neighborhood conditions or location may be worse or displacees may feel 
their overall situation has deteriorated for other reasons. As Hartman et al put it in 1981: 
The trouble, cost, psychological trauma and political impotence associated with forced 
displacement represent a real hardship for the elderly and many other displacees … we 
note that what limited evidence is available suggests that low-income displacees are 
particularly hurt. In summary, displacement appears, in our view, seldom to be 
unproblematic and frequently is a severe hardship (Hartman et al, 1981). 
 
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the policy shift away from affordable housing 
projects was evident in many American cities and generated objections from displaced residents 
and their allies in academia. One of the most publicized examples of the callous disregard for the 
poor was Boston’s West End renewal project. The West End neighborhood was a close-knit 
Italian community living in a collection of high-density older tenements. Unfortunately, it also 
bordered on Boston’s central business district.  Sociologist Herbert Gans chronicled the West 
Enders’ attachment to their “urban village,” psychologist Marc Fried reported on the 
psychological damage inflicted on the displaced residents, and housing expert Chester Hartman 
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computed the financial burden that relocation placed on West Enders as they paid an average of 
73% more for rent in their new homes (Fried 1966; Gans 1962; Hartman, 1966). 
 
2.4.3 Psychological effects 
 
Urban renewal-based displacement disrupted existing social networks, causing 
widespread emotions of sadness, grief, and depression at the individual level (Gans 1962, Fried 
1966). These negative emotional impacts were the strongest and the longest lasting for those who 
had strong ties to family, friends, and neighbors who were also in the neighborhood that was 
redeveloped (Gans 1962, Fried 1966). Marc Fried (1966) identified external stability as 
extremely important for the working-class (more so than the middle-class); with the loss of home 
and neighborhood came a loss of spatial identity and severe grief. As Jacobs puts it, “the 
treasured ‘security’ of the home base is, in part, a literal security from physical fear,” and in early 
stages of relocations to condensed public housing superblock developments, Mrs. Ellen Lurie of 
Union Settlement in Harlem in 1956 described conditions in a new project for the relocated 
families as, “a bulk of initially unhappy people, angry at the Housing Authority for forcibly 
uprooting them, not fully understanding all the reasons for the move, lonely and insecure in a 
strange new environment” (Jacobs, 1961). 
In the short term, people were aware of the trauma of moving and of the significance of 
the loss of “home.” But the financial costs were high and drained many families, some for years 
to come. Fullilove (2001) believes that 
…it is an accurate reading of the available data to say that community dispossession—
and its accompanying psychological trauma, financial loss, and rippling instability—
produced a rupture in the historical trajectory of African American urban communities. 
By the 1950s, communities were beginning to accumulate sufficient capital to enable 
their members to move on to the broader American scene. In this, they followed patterns 
established by earlier waves of immigrants to the city, indeed, immigrants who, years 
earlier, had settled in the same urban neighborhoods that became African American 
enclaves early in the 20th century. That road to the melting pot was closed by urban 
renewal. 
 
As Zipp (2013) succinctly summarizes, postwar Old Urban Renewal was a process in which 
“private real estate interests enjoyed public sanction and subsidy in a campaign that destroyed 
working-class neighborhoods, uprooted and dislocated communities, reinforced racial 
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segregation, spurred suburbanization, and furthered deindustrialization.”8 
 
2.5 End of Old Urban Renewal 
 
Urban renewal officially ended in 1974. Title I funding ceased and President 
Ford and the U.S. Congress incorporated urban renewal funding into the Community 
Development Block Grant program (Erickson, 2009). Recent scholarship proves that urban 
renewal was relentlessly local - the federal push for urban redevelopment progressed under terms 
established by local political cultures in cities across the country. In most cities the local “growth 
coalitions” that assembled to try to harness the government funding unleashed by the 1949 
Housing Act were more influenced by the real estate industry and downtown business interests 
than the reform-minded intellectuals like Catherine Bauer pushing for idealistic and supportive 
moderately priced low-income affordable shelter (Zipp, 2013).  
The utopic paradigm that was intended to create an egalitarian and cosmopolitan urban 
culture, in reality generated a dystopic version of urban life whose legacies we continue to see 
today, one which encourages a privatization of public space and exaggerated social stratification 
and hierarchy. This spatial logic of modernism continues to be employed by developers and 
other proponents of urban growth who use the vocabulary of urban renewal to create new lines of 
segregation between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the disenfranchised. The pattern of 
urban segregation based on the rhetoric of urban renewal represents a new spatial strategy to get 
access to and command over resources belonging to unprivileged groups. David Harvey 
perceives the appropriation of assets as a form of capital accumulation that rests upon 
dispossession of the surpluses of others, “to absorb them into the circulation of capital but to 
have the power to devalue them and even destroy them” (Harvey, 2007). How to make the land 
more productive was the major concern for the city planners. Increased property tax, land values, 
and higher rents led to a coherent pattern of exclusion under the name of urban renewal. Through 
these socio-spatial strategies, the city became less livable for the poor and racial minorities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See, e.g., the articles collected in Eric Avila and Mark H. Rose, “Race, Culture, Politics, and Urban 
Renewal: An Introduction,” Journal of Urban History 35 (2009): 335–47; Alison Isenberg, Downtown America: A 
History of the Place and the People Who Made It (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 166–202; David 
Schuyler, A City Transformed: Redevelopment, Race, and Suburbanization in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1940-1980 
(University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002); and Kevin Fox Gotham, Race, Real Estate, and Uneven 
Development: The Kansas City Experience, 1900-2000 (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002); Robert M. Fogelsong, 
Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 317–80; Jon C. Teaford, 
“Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath,” Housing Policy Debate 11 (2000): 443–65. 
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(Harvey, 2007).  
 
2.6 Between Renewal ‘Eras’ (1974-1992)  
 
Urban renewal officially ended in 1974. Title I funding ceased and President 
Ford and the U.S. Congress repackaged urban renewal funding into the Housing and Community 
Development Act, which consolidated community development programs into the now-
ubiquitous block grants, establishing the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) 
program, and officially established the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) assistance 
program (Erickson, 2009).  
CDBG began in 1975 as a direct result of the community needs identified by the Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1974, and deployed money on a needs-based assessment to 
metropolitan areas for infrastructure development (Richardson, 2005). The CDBG program 
marked a shift in federal government funding policy away from categorical grants to local 
communities in favor of “revenue sharing” in the form the block grants that allow for more local 
flexibility in dispersion (Ball & Heumann, 1977). The formula takes into account population, 
overcrowding, poverty, growth lag and pre-1940 housing. Cities receiving funds were required to 
spend it on projects benefitting low and moderate-income residents (Rich, 1993). As was the 
case under the previous urban renewal program, cities could allocate the money for clearance or 
rehabilitation of slum buildings, but the grants could also fund a range of programs and facilities 
including neighborhood centers, nonprofit economic development schemes, building code 
enforcement, energy conservation, and varied public works projects and public services 
(Teaford, 2000). 
One of the emphases of CDBG that has become more prominent in the decades since its 
initial inception but that is also a direct response to documented Old Urban Renewal failures is 
the citizen participation element. The CDBG policy goals theoretically emphasized participation 
of members of local communities affected by CDBG investment, but the program began to 
emphasize conflicting goals as it evolved: (1) aiding low and moderate income households and 
(2) meeting general community development needs (see National Citizens Monitoring Project, 
1981). The results have often been less effective citizen input and a dispersion of CDBG funding 
outside of low-income areas nationwide (Heumann, 1982). The other critique of CDBG policy 
has focused on the quality of federal monitoring of the program (see NAHRO, 1977; Nenno, 
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1981).  
The 1980s saw a period of innovation in affordable housing policy and new ideas for 
addressing urban poverty. Mixed-income housing and low-income resident mobility became the 
foci, new public housing was rarely built and subsidies began shifting towards community-based 
non-profit organizations that were building mixed-income communities (Goetz, 2003). Many 
public housing developments during this time, faced with management challenges, aging 
building stock and declining social conditions in housing developments gaining national press 
attention, attempted to deal with their worst properties through demolition. Public housing 
authorities that could not afford straightforward demolition according to HUD’s criteria often 
used a process called “de facto demolition” where they allowed properties to decline by 
“neglecting upkeep, filing to re-rent vacant units, and sometimes even refusing to spend HUD-
allocated funds for modernization and improvement” (Goetz, 2003). Then, when conditions had 
deteriorated enough, the housing authority would petition HUD for demolition as a necessary 
action due to properties’ poor extant conditions.  
The HOME program, enacted in 1990 funds municipalities through a needs-based 
formula to create affordable housing opportunities for low and moderate income residents (Hyra 
2012). Hyra (2012) argued that the combination of these two funding streams with two created in 
the early 1990s (HOPE VI & EZ) helped stimulate the “New Urban Renewal.” 
	  
	  
2.7 New Urban Renewal (1992-2007): Community Development, Glocalization & more nuanced 
race-class dynamics 
 
 From 1992 to 2007, old urban renewal language transformed to new community 
development language and translated into new federal policy in the Homeownership and 
Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) and the EZ Initiative programs, combined with 
earlier CDBG and HOME programs. A focused downtown growth and expansion strategy, “New 
Urban Renewal” focused on destroying the modernist superblock public housing developments, 
redeveloping the “second ghettos” and attracting middle class families and members of the 
“creative class” to new mixed-income housing in the inner city (Goetz 2011a, Hyra 2008). As in 
its previous iteration, New Urban Renewal’s rhetoric and policy outcomes did not align. The 
outcomes of this round of urban investment created substantial increases in central business 
district (CBD) property values, with another round of displacement for those in public housing 
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and other inner city residents near CBDs around the U.S. Distinct from Old Urban Renewal 
however, disenfranchisement divisions along solely racial lines turned into disenfranchisement 
along racial and class lines – middle class African Americans in New Urban Renewal were often 
economic beneficiaries at the expense of lower income residents, the majority of whom remained 
racial minorities.  
Between 1980 and 2000, Chicago’s downtown “Loop” experienced a 150% increase in 
population and New York City’s Manhattan experienced a 7.6% increase. At the same time, their 
property values skyrocketed. From 1980 to 2000, the median home value increased 266% in the 
Loop, and 581% in Manhattan. In addition to increased population and booming property values, 
these cities also experienced job growth, particularly in the high-wage service sector. Between 
1980 and 1998, New York and Chicago added 222,000 and 150,000 jobs respectively (Hyra 
2008). Moreover, between 1996 and 2003, Washington, D.C. added 41,600 employment 
opportunities (Fuller, 2004). Many of these jobs were located in the CBD and in the high-wage 
financial and business service sector. Goetz’s (2011a) national study shows that, while holding 
other variables constant, cities with greater rent gaps between citywide private market and public 
housing median rents were more aggressive in razing public housing during the new urban 
renewal period. This empirical study suggests that hot housing market cities used HOPE VI to 
promote further growth and centralization by labeling and then razing ‘economically 
underutilized’ properties. 
Massive restructuring of the type observed in Chicago, Washington, and many other 
cities required the use of multiple policy tools to aid in renewal processes. Hyra (2012) argues 
that four federal policy initiatives and their respective funding streams in particular helped to 
stimulate the “New Urban Renewal” – HOPE VI Grants and Enterprise Zones combined with 
above-mentioned Community Development Block Grants and Federal HOME dollars. I briefly 
describe these two more recent initiatives below. 
 HOPE VI began the “New Urban Renewal,” deploying more than $6 billion in grants to 
local housing authorities to raze distressed public housing units and replace them with mixed-
income developments (Turner, Popkin, & Rawlings, 2009). HOPE VI grants were designed to 
redevelop large tracts of land and ranged from $30 to $50 million. In Chicago, nearly all of its 
infamous public housing high-rise projects, many located just outside of the CBD, were 
demolished as part of the city’s $1.6 billion Plan for Transformation (Bennett & Reed, 1999; 
	   27 
Bennett, Smith, & Wright, 2006). In 2009 Atlanta’s public housing authority completed the 
demolition of its entire traditional public housing stock (Oakley et al, 2010).  New Orleans, 
which once had nearly 12,000 public housing units, now has only 1,000 (Hyra, 2012).    
 The Enterprise Zone (EZ) Initiative enacted in 1993 was a competitive initiative where 
cities were selected to receive $100 million block grants to stimulate business development and 
job creation in low-income areas (Hyra, 2008). Businesses in EZ areas received tax breaks and 
reduced regulatory requirements for the initial 10 years (Ranney, 2003). 
 However, unlike “Old Urban Renewal,” there has been an upscaling of causality to 
include not just federal policy, but the “glocalization” of financial markets related to housing. 
The integration and deregulation of global financial markets affected inner city development 
specifically in the availability of capital and credit (Hyra, 2008; Gramlich, 2007; Ranney, 2003; 
Sassen, 2000; Wyly et al, 2004). Mortgage credit for home purchase, unlike during Old Urban 
Renewal, flowed unregulated into inner city areas, stimulating inner city gentrification patterns 
and outpacing even mortgage lending in the suburbs (Getter 2006; Sassen 2009; White 2004; 
Wyly et al 2004). These developments were particularly associated with the “financial product 
innovation” that led to the subprime mortgage lending crisis in 2008. Often peddled in the 
neighborhoods that had been previously “redlined” for mortgage lending, subprime loans went 
disproportionately to African Americans, increasing from $35 billion in 1994 to $625 billion in 
2005 (Gramlich, 2007).   
Ranney and Wright (2003) argue that one key to understanding the redevelopment of 
Chicago’s Black Belt is “the integration of real estate into global capital markets.” They state the 
“integration of financial markets is a major factor driving changes in the housing market and the 
gentrification of many cities” (Hyra, 2012). Ding et al. (2008), in their subprime-lending analysis 
of Atlanta, “found a strong geographic concentration of higher-priced lending in African 
American tracts and low-income tracts, even after including other tract-level explanatory 
variables.”  
 Similar to Old Urban Renewal, the demolition of distressed public housing 
disproportionately affected African Americans, displacing nearly 240,000 people, 80% of whom 
were African American (Goetz, 2011b). In fact, this is a conservative estimate, only accounting 
for people displaced from demolished public housing units, not inclusive of the gentrification of 
the surrounding neighborhoods. As explained above, often with rising property values, many 
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renters and small businesses are unable to stay. Hyra (2012) in researching Harlem in New York 
City and Bronzeville in Chicago said he  
…witnessed and heard of cases where landlords damage their buildings’ roofs or 
foundations to get tenants out of what was deemed, after the damage, an unsafe building. 
Once the tenants were out, the landlords planned to redevelop for market rate rents. 
 
This, in addition to figures for small business displacements, are the kinds of secondary and 
tertiary effects of urban renewal and gentrification processes in cities that are so difficult to 
quantify. This “indirect displacement” is a highly debated topic (see Freeman & Braconi, 2004; 
Hyra, 2008; Newman & Wyly, 2006; Vigdor, 2002). Nevertheless, given that in 2000 only 48% 
of the nation’s public housing population was African American (Goetz, 2011b), the 
disproportionate effect of displacement (80%) can be explained by the focus of HOPE VI funds 
on demolishing “the most distressed public housing stock” (Hyra, 2012).  
 
2.8 New Urban Renewal: Outcomes 
One of the differences in the outcomes from Old to New Urban Renewal has been a shift 
in the contained class - race dynamics. There has been the emergence of a significant black 
middle class since the Civil Rights Movement, and from 1960 to 1991 the black middle class 
more than doubled in size (Massey & Denton, 1993). However, the black middle class remains 
economically vulnerable because of its extreme reliance on public sector and quasi-public sector 
employment. These individuals also have to deal with glass ceilings, job and social segregation, 
and residential segregation. However, some affluent and middle-income African Americans 
(politicians, real estate developers and middle income homeowners) have definitively benefited 
from new urban renewal (Boyd, 2008b; Hyra, 2008; Patillo, 2007). The black middle class 
moved to the inner city, and their political actions contributed to neighborhood revitalization by 
discouraging additional subsidized housing and social services and supporting the construction 
of upper- and middle-income housing (Boyd, 2008b; Goetz, 2011b; Hyra 2008; Pattillo, 2007). 
In the 1990s and 2000s, the urban black middle class became part of Logan and Molotch’s 
(2007) urban growth machine, demonstrating that local as well as international and national 
forces entwined to create the effects of New Urban Renewal.  
In Washington, D.C., the African-American mayoral and city council leadership gave 
$23 million in subsidies to an African-American development team to help finance the 
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construction of a large mixed-use building with 300,000 square feet of commercial space and 
180 residential units, which contributed to the redevelopment of a formerly low-income, African-
American neighborhood (Hyra 2011, quoted from Hyra 2012). In Chicago and Washington, 
D.C., African-American directors of the housing authorities controlled the distribution of HOPE 
VI funds, which directly contributed to inner city redevelopment. In New York City, African-
American development companies built luxury housing that contributed to Harlem’s 
redevelopment (Hyra, 2008). In this most recent urban renewal cycle, the less advantaged were 
displaced, but often local middle and upper-income African Americans benefited financially.  
 The dramatic reduction of HOPE VI funds in 2010 to only $5 million down from its 
original $6 billion, combined with capital and credit flows slowing down in 2007 combined to 
bring “New Urban Renewal” to an end. In Making the Second Ghetto (1998), Arnold Hirsch 
argues that the symbolic architects of the old urban renewal were all white. But in the new urban 
renewal some of the development actors were African-American. Thus, the racial implications of 
the New Urban Renewal are tied to class as well as race.  
 While these precise mechanisms of urban redevelopment have slowed, recent 
designations for post-recession foreclosure crisis funding has shifted the conversation yet again 
to “blight” in combination with the contemporary foreclosure crisis. Between 2008 and 2010, 
through HUD’s Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP), nearly $7 billion was allocated to 
cities to help them deal with mounting foreclosures and blight. Some municipalities are 
proposing to use their NSP funds to demolish units in blighted areas. For instance, Detroit plans 
to demolish nearly 10,000 units of housing (Hyra, 2012). 
 
2.9 Combined Health & Financial Effects of New Urban Renewal 
 There have been a number of theoretical constructs put forward by social scientists in the 
intervening decades since the beginning of Old Urban Renewal to explain the social structures 
we see in the U.S. today. The “housing niche” model and the “neighborhood effect” are two 
primary lenses that help shed light on the significance and long-term implications of housing 
displacement on individuals. 
 
2.9.1 The Housing Niche Model  
The “housing niche” model is a social ecological framework for understanding the 
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cumulative disparities in housing and health among non-white segments of the American 
population. The complex histories of property and wealth depletion among African Americans, 
only one aspect of which is very briefly outlined above (urban renewal), demonstrate in part how 
displacement from property transmits disadvantage intergenerationally in the U.S. context 
(Saegert et al, 2011). Researchers using post-2000 data sets find that black households nearing 
retirement have a median net worth of $27,000, compared to $198,000 for whites in the same age 
group (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007; Saegert et al, 2011). Low-income people and people of color 
are no longer explicitly denied access to mortgage credit, but rather are granted access on highly 
unequal terms (Wyly et al, 2009), a shift that has occurred with an increasing policy emphasis on 
neoliberal demand-based private market housing solutions and corresponding reductions in 
traditional supply-oriented policy outcomes of physical public housing stock.  
Starting with Clinton in the mid-1990s and continuing through Bush’s “Ownership 
Society” initiative, the federal government sought to expand homeownership, particularly among 
the communities that had long been excluded from it. Federal policies targeted not only the 
consumption side of subprime lending but also supported the expansion of the demand side. 
Multiple federal regulatory and legislative policies promoted deregulation (Immergluck, 2009, 
2011). Executive and judicial actions undermined state and local protections from predatory and 
fraudulent lending practices (Sagert et al, 2011), and the communities hit hardest were those who 
received the majority of subprime mortgage loans – low-income African American residents.  
African Americans have been more likely to experience mortgage delinquency and 
foreclosure, partially as a result of subprime loans, but also because of the history of racially 
specified dual housing markets (Apgar & Calder, 2005; Schwartz, 2015). The traditional 
conception of the “American Dream” includes homeownership as a centerpiece. For most 
families, their home is their largest investment and their largest asset – and if the value of a home 
is depressed, the accumulation of wealth is correspondingly restricted, as well as the advantages 
that wealth provides. If home values are depressed because the land they occupy is in center-city, 
lower-income lower-serviced areas, those homeowners do not benefit equally from the same 
levels of appreciation of real estate that higher-income higher-serviced areas experience. This 
has direct effects on the accumulation of wealth, but it also makes it more difficult to secure 
home improvement loans, or use a residence as collateral for obtaining home equity loans or 
loans for education for children, automobiles or business start-ups (Squires & Kubrin, 2005).  
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Homeownership has been viewed as a way to improve lives and a way to build wealth 
that could be passed on to the next generation, as well as a way to stabilize neighborhoods and 
regenerate the “underserved markets” that had been repeatedly socially, economically, and 
physically destabilized by policies and practices of racial exclusion. These include restrictive 
legal covenants, the neighborhood residential redlining codified by FHA and the Home Owner’s 
Loan Corporation (HOLC) (Schwartz, 2010), urban renewal, not-so-benign neglect (Wallace 
1988, 1998), blockbusting, and the Section 235 scandal (Bratt, 2007). This long line of nearly 
uninterrupted crisis has disproportionately affected African Americans and low-income and 
inner-city communities. Despite the rhetoric of ownership as a stabilizing force, between 1997 
and 2005 African Americans were more at risk for foreclosure even after controlling for other 
factors related to sustainable homeownership such as employment, household income, and home 
equity (Apgar & Calder, 2005; Williams et al, 2005; Gerardi & Willen, 2009). As Rugh and 
Massey (2010) put it, “high levels of segregation create a natural market for subprime lending, 
and cause riskier mortgages, and thus foreclosures, to accumulate disproportionately in racially 
segregated cities’ minority neighborhoods.” 
In further evidence of low-income communities of color being targeted for financial 
strategies of accumulation by the white establishment at the expense of material dispossession of 
African Americans, in 2005, Wells Fargo created a series of ‘Wealth Building Strategies’ 
seminars and dubbed itself “the nation’s leading originator of home loans to ethnic minority 
customers.” The bank enrolled black public figures in an ostensible effort to educate blacks on 
building “generational wealth,” but the seminars were in fact a front for wealth theft, or what 
David Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession” in Marxian terms. In 2010, the Justice 
Department filed a discrimination suit against Wells Fargo alleging that the bank had funneled 
black customers into predatory loans regardless of their creditworthiness. This was not 
coincidence – it was racism reifying itself under more subtle and complex intertwined economic 
and property tools. According to The New York Times, affidavits found loan officers referring to 
their black customers as “mud people” and to their subprime products as “ghetto loans.” “We 
just went right after them,” Beth Jacobson, a former Wells Fargo loan officer, told The Times. 
“Wells Fargo mortgage had an emerging-markets unit that specifically targeted black churches 
because it figured church leaders had a lot of influence and could convince congregants to take 
out subprime loans.” In 2011, Bank of America agreed to pay $355 million to settle charges of 
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discrimination against its Countrywide unit, and the following year, Wells Fargo settled a 
discrimination suit for more than $175 million. But in 2009, half the properties in Baltimore 
whose owners had been granted loans by Wells Fargo between 2005 and 2008 were vacant, and 
71% of these properties were in predominantly black neighborhoods (Coates, 2014).  
 
2.9.2 The Neighborhood Effect 
The second lens that helps understand the compounding and cumulative effects of 
American public policy disproportionately affecting its most vulnerable citizens is the now 
widespread recognition that neighborhoods, as a proxy not just for physical environments but 
also social networks and access to opportunity, matter for life outcomes. A consensus has 
emerged since 2008 among social scientists that neighborhoods do matter in determining human 
welfare, and the negative effects of concentrated neighborhood disadvantage are broad, 
especially in the long-term (Massey, 2013; Wodtke, Harding & Elwert, 2011). After analyzing 
the effects of the recent Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment HUD initiated in the 1990s 
whose findings were released in 2011, Massey (2013) concludes, “the social structure of urban 
America is such that absent a forceful intervention, powerful, institutionalized, socially-
embedded processes will operate to replicate the existing ecological landscape, despite the noble 
intentions of voucher program designers.” MTO demonstrated the limitations of supply-side 
voucher-based housing programs in increasing the social capital of poor minority families by 
moving their residential locations within our modern urban landscape, precisely because urban 
America remains highly segmented along both race and class lines.  
Despite extensive residential mobility relative to what African American residents 
experienced in 1950 in the City of Chicago, the socioeconomic and racial-ethnic composition of 
Chicago’s neighborhoods in stable over time. The same neighborhoods that were disadvantaged 
in 2000 were disadvantaged in 1990, in addition to 1980, 1970, and 1960. In addition, 
irrespective of year, neighborhoods that were disadvantaged with respect to socioeconomic status 
were also disadvantaged with respect to health, crime, collective efficacy, civic organization, 
altruism, and other factors relevant to human welfare (Massey, 2013). Along with poor health, 
high neighborhood disadvantage simultaneously predicts high crime, weak civic organization, 
isolated social networks, and cynical social attitudes, exposing residents to the combined 
influence of these maladies so that their independent effects cannot really be disentangled 
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theoretically or empirically. 
 In 2011, Robert Sampson published “Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring 
Neighborhood Effect,” demonstrating that interlocking experiences of human disadvantage begin 
in human social cognition and have interlocking effects in constraining individual choice. As 
Massey (2013) summarizes:  
The perceived level of crime and disorder within neighborhoods increases systematically 
as the black percentage and poverty rate rise, irrespective of actual rates of crime and 
delinquency. Although observed disorder may predict perceived disorder, racial and 
economic composition matter far more in determining the perceived safety and 
desirability of neighborhoods and strongly shape residential decisions. Not only are 
African Americans far more likely than whites to experience concentrated poverty at any 
point in time, but exposure to its pernicious effects has actually increased over time, 
despite the passage of landmark civil rights legislation. Among African Americans born 
prior to the end of the civil rights era (1955–1970), for example, 62 percent grew up in 
neighborhoods that were more than 20 percent poor whereas among those born afterward 
(1985–2000) the figure had risen to 66 percent. In contrast, the respective figures for 
whites in the same birth cohorts were just 4 percent and 5 percent. Racial gaps in income 
and wealth are determined far more by neighborhood conditions than family background, 
‘For these outcomes, aspects of the family environment play little role in explaining 
black/white gaps, while neighborhood conditions explain a substantial portion of the 
racial gap in each outcome’ (Sampson 2011, emphasis in original).  
 
The predominantly black West Side Chicago neighborhood of West Garfield Park had 
one of the highest incarceration rates in Sampson’s research, more than 40 times as high as the 
white neighborhood with the highest rate – Clearing, bordering Midway Airport on the South 
Side of Chicago. Sampson writes, “this is a staggering differential, even for community-level 
comparisons – a difference of kind, not degree” (Sampson, 2011).  
 
2.10 Fiscal Policy Driven Urban Renewal: 2007-Current 
The public sector has long played a role in structuring housing markets, from tax 
deductions for mortgage and property tax interest, federal insurance of many mortgage loan 
products, and even public housing supply and low income housing tax credits – and often these 
essentially amount to subsidies for the profits of contractors, lenders, insurers, and other entities 
involved in housing construction or provision. In most federal programs providers charge what 
they determine to be a fair market price, the consumers pay what the government determines to 
be an affordable share of their incomes, and the government pays the difference. By encouraging 
homeowners to purchase more expensive housing than they could otherwise afford, and creating 
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financial subsidy tools to assist those who don’t qualify for credit thresholds in the private 
market access to capital, the U.S. government has for decades subsidized contractors, lenders, 
insurers, and all others involved in the housing industry. In myriad ways, as R. Allen Hays put it 
in his seminal 1985 book Federal Government and Urban Housing, “subsidies to the poor 
become, in effect, subsidies to the winners in the marketplace” (Hays, 1985; quoted from 
Squires, 2005). 
Since the 2008 crash, the extent and use of these subsidies, from federal neighborhood 
and community development funds to housing choice vouchers and the general move from 
public housing supply to demand-based housing subsidy policies in the second half of the 20th 
century, have been increasingly guided by local municipalities’ “constrained” fiscal policy space, 
which is constitutive of increasingly globalized capital markets and risk-spreading real estate 
speculation, combined with local political culture and growth machine pressures. Not every city 
starts from the same set of options and capacities, regardless of their position relative to global 
capital, and understanding a specific cities’ plausible FPS provides a more policy-relevant and 
realistic understanding of the actual decision-making options available to local government 
actors in addressing issues related to affordable housing need in constrained local urban land 
markets.  
Rather than understanding factors affecting local economic capacity (like job 
opportunities, minimum vs. living wage policies, cost of living, and economies of scale in non-
local business supply chain operations), previous emphasis has been on Tiebout-esque individual 
choice sorting in explaining housing market trends at the local level. But by examining FPS (3) 
the city-imposed controls on the plausible behavior of fiscal policy makers, FPS (4) the changing 
service demand in municipalities, and FPS (5) the prevailing local political culture, I posit that 
another round of urban renewal is now taking place. A process of urban renewal that is locally 
constrained, fiscally driven, influenced by global property capital markets and state and federal 
legislation, but also directed by local citizens’ demands, needs, and preferences for services as 
interpreted through the prevailing political culture of the local community. It is the combination 
of all of these elements in our increasingly globalized and glocalized world that directly 
influences and often constrains the ‘plausible’ set of fiscal management options available to local 
decision-makers. It remains to be seen whether this new analysis lens of fiscal policy driven 
urban renewal can stimulate changes to the increasingly widely documented outcomes of the 
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recurrent structural violence and further marginalization of those most historically denied access 
and disenfranchised at every possible level. However, adding the additional levels of fiscal 
policy analysis to traditional urban renewal studies is vital in providing a framework for an 
analysis that is increasingly as layered and complex as the phenomena being studied.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
 
3.1 Research Approach 
Epistemology and ontology form the theoretical basis of how the world can be 
experienced, what constitutes knowledge, and what can be done with that knowledge (Walliman, 
2006). Social science research is carried out from manifold epistemological and ontological 
perspectives that affect research outcomes based on emphasis and process. It is therefore 
important to account for assumptions and positions at the outset, as methods should be aligned 
with ontology and epistemology (Pouliot, 2007). The theoretical perspective this paper takes lies 
firmly in an inductive, historical, interpretivist constructivism. I use a primarily inductive case-
study method, the goal of which is to generate a theory of how “fiscal policy-driven” urban 
renewal works, through what mechanisms and with what outcomes. My constructivist 
methodology has two components: first, the inductive case-study method; and second, an 
interpretive and historical qualitative analysis. 
I follow Adler (2002) and Guzzini (2000) to define constructivism as based on three 
tenets: first, knowledge is socially constructed (an epistemological claim); second, social reality 
is constructed (an ontological claim); and third, knowledge and reality are mutually constitutive 
(a reflexive claim). Accordingly, the social construction of knowledge and the construction of 
social reality are two sides of the same coin. This position is of particular importance to the 
planning profession, whose primary focus has been to tell functional descriptive ‘stories’ (GIS-
based planning maps and models) identifying decision points by illuminating “the facts.” These 
have historically often served to perpetuate the myth of the objective and technical planning 
expert. But as Sandercock (2003) convincingly and eloquently argues:  
…there is no such thing as mere description, or pure facts. There is always an 
author, the planner as policy analyst, who is choosing which facts are relevant, 
what to describe, what to count, and in the assembling of these facts a story is 
shaped, an interpretation, either consciously or unconsciously, emerges. Facts are 
usually marshaled to explain something and to draw some conclusions for action. 
 
Constructivists believe that the human capacity for reflective learning is the primary way 
social actors cognitively frame and understand the material world they experience. It sees social 
facts as only “facts” by human agreement, and these collective understandings then informing 
and guiding how individuals use their material abilities and power. All constructivists agree that 
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what is most important is not just to explain the ways that structures contribute to individual 
identity and interests, but also vital is understanding how these structures are socially constructed 
in the first place (Adler, 1997; Wendt, 1992). 
Based on a pragmatist philosophy of science, constructivism places interpretation as 
equally important as traditional natural sciences methods of investigation that result in either 
deductive proof or inductive generalization. Interpretation thus becomes intrinsic to explanations 
about the social construction of reality, providing better explanations of social reality. The roles 
of choice, deliberation and judgment become equally paramount. Historical methodology focuses 
on the historical processes that create specific social contexts. No social realities are natural, 
being rooted in specific historical political and social processes that are best uncovered through 
narrative causality. Narrative causality traces the historical evolution of subjective and 
intersubjective social meanings to explain how they brought about a given social context. For 
constructivists, this historical analysis combined with an interpretive approach that allows 
subjective meanings to become objectified as part of an intersubjective context, allows for a 
holistic portrayal of causality and historicity in our contemporary context (Pouliot, 2007). 
Thus, we can only study the appearance of a thing in the physical world, rather than the 
thing itself, but because of our own humanity, we are in a position to know about human 
consciousness and its variegated roles and influences in individuals and in society. As a method, 
the purpose of interpretivist constructionism then is not to search for causal explanations, but to 
find a deeper and more holistic understanding (Walliman, 2006). Language is full of shared 
meanings and symbols, and the interactions of humans through speech define individuals as the 
source of ideas and opinions, but also as reflections of the perceptions of others (Walliman, 
2006; Alcoff, 2006). Humans are reflective, which makes cause-and-effect relationships complex 
and difficult to determine, and incredibly subjective. It is impossible for a researcher to take a 
completely detached view of society, so investigation is necessarily dependent on interpretation, 
and a less deterministic approach can provide useful understanding, without the need for the kind 
of universal or uniformly verifiable facts the natural sciences and rational scientific method aims 
to produce. 
There are many different social science research methods, which fill different needs and 
situations, but case studies are best when one needs to understand complex social phenomena. 
Case studies are empirical inquiries that “investigate a contemporary phenomenon in depth and 
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within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009). Often the most interesting and most powerfully relevant 
phenomena in politics and planning are found in the nuanced minutiae of power dynamics that 
cannot be distilled into formulaic “standard” cases. 
In general, case studies are best when explanatory questions are posed, as they allow 
operational links to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence, which would 
be better suited to experiments, surveys or histories. Case studies are most often used when “a 
how or why question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the 
investigator has little or no control” (Yin, 2009). Instrumental case studies are used when the 
intent is to understand a specific issue or problem (here: the uneven racial outcomes of state-
initiated forced residential displacement) (Stake, 1995).  
The case study method uses similar techniques to those used in a history, but adds 
sources of evidence not usually included: direct observation of the events being studied and the 
interviews of people involved in the events. Experiments in the rationalist tradition 
decontextualize phenomena from their contexts, attempting to isolate variables to learn how they 
respond in a ‘controlled’ environment; histories do deal with phenomenon and context but focus 
on non-contemporary events, and surveys often try to deal with phenomenon and context, but are 
limited in their ability to explain context. These methods overlap certainly, but the case study is 
better suited to the tri-part constructivist methodology laid out above, providing source material 
for inductive reasoning, interpretation and historical context into a holistic aggregate. This 
approach allows for better identification of the sum and implications of the structural constraints 
on actors and their motivations in the political and social spheres. This distinction from 
extractive research methods is particularly important to understand in the context of planning 
interventions and outcomes, whose main concern involves the creation of practical, immediate 
and intermediate, solutions to “wicked problems” (Rittel & Webber, 1973).  
The contextual conditions of the creation and implementation of the Bristol Park 
Neighborhood Plan (e.g. the constrained fiscal policy space of state agents) are vitally important 
to understanding not only the causal links and pressures that led to observed outcomes, but that 
context helps answer the question of why we continue to observe uneven racial outcomes from 
state-initiated forced residential displacement. This requires historical and contemporary 
triangulation to contextualize observed results with their structural conditions.  
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Unlike other research methods, there are no “standard” case study research designs. In 
this study, the process of collecting, analyzing and interpreting data was guided by the following 
propositions:  
(1) The City of Champaign’s Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan will result in racially 
significant spatial outcomes similar to those documented from Old Urban Renewal 
(2) We need better tools and a more holistic approach to identify the causal relationships 
between the plan’s stated intentions and observed material outcomes 
(3) Fiscal Policy Space can help identify these causal relationships and better guide future 
interventions 
The specific “case” evaluated here is the City of Champaign’s design and implementation 
of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan (BPNP), which to date has been a roughly 7-year process 
(2007-2014), but currently remains ongoing. This case was chosen as a current and ongoing 
paradigmatic example of contemporary urban investment and development processes occurring 
in U.S. cities in our contemporary, devolved, neoliberal socio-political context. While this is the 
specific time frame of the Bristol Place neighborhood redevelopment plan, I also trace local 
long-term historic narrative themes of affordable and public housing provision, local urban 
renewal, and their effects on the Champaign-Urbana community from 1949-1973, and situate 
that context with a more recent historical portrayal of neighborhood change dynamics and 
governance ethos from 1990-2014, as the City of Champaign’s fiscal and political priorities 
shifted in the wake of Neighborhood Wellness initiatives initiated at the federal level by HOME 
funding, but which also had localized effects, seen through the creation and development of the 
Neighborhood Services Department within the local city government, for example. 
 
3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
In performing the research, I reviewed government documents, newspaper and other 
news-related archives, local community research reports and conducted semi-structured 
interviews with government officials, local affordable housing advocates, financial managers, 
and community members. 
 
3.2.1. Government documents (1989 – 2014): Planning, Finance, Policing, Code Compliance 
 The government documents I assessed were available online at either the City of 
Champaign’s document portal for official City Council Study Sessions and Council Bills, or 
through other portions of the City of Champaign’s website that list planning and budget-related 
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finance documents from 1990-2014. These often included as attachments, private consultants’ 
reports and local housing and market studies, which I also evaluated. I spent more time 
exhaustively evaluating documents from the most recent time period bounding my case study, 
from 2007-2014, and used older documents to provide historical and cultural community context 
as needed.  
 I analyzed City of Champaign Annual Police Reports generated by filing Freedom of 
Information Act requests dating back to 1994, including Part I crime incidents by beat from 
1995-2014, traffic stop outcomes for FY2006-2007 and FY 2009, citizen complaints and 
allegation outcomes from 1989-2013. 
 I collected complaint-based code violation citations by location and length of time to 
resolution for FY2007-FY2014, also generated by filing Freedom of Information Act requests.  
 
3.2.2. Historicity – Newspaper Archives (1949 – 1973) 
 The historical newspaper archives referenced in this study are from: (1) the Champaign 
County Historical Archives at the Urbana Free Library which contains searchable issues from the 
Champaign-Urbana Courier from 1877-1978 (the name changed 8 times during this time period 
and ceased publication in 1978 under the title ‘Morning Courier’), and searchable issues from the 
Champaign News-Gazette from 1919-current on microfilm; and (2) the Illinois Digital 
Newspaper Collections at the University of Illinois which contains issues from the Daily Illini 
from 1874-1975. Searched issues from all three sources were limited by date to 1949-1973, 
concurrent with the timeline of national Old Urban Renewal. The following search terms were 
used to identify historical public newspaper documentation of apartheid housing processes in 
Champaign-Urbana: “North End,” “Urban Renewal,” “Slum,” “Shack,” “Blight,” “Community 
Development,” “Housing,” “Zoning.” While there were other local newspapers printed in the 
Champaign-Urbana area at the time (Illinois Times (1949-1965), Urbana High School Echo 
(1915-1993), Champaign-Urbana Underground Press (1969-1982)), this study focuses on the 
City of Champaign and its housing and recent urban development history. Historically and 
currently, the Champaign News-Gazette focuses on and is published in the historically and 
contemporary more conservative ethos of the City of Champaign, the Daily Illini is an 
independent University of Illinois student publication, and the Champaign-Urbana Courier was a 
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newspaper that is well-known locally as the voice of Urbana residents, historically a publication 
with a more liberal political ethos.  
In choosing these three newspapers, I am not claiming to have performed an exhaustive 
historiography of apartheid housing patterns in the Champaign-Urbana area from 1949-1973, I 
rather used a less rigorous methodological approach to provide insight into the local historical 
context of the larger focus of my instrumental case study, in terms of local social, cultural, 
planning and governance histories. As a primary source, historic newspapers provide windows 
into our past, and offer a rich documentation of the development, course and history of local 
industry, politics, and local cultural and social community life and its significance relative to 
larger national and global trends.  
Analysis of these records was done with the aim of identifying in this local context, what 
nationally-recognized Old Urban Renewal themes were evident in local experiences and 
conversations going on at the time. Thus, the focus was on identifying segregated housing, 
“slum” or “blight” clearance, redevelopment, proximity to the CBD (here, the downtown 
Champaign business district), minority containment via displacement, poverty alleviation, and 
any stated financial, social and political costs associated with either containment or displacement 
during this time period.  
 
3.2.3. Semi-Structured Interviews  
 I conducted 25 semi-structured interviews, 14 with non-residents identified through my 
own snowball sampling method, and 11 with residents over the age of 18 as part of Dr. Andrew 
Greenlee’s ongoing research project. The residents were identified as those living in the area 
defined by the Bristol Place Master Plan Draft for Review dated April 15, 2014. Interviews 
across both groups ranged from 30 minutes to almost 2 hours in length (average was 66 minutes 
long): the resident interviews averaged 46 minutes long, and the recorded non-resident 
interviews averaged around 86 minutes each.  
The 14 non-resident interviews were identified through a snowball sampling technique. I 
used a snowball sampling technique in order to develop a theory throughout the research process, 
and to look for participants who could provide the appropriate and relevant missing data for the 
elements of the theory as different pieces came together. Guided by an initial understanding 
informed by publicly available planning documents and information gathered from interviews 
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with residents living in the redevelopment area in 2014, I identified the 14 non-resident 
interviewees by iteratively asking, “What stakeholder group should I turn to next to gather 
information I need to understand what is happening or has happened, and why?” What often 
occurs in such qualitative research, and what was also the case in my case study, was a clear shift 
over the course of the data collection period from theory development to testing out ideas as 
more explanatory information was gathered. I attempted to balance race and gender with mixed 
results, and tried to focus generally on interviewees with longer community tenures because of 
the historical trajectory of my assessment, relying heavily on referrals from prior interviews to 
select interview subjects strategically. Of my 14 interviews, 4 were with “top tier management” 
professionals, 6 were with “middle management” professionals, and 4 were with other 
community stakeholders with experience in local housing issues; 9 interviewees (64%) were 
male and 5 (36%) female; and 11 interviewees (79%) were white and 3 (21%) were African-
American. 
The questions I asked this set of stakeholders were based off of a different set of semi-
structured interview questions than those used with the residents as part of Dr. Greenlee’s 
research, and focused on interviewees’ personal history in the Champaign-Urbana area, the 
nature of their involvement with the Bristol Place Redevelopment initiative, and their opinions 
and thoughts about their own experiences with its planning process. Additionally, in order to 
guide the snowball sampling method, each interviewee was asked to identify from their 
perspective the key decision-makers, proponents and opponents of the BPNP over the length of 
their involvement or knowledge of the project. I used detailed field notes from each interview 
when interviewees did not consent to being audio recorded, transcribed those notes after the 
interview and sent them back to each interviewee via email to verify accuracy of facts recorded 
(see sample consent form in Appendix B.1).  
The 11 resident interviews I performed as part of Dr. Greenlee’s research, only a small 
fraction of which are referenced here, were based off of a set of semi-structured interview 
questions approved by the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) Institutional 
Review Board asking about housing status and history, employment status and history, and 
personal questions ranging from basic family dynamics to social network and neighborhood 
perception. All interviewees were also asked what their strongest personal reactions were to their 
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experience with the BPNP planning and relocation process (to date) and perceptions of the stated 
goals of the plan.  
This interview research in its entirety was conducted in accordance with informed 
consent guidelines: a detailed research summary sheet written in language no higher than an 8th 
grade reading level was provided in advance of conducting interviews, a phone screening 
occurred before each interview was conducted, and before consent forms were signed, I assessed 
the decision-making capacity of all participants to ensure with specific questions that they fully 
understood the participation risks and plans for results dissemination clearly. Each interviewee 
was given the option for fully confidential participation or for the researchers to be able to share 
de-identified text transcriptions of portions of interview audio, and/or their name and relevant 
background information (see sample consent form in Appendix B.2). All resident interviews 
were audio-recorded, interviewees filled out a basic demographic survey before the interview, 
and all resident participants received a $20 Visa gift card as remuneration for their participation 
in the research. All participant data post-interview was assigned a unique identification number, 
stored securely and separately from the transcription, and all signed consent forms and 
confidential data was stored in accordance with UIUC electronic data security procedures.  
 
3.2.4. Semi-Structured Interview Analysis 
My approach to interview data analysis is grounded in the interpretive, inductive, 
constructivist approach outlined above. I attempted to identify the relationships between social 
behavior and individual cognition through understanding my interviewees’ mental models as 
represented by their question responses through open coding those responses by theme. In 
attempting to understand the constrained and plausible fiscal policy space of the City of 
Champaign’s Planning, Finance, and Neighborhood Services staff, as well as its elected officials 
on City Council during 2014, I relied on statements by all interviewees to define the parameters 
of what each interviewee understood to be the most and least important components of this plan 
and planning process. After assembling these themes, I re-engaged with the direct text of 
interviewee’s responses to evaluate the strength of theme represented by the strength and 
frequency of concepts’ presentation. Only those themes whose strength either by position of 
interviewee in structural hierarchy or by frequency among other respondents were analyzed in 
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this case study. These themes show up as headers that guide the planning story relayed in 
Chapters 5-7.  
The mental models of individuals serve as internal representations of their perceived 
world, and language is the key to mediating and developing them (Vygotsky 1962, 1978; Luria 
1978, 1981; Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Latour & Woolgar, 1979). Concurrent with Carley & Palmquist 
(1992), I understand mental models to be (1) internal representations, (2) language being the key 
to understanding and represent mental models, (3) mental models are networks of concepts, (4) 
individual meaning of a concept is embedded in its relationship to other concepts in the 
individual’s mental model, and (5) the social meaning of a concept is found in the intersection of 
multiple individuals’ mental models. We can thus use language as a window through which to 
view the individual’s mind and by studying the social use of language we can build 
representations of the mental models that inform social action (Stryker, 1980). 
 These claims rest on three assumptions: (1) that interview text can be modeled using 
concepts (“open” codes); (2) that interview text is a sample of what is individually known and 
thus the contents of an individual’s cognitive structure; and (3) that the symbolic structure 
extracted from the interview text is a sample of the full symbolic representation of the 
individual’s cognitive structure. Evaluating the completeness of the interview samples collected 
here would involve evaluating the original mode of communication, the length of the text, and 
the method of extraction, which is well beyond the scope of this paper.  
 The conceptual content analysis I used in evaluating my interview data relied primarily 
on exploratory open coding, which examines the content of written texts and identifies the 
presence and frequency of certain concepts or words (Palmquist, 1990). Primarily focusing on 
the frequency of words or phrases and not relationships between them, conceptual content 
analysis can “tell us about a text’s fundamental building blocks but not the structure in which 
those blocks are arranged” (Carley & Palmquist, 1992). 
I began with an exploratory “open” coding process, proceeding line-by-line, to ensure 
that analysis reflected what the data were saying, rather than my preconceptions as a researcher 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2007). Resident audio interview transcripts and field notes were “open” 
coded with a combination of “in vivo” coding and manifest themes to form an axial coding 
taxonomy based on the results of this first stage of the coding process. “In-vivo” coding uses 
direct quotes or explicit terms taken from the interview transcripts, and I use manifest themes 
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here to refer to the types of salient concepts addressed in interview dialogue that were 
summarized or condensed to capture their essence (Saldana, 2009). For example, one of the 
primary “in vivo” codes that came out of my analysis was “Champaign is a well-oiled machine,” 
and depending on which type of interviewee elaborated on their beliefs about Champaign’s 
governance, manifest themes that related to this in-vivo code were “shadow state politicking” 
and “showcase neighborhood redevelopment.” 
My exploratory coding process focused on identifying intentions, beliefs, motives, rules 
and values, while keeping the following questions in mind from Saldana (2009), to help 
understand the plausible fiscal policy space of Champaign’s decision-makers:  
• What are people doing? What are they trying to accomplish? 
• How, exactly, do they do this? What specific means and/or strategies do they use? 
• How do members talk about, characterize, and understand what is going on? 
• What assumptions are they making? 
• What do I see going on here? What did I learn from these notes? 
• Why did I include them?  
 In identifying manifest themes, I followed Lofland et al (2006) to identify major units of 
social organization referenced that fell into: 
1. Encounters (a temporary interaction between two or more individuals such as sales 
transactions, panhandling, etc.); 
2. Roles (student, mother, customer, etc.) and social types (bully, tight-ass, geek, etc.); 
3. Social and personal relationships (husband and wife, party-goers, etc.); 
4. Settlements and habitats (villages, neighborhoods, etc.); and 
5. Subcultures and lifestyles (the homeless, skinheads, gay leather bears, etc.) 
6. Cognitive aspects or meanings (e.g., ideologies, rules, self-concepts, identities); 
7. Emotional aspects or feelings (e.g., sympathy in health care, road rage, workplace 
satisfaction); 
8. Hierarchical aspects or inequalities (e.g., racial inequality, battered women, high school 
cliques) 
 Each of these categories of codes inter-related with information gathered from 
government documents and data requested by FOIA request, and helped to illustrate the 
decision-making space of different stakeholders in the planning story laid out in Chapters 5-6. 
These categories of storytelling in turn helped me to construct the plausible fiscal policy space 
constraints experienced by decision-makers. 
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CHAPTER 4 
OLD URBAN RENEWAL IN CHAMPAIGN, ILLINOIS 
 
4.1 Early Housing Practices in CU: The creation of the segregated “North End” 
Patterns and practices of housing discrimination have generated and often sustained 
detrimental race relations in all other areas of community living, and the currently branded 
“micro urban” twin city communities of Champaign and Urbana, Illinois are no exception. The 
widespread trajectory of housing issues in the Champaign-Urbana (CU) area dovetails with the 
evolution of widely documented trends elsewhere nationally, full of racially restrictive 
covenants, segregated separate and unequal housing stock and neighborhood access, and 
different forms of institutional and local gatekeeping. The context of housing in the City of 
Champaign needs to be situated with two major facts about the area: (1) the City of Urbana and 
the City of Champaign are twin cities that border one another to form the contemporary U.S. 
Census-designated metropolitan area “Champaign-Urbana”; and (2) the flagship campus of 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign spans the boundaries of both cities. It is impossible 
to separate the influence of the university on the relative growth and development of both 
incorporated municipalities since its founding in 1867. The policies of both local and university 
housing systems affected local housing history, and together set the tone for community race 
relations in all other areas of living. 
Housing discrimination in the form of residential segregation was virtually 100% 
complete in CU until the 1960s. Through the 1940s, and extending into the 1960s all blacks were 
required by policy or practice by both town and gown to live in the outskirts of town in a “Black 
Belt” area that became designated the “North End” and the “Negro District” by whites (Frank, 
1990), and the “East End” by black residents (Plaut, 2010). Between 1940 and 1968 the African-
American population of Champaign more than quadrupled in size from approximately 1,700 to 
8,000 (LWV, 1968). As the African-American population in Champaign increased, the area now 
known as the “North End” emerged as a wholly “black neighborhood,” shaped by discriminatory 
housing practices that forced African-Americans into a geographically bounded space. 
 Unlike in the Jim Crow south during the same time, northern whites often attempted to 
conceal their racist ideas and actions by shifting the impetus for discriminatory philosophy onto 
institutions, hierarchies, and the rules and procedures laid out by vague, amorphous “others” in 
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ways that facilitated local actors concealing their own often deep-seated personal racism. 
Because in the North race laws and policy mandated equality, the spirit and letter of the law were 
contravened by practices and customs rather than legal statute, and nowhere is that more easily 
and widely documented than in housing access and conditions. Illinois had statutes between 1865 
and 1963, for example, which charged its citizens to provide for the “full and equal enjoyment of 
the accommodations” for all its people and which prohibited “discrimination and intimidation on 
account of race or color in employment under contracts for public buildings or public works.”9 In 
1937 the state of Illinois also passed a statute which mandated that “no office of the State of 
Illinois, ... or of any State University ... shall deny or refuse to any person, on account of race, 
color or religion, the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or 
privileges of his office or services or of any property under his care” (Frank, 1990).10  
Sociologists Charles S. Johnson and Herman H. Long studied the characteristics and 
effects of housing segregation and containment in Northern cities, and in their 1947 findings 
documented the circular reasoning laden with stereotypical thinking which evolved into creating 
and sustaining a self-fulfilling prophecy of the image of black inferiority. Johnson and Long 
reasoned: “for the mass of white citizens, if they give the matter any thought at all, the unsightly 
appearance of the overcrowded Negro areas is sufficient evidence of carelessness, neglect and a 
disregard for the upkeep of property; and these are cited as racial traits” (Long & Johnson, 1947). 
Johnson and Long further argued that these inferior “traits” of the designated section of town 
then “become the reason for public insistence that Negroes continue to live in it.” This 
description provides the relevant socio-historical lens to understand the history of housing 
discrimination in CU. 
During the period leading up to Old Urban Renewal in East Central Illinois, multiple 
groups recognized the poor housing conditions in the Champaign-Urbana area. The Chairman of 
the City Planning and Landscape Architecture Department at the University of Illinois spoke on 
this topic in the late 1930s, and the Champaign-Urbana Planning Commission (now the Regional 
Planning Commission of Champaign County (RPC)) in 1938 evaluated the local housing stock 
and published a study on “Sub-Standard Housing of Champaign-Urbana” (Patton, 1968). Led by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Illinois Revised Statutes. 1885, complied and ed. By Harvey B. Hurd (Chicago: Chicago Legal News Co., 
1885), 388; Laws of Illinois. Sixtieth General Assembly. 1937, printed by the authority of the state of Illinois, 1937, 
484-85; Revised Statutes of the State of JIlinois. 1933, Smith-Hurd (Chicago: Burdette-Smith Co., 1933),682-683. 
10 Laws of Illinois. Sixtieth General Assembly 1937, 480 (printed by the authority of the state of 
Illinois, 1937). 
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Professor Karl Lohmann, the evaluation team noted the obsolescence of dilapidation of hundreds 
of houses, many of which were still occupied, and the inadequacy of building codes and city 
ordinances to enforce “a minimum standard of decency, safety and sanitation” (LWV, 1951). In 
1941 the Housing Authority of Champaign County (HACC) ordered a study of housing 
conditions for low-income families. Of 3,722 dwellings inspected, 43% were declared 
substandard. Substandard designations involved one of the following observed conditions: (1) 
when it lacked sanitary facilities (1,349 were in this category); (2) when in need of major repair 
(744); (3) when in a condition so hazardous to health and safety as to be considered unfit for 
habitation (210). As a result of this report, land was acquired by the HACC to construct 140 units 
of public housing, but there were many project delays and before the project could be started, 
funds were diverted to war purposes (LWV, 1951).  
These initial studies and additional postwar surveys discussed below identified the 
greatest concentration of substandard housing and associated infrastructure and health problems 
as being centered around the Illinois Central Railroad tracks north and slightly east of the City of 
Champaign’s downtown area. The bulk of the substandard housing cited was within the City of 
Champaign, but conditions extended further eastward into Urbana as well. A long-time local 
black activist Terry Townsend identified the power dynamics evident in something as basic as 
the nomenclature behind the segregated spatial area containing the majority of African-American 
residents in Champaign-Urbana north of University Avenue (the local Black Belt): whites calling 
it the “North End,” and blacks calling it the “East End,” referring to the Northeast end of 
Champaign. Significantly, this area has since widely become known in CU as the North End. 
 
4.2 The Role of UIUC in creating and sustaining segregated early CU housing markets 
The founding of UIUC in 1867 was fraught with real estate speculation parallel to 
anticipated growth across the twin cities and the 1862 passage of Lincoln’s Morrill Land Grant 
Act. CU speculators understood that:  
…a college would bring stores to adjoining locations. Rooming houses and boarding 
houses would be needed. Teachers would rather live near the school; houses would be 
needed for them. In a few years such a school would have its own little community. 
Therefore, money was to be made in real estate rather than in education (Sifferd, 1967).  
 
The University of Illinois’ housing policy from 1880, when its only dormitory was destroyed in a 
wind storm, until the World War I era when Busey Hall was built in 1918 was that the university 
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would not own any student housing, instead “depending almost entirely on the Champaign-
Urbana community to provide the food and shelter its students required” (Zammuto, 2010a). In 
1911, of the 695 women in attendance at UIUC, 350 were in private rooming houses, and one 
third did not board where they roomed (Sifferd, 1967). Town residents very early on created an 
implicit symbiotic dependence between “town and gown” from the earliest origins of student 
housing. And “the recurrent theme [in university housing provision] … extended priority to 
white males first, white females second, and blacks, if considered at all, last” (Frank, 1990). By 
the 1940s, UIUC owned three dormitories which housed only 841 (7%) of its 12,358 and 
increasing enrollment numbers (Zammuto, 2010b). The practice of residential segregation was so 
entirely accepted by the majority of University affiliates that in virtually all official housing 
documents dated prior to 1945, the housing needs of black students were never even mentioned. 
African-American UIUC students fended for themselves with the help of other local African-
American residents (Frank, 1990). 
During WWII, housing conditions across CU grew worse rather than better. New 
building virtually stopped and many materials for remodeling were not available. The expansion 
of Chanute Field, an Air Force training camp in nearby Rantoul (a suspected sundown town 16 
miles northeast of CU (Loewen, 2005)) and the migration from the south of workers in the 
expanded Illinois Central Railroad Yards and other industries, and finally the post-war influx of 
families of student veterans increased CU population from 49,000 in 1940 to 62,000 in 1950 
(37% over the decade). Lack of supply of building materials during this time meant 
overcrowding, use of basements and attics, conversions of sheds, garages, and chicken coops, 
and the erection of many tar-paper shanties. Trailer camps sprang up, and poorly-built visiting 
camps were used as permanent dwellings at high rents. Sanitary conditions were often 
“deplorable” (LWV, 1951).  
The end of the war exacerbated community housing provision problems even more, as 
returning veterans who were entitled by the GI Bill to receive a government-funded college 
education flooded into CU, making up part of what would be a very profitable blessing to the 
community’s housing industry, as UIUC housing historian Charles Sifferd put it, “enrollment in 
the University was contingent on whether or not one could find housing” (Sifferd, 1967). 
Because private housing was preferable to the makeshift barracks-style quarters in the Ice Rink, 
the West Hall of Memorial Stadium, and the Armory on campus, the time was perfect for profit-
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hungry exploitation of a captive market. Overall, conditions were over-crowded, dilapidated, 
rents were high, and discrimination against women, and most severely, blacks, was rampant. 
In fact, the actions of Illinois administrators lagged behind other Big Ten universities as 
well as some factions on campus. In 1959, the Urbana chapter of the American Association of 
University Professors issued an official statement urging the administration to “move with all 
deliberate speed to eradicate the evil of discrimination from the University community” (AAUP 
statement, 1959). In 1961, Cornell, Wisconsin, Iowa, Michigan State, and Michigan had all 
banned racial discrimination in housing. The University of Illinois though, still supported racial 
segregation. By February 1965, a document entitled “Report Concerning University Policies 
Relating to Racial Discrimination in Private Student Housing,” was issued by the Housing 
Review Committee which stated that there were still  
…about 52 percent of spaces in uncertified homes and 80 percent of the apartments that 
were offered to students through the Housing Division listing service before March 1965 
[we]re not listed because of the operator's failure to sign the pledge of nondiscrimination 
(Frank, 1990). 
 
The University of Illinois is deeply embedded in CU community norms and vice versa, 
especially in housing, and along with many of those who held power in this area at the time, the 
“town and gown” relationships built along real estate speculation and market advantage together 
promoted and reinforced racial segregation in housing, even when it explicitly broke Illinois law. 
It is worth emphasizing that the speculative real estate market has been active in the CU area 
since the founding of the University, and particularly the local rental market is still deeply 
intertwined with housing provision and policy at UIUC and in CU more broadly today. 
 
4.3 Housing Conditions in the East End 1930-1959: Villainous 
In 1949, “a group of Negro women” from the League of Women Voters of Champaign 
County’s Social Welfare Committee performed a “Shack Study” investigating the housing of 
Negroes in CU.11 A random sample of 85 shacks was performed, shacks inhabited by 109 
families and 389 people, including 166 children. The study determined that the neighborhood 
“contained both negro and white families but was predominantly Negro.” The study began with 
this description: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The area studied roughly corresponds to the early North End: bounded on the south by Washington, north by 
Bradley, east by Goodwin, and west by the IL Central RR tracks. 
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The area is not beautiful. Streets are unpaved and sidewalks at a premium. The mean 
little shacks are strangely haphazard and ugly, the yards teeming with litter, stagnant 
pools of water are underfoot, the privies, doorless, send out their stench, and everywhere 
mud lies thick (LWV, 1949). 
 
Out of a random sample of 85 “shacks” less than a third, or only 27, had inside faucets. In 
19 shacks water had to be carried from next door, and in one case, had to be carried from a faucet 
a block away. Only 18 dwellings had inside toilets. In these the pipes frequently froze during the 
winter. Outdoor privies, often shared with neighbors, were used by the occupants of more than 
half of these shacks and sometimes required an extra rental of four or five dollars a month. Nine 
shacks had no toilet facilities whatsoever, inside or out, not even a neighbor’s privy (LWV, 
1951). When asked how waste disposal was managed in one of the shacks without toilet 
facilities, one of the occupants replied, “we just wait until dark and go out in the yard” (LWV, 
1949). The rooms were about half the size of ordinary rooms, many with six- or seven-foot 
ceilings. The study disclosed that 62 percent of the people were living in overcrowded 
conditions, according to the American Public Health Association standard of one and one-half 
persons per room. 45 percent were living two or more to a room, and 20 percent were living 
three or more to a room (LWV, 1949).   
The rushed and poor construction of dwellings as a result of post-war materials scarcity 
combined with the area wide population increases referenced above, created deplorable living 
conditions for the poorest and most marginalized residents in a still segregated community. For 
many of the people described in the Shack Study, their only shelter options were the types of 
makeshift quarters described. A single example: a converted chicken house consisted of 2 rooms 
occupied by 2 people, where the kitchen was 7’4” by 9’6” by 6’9” and the ceilings were 6’ high. 
The total number of cubic feet in the two rooms was 680, or 340 per person. The American 
Public Health Association in its Committee on Hygiene of Housing had set 500 cubic feet as an 
absolute minimum amount of space per person where rooms are used for both sleeping and 
eating (APHA, 1941). FHA standards were considerably higher at the time, and the mortgage 
lending practice in CU at the time was not to grant home mortgage loans where the number of 
cubic feet per person fell below 720. The average room in these shacks was half the size of the 
smallest room in a house of standard construction (LWV, 1951). 
The rapidity of construction of the majority of the North End shacks also did not take 
ventilation or insulation into account, and this meant that heating costs were excessive, 
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particularly in winter, when in most cases the cost of fuel ended up being higher than the cost of 
rent. Additionally, coal had to be bought in small quantities (which meant at a greater cost), due 
to lack of storage space. Many families burned two tons of coal a month in winter, at an average 
cost of $12.50 per ton. Of the 85 shacks, 80 were heated by coal stoves, two by coal furnaces, 
two by kerosene stoves, and one by a gas heater. The LWV wrote:  
…the area offers a serious fire hazard. In the tiny, cramped rooms crowded with 
necessary possessions, stoves had to be close to tinder walls, and there was almost no 
chance to control a sudden flame if it should spurt up, before the entire room would be 
ablaze. A fire in July 1949 destroyed a shack in a few minutes and took the lives of the 
young occupants. Colonies of shacks, dangerously close to one another, increase fire 
hazard, and fires are frequent (LWV, 1949).  
 
Sometimes shack colonies, clusters of three to five shacks found on one lot, created further 
problems of overcrowding, and serious fire hazards were found everywhere (see shack images in 
Appendix C.1). 
Unpaved streets and lack of sewage disposal and garbage collection created a scene that 
was not only dreary but definitely hazardous to residents’ health. Unpaved streets became 
muddy, and the justification given to the LWV Social Welfare Committee members from private 
garbage collectors for not collecting garbage in the North End was that the muddy conditions 
were so bad they could not take their heavy trucks over the unpaved streets (LWV, 1949). The 
Committee’s report also stated that city ordinances that forbade such neglect were not enforced 
in the North End neighborhood. As for privies, both Urbana and Champaign had regulations for 
their construction and maintenance, but neither had inspection requirements ensuring 
compliance. Axiomatically, the Public Health Department acknowledged the high degree of 
communicable diseases in the area as a result of such conditions, yet the Public Health 
Department, despite having “the authority to condemn dwellings, consider[ed] it impossible to 
exercise this authority when there [wa]s no place for people to move” (LWV, 1968). At the time, 
such conditions were often considered sufficient “proof” in support of the circular logic and self-
fulfilling prophecy held by most whites at the time that African Americans were “dirty, 
neglectful, and have little dignity” (Frank, 1990). It is highly likely that this kind of logic was 
one of the driving forces in perpetuating racial segregation and containment in CU’s housing 
history.	  
For the conditions described above, the median rent paid per shack was $22.50 per month 
(the range was $5.00 to $42.00 per month), exclusive of utilities, which were never included in 
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the rent. Particularly in terms of the conditions of shelter, most agree that the rents were 
excessive. A study of 200 low-income renting families showed that 28.5% were paying one third 
or more of their incomes for rent, and more than ten percent were paying half or more. Yet 70% 
of these families had to provide heat in addition, at an average estimated additional cost of $19 
per month for fuel in winter, a cost heightened by the flimsy construction that made the houses 
almost impossible to keep warm. The social workers who provided data for this study noted 
tensions in families living under makeshift conditions, as well as lowered physical stamina and 
spread of disease (LWV, 1949). 
 
4.4 Gatekeeping and Racially Restrictive Covenants in Champaign-Urbana 
With the variety of institutions and individuals, along with the variety of methods that 
they used, Champaign-Urbana’s early dual housing markets are consistent with the findings of 
Dorothy K. Newman (1978) who writes about black Americans’ experience and treatment within 
white institutions: “from the first visit to the realtor, up through various institutions locally, and 
even shaping the many layers of governmental policy which underwrites so much of the housing 
financially, separation is virtually ensured” (Newman et al, 1978). Historians and sociologists 
have studied the “gatekeeping” roles of various community actors in creating and maintaining 
segregated housing markets in the United States at length: research on the causes of residential 
segregation has focused on the “institutional web” created by redlining, racial steering, and 
market forces (Farley, 1987; Foley, 1973; Kain, 1968; Kain & Quigley, 1975; Myrdal, 1944; 
Feagin & Feagin, 1978); micro-level analyses of discrimination documented by studies of real 
estate steering (Wienk et al, 1979). On a neighborhood level, segregation has been 
conceptualized as ordered segmentation (Suttles, 1968) and the defended neighborhood (Suttles, 
1972); and in actual practice, attempts to maintain separation among people of different ethnic 
and racial groups have taken the form of restrictive covenants or zones (Krase, 1982), acts of 
violence (Rieder 1985), and the use of local social networks (DeSena, 1990, 1994).  
In most parts of the country gatekeepers are typically identified as real estate agents, 
lending institution agents, and property owners and managers. The history of CU supports this, 
and local evidence in the form of oral histories, newspaper editorials, and other period reports 
overwhelmingly support the assertion that the dual housing market did not exist by chance, as 
result of variation in income level, or from the personal preference of local African-American 
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residents. Instead, whites, whether acting as individuals or as members of institutions, 
deliberately confined black residents to the tiny parcel of space in the North End (see Frank, 
1990 for detailed primary source research supporting this claim).  
Racially restrictive covenants were the primary and most deplorable mechanism used to 
segregate African-Americans because of their implicit legal justification couched in traditional 
American property-rights-based individualism. Between 1941 and 1950 in Champaign County, 
18 racially restrictive covenants were written into new subdivision deeds. The total number of 
parcels affected was 774 (65 in Rantoul, 50 near Savoy and 587 in CU) (Schwarzlose, 1965). 
Not coincidentally, this period was also when the CU area experienced the largest increase in 
African-American residents. All of the covenants were worded exactly the same, in the highest 
restrictive legal terms possible for similar statutes at the time: “no part thereof will be sold or 
leased, either in whole or in part, to or permitted to be occupied as owner, or tenant by any 
person or persons not of the Caucasian race” (Frank, 1990). By contrast, in Chicago for example, 
only 1.4% applied to all races except Caucasian, and 85% applied to “all persons with 1/8 part or 
more Negro blood.” Additionally, only 0.5% of all race covenants in Chicago provided an 
indefinite duration, most containing language like “until abrogated by written agreement of 
owners of 75 percent of frontage” (Long & Johnson, 1947).  
As mechanisms of segregation and containment, it is hard to find covenants more direct 
than these. When considered in the light of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
a direct contradiction results: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” In addition to federal constitutional law, the State 
of Illinois had an 1885 law that forbade discrimination in public accommodations:  
All Persons Entitled to the Full and Equal Enjoyment of the Accommodations at Inns, Etc.: Be 
it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois represented in the General Assembly: That all 
persons within the jurisdiction of said state shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of 
the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, restaurants, eating houses, 
barber shops, public conveyances on land or water, theatres and all other places of public 
accommodations and amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by 
law, and applicable alike to all citizens (Criminal Code, Illinois Revised Statutes. 1885, 338).  
 
In addition to the 1937 amendment, the Illinois General Assembly passed another Civil 
Rights statute. Section I of this Act states: 
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No officer or employee of the State of Illinois, or of any political subdivision thereof, or of any 
county, or of any Park District, or of any Forest Preserve District, or of any State University of 
subdivision thereof, or of any State Normal School or of any subdivision thereof, or of any 
municipal corporation in the State of Illinois, shall deny or refuse to any person, on account of 
race, color or religion, the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, 
facilities or privileges of his office or services or of any property under his care (Laws of 
Illinois Sixtieth General Assembly, 1937). 
 
This would seem to legally prohibit the signing of racially restrictive property deeds by all 
“officers and employees of the State of Illinois,” but in 1944, Illinois legislators voted against 
two bills that would have specifically provided for the legal enforcement of the prohibition of 
race covenants. And unfortunately, it was not until 1948 that the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down the race covenant as unconstitutional and legally unenforceable in the NAACP-initiated 
case Shelley vs. Kraemer in St. Louis, Missouri. Chief Justice Vinson delivered that opinion, 
which stated: 
The States have made available to such individuals [those “private individuals (who) impose 
such discriminations as they see fit”] the full coercive power of government to deny to 
petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises 
which petitioners are willing and financially able to acquire and which the grantors are 
willing to sell ... The historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment became a part of 
the Constitution should not be forgotten. Whatever else the framers sought to achieve, it is 
clear that the matter of primary concern was the establishment of equality in the enjoyment of 
basic civil and political rights and the preservation of those rights from discriminatory action 
on the part of the States based on considerations of race or color (Bardolph, 1970). 
 
Despite these state-level legislative directives, between 1948 and 1950 there were more 
racially restrictive covenants recorded in Champaign County, the collective tracts of which were 
owned by 17 individuals, 2 of which did not reside in CU, 5 of whom were only listed as 
“wives” following their husbands’ names, and 9 of whom held positions of power within the 
community related to land management and housing:  
1. Howard O. Watson, Field Supervisor for the Equitable Life Insurance Company 
2. H. A. Richter, Real Estate Agent and Insurance Agent 
3. L. M. Rovelstad, Real Estate Agent and Secretary/Treasurer of the Commercial Savings and Loan 
Association 
4. Myra Rovelstad (L. M. and Myra were married), Real Estate Agent 
5. Cecil R. Ozier, General Contractor for Ozier-Weller 
6. Scott E. Weller, General Contractor for Ozier-Weller 
7. Catherine M. Weller (Scott and Catherine were married), Secretary/Treasurer of Ozier-Weller 
8. Gordon F. Kamerer, Manager of the Urbana-Lincoln Hotel (now Jumer's) 
9. Most significantly: Charles M. Webber, presiding as Champaign County's only judge from 1935 to 
1946 (during which time he annexed two other subdivisions to Champaign with race covenants) and 
who returned to practice law as an attorney with Webber and Balbach following his judgeship  
(Frank, 1990). 
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But residential segregation has often also perpetuated in the United States through the 
everyday activities and community and social norms of individuals as much as by legal statute. 
Together with the formal practices of institutions, the informal actions of people attempting to 
preserve the local culture of their neighborhoods plays a major part in the systemic violence of 
racism. Casual conversations among neighbors on the streets, in church, and around political 
events are often the medium by which the preferences of individuals are translated into macro-
level patterns of residential segregation (DeSena, 1994). Directly affecting the quality of lives of 
African American CU residents, covenants translated into cues for social interactions as well. In 
their 1947 book People vs. Property: Race Restrictive Covenants in Housing, Long & Johnson 
explained: 
...the race restrictive covenant is significant not only as a legal instrument limiting the 
housing supply and defining residential racial segregation, but also because its use brings 
into existence a body of social practice, attitudes and policy having a detrimental effect 
upon the character of race relations for the total community (Long & Johnson, 1947).  
 
Thus, in less easily traceable and thus documentable ways after Shelley vs. Kraemer, pernicious 
personal stereotyping based on residential neighborhood location persisted. 
 To illustrate the injurious confluence of structural racism as seen through covenants and 
gatekeeping in real estate combined with social prejudice in restricting life outcomes, I present a 
single case study: that of Taylor Thomas, a prominent Champaign local (see Appendix C.2 for 
photo). After he earned his degree in English and History from Tennessee State University (an 
HBCU) in 1935, he sent out about 75 letters to find a teaching job. Only a few letters came back 
to him but no jobs were offered so he started waiting tables and he found other odd jobs. He saw 
white men who did not have as much education as he had, but they had better jobs. He got tired 
of the situation so he decided to move to Indianapolis where he found a government job as a 
night watchman. He had so many jobs, extension courses, and singing lessons that five years 
later he got tuberculosis and had to stay in bed four years. In the fall of 1945, he became the first 
director of the Douglass Center, a recreation center named for Frederick Douglass. At the 
Douglass Center, he started a kindergarten and he coached athletic teams that were so good he 
was offered a teaching job at Jackson, an all-black school in Danville. He was educated to be a 
teacher and it took 12 years to become one. In Danville, in addition to being a teacher, he was the 
coach of all the sports. His football team won all their games for six years. He was the education 
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association vice-president but he was stopped from becoming president of the association 
because of his skin color. While he was doing all of this he earned a master’s degree in education 
in 1951, and an advanced certificate in educational administration in 1955, both from the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (Roundtree & Tyler, 1997). 
During this time, he and his wife lived in a tiny upstairs apartment in the North End on 
Columbia and Fifth streets, then later on Fifth and Vine Streets, and during this entire time, the 
couple sought housing commensurable with their incomes but could not get it. Thomas 
remarked: 
We think that we knocked on so many doors...we received all kinds of insults and 
everything else in trying to get housing. Housing was very hard, I mean wherever you 
wanted to buy it, it isn’t that you--sometimes there’s a certain house that you’d like to 
have and I don’t care where it is, if you can afford to buy it you’ll like to get it, but you 
couldn’t (Roundtree & Tyler, 1997). 
 
In one instance, Thomas made a phone inquiry about a home with a real estate agent. When 
Thomas met the agent at the available house, Thomas reported he was told “Oh, well if you 
would of told us who you were over the phone, you would have saved both of us a lot of time.” 
The agent, of course, had not known Thomas and his wife were African American until they met. 
The dual housing system went unquestioned and unchallenged by this agent; no excuses or lies 
were necessary: race was the sole reason for the Thomas’s rejection upon first sight.  
In another instance, Thomas reported that he approached a realtor in efforts to buy some 
land. Here, the agent required “earnest money” as a down payment. Less direct than an outright 
refusal, Thomas interpreted this as a ploy by the realtor; if cash were required it would hopefully 
deter the prospective black buyer from purchasing the land. The stereotype that all blacks are 
poor was also in operation here. If the fee were high enough, the black “threat” would be easily 
eliminated. Thomas, however, had the money. He sent the specified amount to the realtor at 
which point his check was promptly returned. The note attached stated that the owner “wouldn’t 
sell to you.” Whether the agent’s delayed tactic was of his own volition, or whether the agent did 
indeed approach the owner with Thomas’s offer, the result was no sale, and it was obvious to 
Thomas, in his years of experience in such matters, that it was due to his race. 
Taylor Thomas experienced the discriminatory effects of CU financial institutions as well 
as with real estate agents and homeowners. After twelve fruitless years searching for an 
appropriate home, the Thomas’s found one out in the countryside near Urbana whose owner was 
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willing to sell. The owner required a down payment due in forty-five days. The search for a 
lender began. Said Thomas: 
We kept trying and trying, and we went to everyplace in town. We went to insurance 
companies, we went to banks ... they wouldn’t let us have the money saying that it was 
out in the country ... We tried First Federal, and finally there was an insurance company, 
Equitable ... but we finally went--we said well there’s one more, and we’d tried every 
bank in town except that bank. And we said well, we’ll try them, we don’t think were 
going to get it there either (Roundtree & Tyler, 1997). 
 
The final bank was Busey Bank. Incredibly, the loan was granted for a higher sum than Thomas 
had required. The bank personnel said a “home in the country” was no problem to finance. 
Finally, the Taylor family had a suitable home. But over the course of their twelve-year pursuit, 
the Thomas’s had been rebuffed by realtors, owners, and lenders, and their story is consistent 
with the collected experiences of other North End residents.12 
 
4.5 The Role of the Housing Authority of Champaign County (HACC) 
The HACC in 1948 ordered a “Housing Market Analysis in Champaign-Urbana Illinois” 
from the Real Estate Research Corporation of Chicago. This study, known as the “Downs 
Report,” showed that 71.8% of area workers had incomes too low to justify a monthly rental of 
$50, or the purchase of a $6,000 home. Essentially, housing in CU before Old Urban Renewal 
began was too expensive for the majority of its residents. The report recommended (1) the 
formation of nonprofit corporations contemplating a loan of equity money for the down payment 
on houses through grants by the State Housing Board, and (2) direct government subsidy, as in 
public housing projects (LWV, 1951).  
In 1950 the Housing Authority ordered a survey of substandard housing in Urbana 
conducted by the Real Estate Research Corporation. It was estimated that the area surveyed 
(containing 1,533 dwelling units) included 65% – 75% of all the substandard dwelling units in 
Urbana and all the non-white units. The report supported findings from the League of Women 
Voters’ Shack Study completed a year earlier, and reported that 49% of all families in 
substandard units had no inside flush toilet (either shared or used exclusively), and 26% had no 
kitchen sink. The rental housing for African American residents was found to be particularly bad. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Virtually all those interviewed for the Urbana Free Library’s Black Oral History Project mentioned the dismal 
state of housing discrimination and cited poor housing as the main problem they had to endure. See Black Oral 
History Project, Box 338, Urbana Free Library Archives, Urbana, Illinois. 
	   59 
Almost three quarters (72%) was dilapidated, almost half (48%) had no inside flush toilet, and 
almost one-quarter (24%) had more than 1.5 persons per room. Of all rental properties available 
to African Americans, 39% had no running water, and 61% had no kitchen sink (LWV, 1951). 
These results combined with the studies the League of Women Voters produced and its own 
1948 ‘Housing Market Analysis’ spurred the HACC to begin building public housing units on 
the land it had purchased in 1941. 
In 1951, Champaign had 140 units of public housing nearing completion, and Urbana had 
begun work on 125 units. African Americans and whites were segregated, but “equal facilities 
were provided for each group” according to the League of Women Voters. Champaign had 70 
units for whites and 70 units for blacks; Urbana had 99 for whites and 26 for blacks. The African 
American project in Champaign was called Birch Court after a soldier killed in WWII, and was 
located on a 5-acre tract north of Bradley Avenue between Fourth and Fifth Streets. The white 
project was on a 7-acre tract at the northwest corner of Bradley and McKinley. The cost of both 
the Urbana and the Champaign projects was $1,470,000, but only $305,000 (21%) went towards 
the Burch Court and the remaining $1,165,000 was spent constructing the white project. Because 
of the way that payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) were set up in this era, the local community 
was expected to benefit (even though it technically lost property tax revenue from tax-exempt 
public land) from the PILOTs paid, which at the time totaled 10% of the total shelter rents 
received from the structure (calculated from net rent paid after the cost of utilities were 
deducted) (LWV, 1951).  
The HACC restricted residential eligibility by income and race, as well as previous 
housing circumstances. Veterans were given overall preference, but all other prospective tenants 
had to either have been displaced by a slum-clearance project or have been occupying 
substandard housing. The very poorest families were ineligible because their incomes were still 
not steady enough and not large enough to pay the minimum rent made necessary by federal 
financing limitations. The highest rent charged in these early public housing units had to be 20% 
lower than what was charged for standard available housing. Tenants had to pay 20% of their 
income for rent, including utilities, but they were granted an exemption of $100 a year for each 
minor household member (LWV, 1951).  
In Champaign, a non-political committee of six local citizens appointed by the Housing 
Authority selected the first tenants chosen for the Birch housing project. In addition to the factors 
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of income and occupancy of substandard quarters for non-veterans, they gave consideration to 
the length of residence in the community and to the “character” of the applicant. The tenants 
were expected to be “good risks for the prompt payment of rent and to be cooperative citizens, 
not trouble-makers.”  The task of selection of tenants along these lines was clearly highly 
subjective, and mistakes were probably made. Many African-Americans were disappointed 
because their incomes were too high for public housing, but they could find no better privately 
owned housing because of color restrictions in other areas of the community. As a result, there 
were four eligible applicants for every vacancy in the project (LWV, 1951). 
Many North End residents opposed the segregationist practices of the housing authority. 
Two lists were kept, and it was often not provided on a first-come, first-served basis. Instead, 
applicants were assigned to housing by race (Patton, 1968). This created and helped foment 
intense distrust and suspicion leading up to Champaign’s first urban renewal project, as a debate 
around the inclusion and number of public housing units as part of the renewal plan was debated 
over the nine years leading up to its first project implementation.  
 
4.6 Old Urban Renewal comes to Champaign: 1960-1969 
 
After much was made in the news about two local children killed in a 1953 fire resulting 
from the structure burning so rapidly they could not escape, public opinion demanded that the 
city do something about housing conditions in the North End. As a response, the first minimal 
housing code of Champaign was created, which prohibited dirt floors and designated space 
requirements per person (applying to only those above six years of age) (Patton, 1968). 
Enforcement remained a problem however, as code enforcement relied on complaints and 
“because the offices of the building inspectors [we]re understaffed and neighbors [we]re 
unwilling to make complaints” (LWV, 1951). Later codes prevented new construction with 
obvious fire hazards or lack of sanitation, but  
…in some areas buildings [went] up or [we]re converted for use as dwellings without the 
issuance of a permit, as in the case of the converted sheds and tar-paper shanties… [and] 
in the absence of routine inspection or complaints from others, many violations, 
particularly in the poorer neighborhoods, [went] undetected. Public opinion, 
unfortunately, [did] not supported enforcement (LWV, 1951).  
 
This conflict between general white and black community public support for better 
housing conditions, but lack of functional support for explicit enforcement programs to 
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implement the changes is also widespread in political science research on voting attitudes and 
behavior patterns in the post-Civil Rights era into the 1980s and 1990s. Another limiting factor 
to early code enforcement was the realization that if the majority of the North End housing was 
in poor enough condition to condemn, those residents would need to relocate to housing 
elsewhere in the city, and explicit residential segregation disallowed blacks in any other area of 
the city at the time. The issue of poor code enforcement arose in 1964 during debates around the 
use of federal funds to finance the urban renewal program by the Chamber of Commerce, who 
“criticized the lax enforcement of the building code and Council’s proposal to increase the utility 
tax to pay their share of the cost of urban renewal” (Patton, 1968). Code enforcement came up 
again two years later in January 1966, when the City was notified that its Workable Program for 
Community Improvement (a prerequisite to receiving federal funds for nearly all community 
improvement programs) would not be recertified unless it undertook either urban renewal or a 
housing code enforcement program (Patton, 1968). And in May of 1966 while waiting to hear 
whether the documentation submitted by the housing authority requesting 30 additional units of 
public housing for Champaign’s urban renewal relocation housing would be approved, then-City 
Manager Browning outlined alternatives to federally-funded urban renewal, the second of which 
was: “enforce the city housing code. This course of action applied to northeast Champaign will 
work a great hardship on a great many people due to the absence of relocation housing” (Patton, 
1968). These all indicate widespread community recognition of an underutilized tool available to 
the City to promote better housing conditions in the North End, one which was not used because 
of the residential apartheid evidenced by stories like the Thomas’s. 
Old Urban Renewal came to Champaign in 1960, when a Citizens Advisory Committee 
on Urban Renewal (CAC) was formed from an initial community meeting with Mayor 
Emmerson Dexter and 30 residents who listened to a Housing and Home Finance Agency 
(HHFA) representative explain the municipal-federal relationships of urban renewal. The CAC 
was to carry out the necessary steps required to initiate an urban renewal project, the first being 
an attempt to clarify what the city must do to meet the requirements of the Workable Program, a 
prerequisite required by HUD to granting loans and grants for clearing, redeveloping and 
rehabilitating slums and blighted areas, grants for concentrated housing code enforcement 
projects and for the demolition of unsafe, dilapidated buildings, plus mortgage insurance for 
housing construction or improvement in renewal areas. With the aid of the City, the CAC 
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completed the workable program and took it to Chicago for review by HHFA. The agency 
recommended that “the section on relocation of residents displaced by renewal efforts be 
expanded” before submission of the program for final approval. The City of Champaign decided 
to implement a General Neighborhood Renewal Plan. Under this approach a renewal plan in 
sections is prepared for a neighborhood of the city, to be implemented over a period of time (see 
maps of proposed urban renewal area in Appendix C.3.) (Patton, 1968).  
 
4.7 Old Urban Renewal: Neighborhood changes indistinct from effects on residents 
The primary issues debated in the early planning stages of Old Urban Renewal in 
Champaign involved open occupancy and the desegregation of the larger community and more 
widespread housing access for African American residents, specifically regarding the renewal 
plan’s proposals on the location of public housing and potential further concentration of 
disadvantage in the North End. 
 The first public opposition occurred in early 1962, when Mrs. Louis Bundman, a member 
of the Council for Community Integration, asked whether or not the proposed urban renewal 
project wouldn’t reinforce the segregated housing across the city. Traffic engineers and urban 
planning consultants Harland Bartholomew and Associates were contracted by the City of 
Champaign to prepare the General Neighborhood Renewal Plan. From July to November, the 
consultants claimed they interviewed the residents and determined their needs and desires, 
interviewing 75% of the people living in the area (Champaign-Urbana Courier, March 31, 1963; 
Patton, 1968). When it became clear that 10% of residents in the proposed renewal area desired 
to move outside of their old community, and the audience insisted that black residents could not 
move wherever they wanted in CU, the consultant replied, “I don’t know of anything like that,” 
and the planning director insisted it was too early to talk about this topic. A spokesman for the 
people then replied, “the fact is, we cannot separate the physical changes within the 
neighborhood from the ‘effect upon the people.’ This should be considered - by some group - at 
the same time as the actual urban renewal planning” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, November 28, 
1962). The residents were unconvinced when the planners claimed this was of no concern to the 
urban renewal plans. One man summed up the feelings of the residents who attended: “What's 
going to happen to me and my family? Where am I going to live? Am I going to be able to pay 
the rent? As long as there is restricted housing in Champaign, urban renewal will do no good” 
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(Champaign-Urbana Courier, November 28, 1962). Despite the planning director and City 
Council’s initial attempts to avoid committing to desegregation simultaneously with 
implementing urban renewal policy, the CU community insisted over the next three years in 
numerous public sessions and neighborhood meetings that they were necessarily concurrent 
issues. 
In a September 1963 Courier article titled: “Champaign’s North End: A Look at the 
Negro and His Housing Woes,” the Champaign Human Relations Commission is quoted as 
saying:  
…the commission believes that the greatest single local barrier to fair treatment of all 
people is the severely restricted opportunity afforded minority group people in securing 
suitable housing within their means…Failure to achieve positive, rapid progress here can 
only lead to undesirable activities which reflect unfavorably on the good name of 
Champaign and its progress as a desirable and thriving community…in the North End, 
there are conditions of misery which only a small percentage of the community is aware 
of – and which an even smaller percentage admits. What to do about this is a problem the 
community has been unable to solve. It is a problem that at last is being recognized. 
 
On March 31, 1963, after nine months of preparation, Harland Bartholomew and 
Associates presented its plan to the city. The General Neighborhood Renewal Plan contained six 
projects covering 227 acres, requiring 800 families to be relocated, with 200 not to be disturbed. 
Of the extant 941 structures, 494 (52.5%) were planned for complete leveling (Champaign-
Urbana Courier, March 31, 1963). A new Citizens Advisory Committee, under the chairmanship 
of John E. Severns, a partner in a local architectural firm, was formed. This committee was to 
play a large role in the upcoming dispute over the urban renewal project. Membership on the 
CAC consisted of three residents of the community and four people from elsewhere in the city. 
Although their backgrounds differed, all but one of the members was a professional or 
businessman (see complete list in Appendix C.4). The first public hearing held by the CAC after 
Mr. Severns became chairman, was held on April 4, 1963. Severns described the atmosphere at 
this time. This meeting was attended by 250-300 people principally from the North End. The 
questions raised clearly indicated that there existed a number of areas of concern, 
misunderstanding, and misconception regarding the proposed plan and its effect on the residents 
of the proposed neighborhood affected.13 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See more detail: Letter to David Gay, City Planner, City of Champaign, Illinois from John E. Severns, June 23, 
1964 (elicited from: A Review of Progress 1963-1964: Workable Program for Community Improvement). 
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Concern for the “human side” of urban renewal was re-voiced by several groups at this 
time, the primary fear being that the city was concerned only with improving the structural 
condition of the neighborhood, and not the situations of its residents. The Champaign Human 
Relation Commission sent a letter to the City Council, asking it to go on record supporting open 
occupancy and stipulating that the primary reason for relocating people displaced by urban 
renewal was neither geography nor existing neighborhood patterns, but the needs and the means 
of the persons involved. On an April 5, 1963 City Council presented its statement of Urban 
Renewal Policy, involving “the democratic principle and right of every citizen in our city to live 
in a residence which meets at least minimum acceptable standards, the choice of which is only 
limited by the individual’s means.” The Council went on to promise priority in the purchase of 
land to those displaced and promised that all developers in the area would be required to state in 
writing “that their developments will be sold, rented, or leased without prejudice as to race, 
color, or creed” before they will be allowed to purchase land in the area (Champaign-Urbana 
Courier, April 5, 1963). 
Part of the initial concern around Old Urban Renewal stemmed from residents’ fear that 
their neighborhood was chosen for renewal to provide expansion space for the rapidly growing 
university. The proposed renewal area’s location directly north of campus provided an optimal 
area for university housing, and the campus had already expanded as far south as it could – 
running into the extensive university farms to the south of the general campus along current 
Windsor Road. North End residents thought it was entirely probable that the city intended to turn 
over their neighborhood to university oriented housing – it would rebuild the slum area, reduce 
costly water and sewer expansion, raise tax revenue and retain higher educated and wealthier 
people in the inner city area near the business district and major highways. When city planners 
mentioned that this plan would bring whites into the community, these suspicions were given 
substantive support, and most interpreted that fact, giving the segregation at the time, as “an 
indication that the neighborhood would be taken away from the Negro” (Patton, 1968). 
Compounding these fears was the widely-known fact at the time that the mayor was a close 
friend of one of the city’s largest slum landlords (name unknown), “whose practice it had been to 
convert one and two-family homes into multiple units as well as construct poor quality new 
homes” (Patton, 1968). Thus local fears of extractive and exploitative private profit to be made 
by this public project took hold. 
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A September newspaper article in 1963 explained some of the prejudicial and predatory 
housing finance practices extant in the North End at the time:  
Because of the sharp demand for housing in the Negro section of CU, the opportunities 
for exorbitant rent collection and inflated real estate prices are many…A young Negro 
couple recently was offered the opportunity of buying a similar home for $11,500. The 
landlord owner, a prominent Champaign citizen, priced the same house to a white friend 
of the Negro couple at $7,000. 
 
Echoing sentiments in this story, the LWV (1951) report stated, “a landlord may receive as much 
as $250 per month from rent for one house, yet only 24 properties in the area are assessed at 
more than $5,000, including businesses.”   
As the community debated and discussed the merits and potential pitfalls of implementing a 
local urban renewal program as a solution to local conditions of “blight,” Planning Director 
David Gay explained the City’s perspective on renewal at the time:  
…one alternative is simply to practice rigid enforcement of the city building codes. That would 
mean that the city would demand that all substandard housing be improved immediately at the 
expense of the property owner. If this is not done, the city then can order the property vacated. 
But then the city would have no legal obligation to relocate occupants of substandard housing: it 
would not be liable for damages to property owners and it would not be required to purchase the 
condemned property at fair value. The trouble is that slums are profitable to some property 
owners. Properties there are cheap and can be paid for in a short time. There is no upkeep 
required and they provide income for the life of the property (Champaign-Urbana Courier, 
September 26, 1963). 
 
This perspective on upkeep of residential property in slums (“none required”) is further 
indicative of attitudes towards the municipal code responsible for regulating property 
maintenance and construction at the time – essentially, of its pro forma status. This “no upkeep 
required” perspective held by City officials like the planning director is one of the ways the 
municipal government is complicit in the creation of residential apartheid in CU. In their 1951 
report on public housing and slum clearance, the League of Women Voters defined the physical 
symptoms of blighted and slum areas as including, “poor building design and construction, high 
population density, overcrowding of dwelling units, faulty subdivision of land, poor street 
pattern, and lack of utilities.” Notably, poor construction, overcrowding, poor street patterns and 
lack of utilities can all be either mitigated or prevented by regular proactive enforcement (not 
complaint-based) of municipal land use codes and city ordinances.  
Around the same time (early 1964 – mid 1965), the proposed renewal area residents 
began to get more vociferously involved in the urban renewal controversy. One of the groups 
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that had previously opposed the project reversed its stand. The Champaign-Urbana Improvement 
Association issued a statement supporting the urban renewal, with reservations. Reverends J. E. 
Groves and Blaine Ramsey presented the position of the group, claiming urban renewal could 
not be regarded as an end in itself. They stated: 
We don’t unanimously agree that urban renewal is the best thing for Champaign’s North 
End…our experience in the past is all we can go by, and we have seen it fail in other 
cities, at least what most of them have is not what we want…but we must do something 
to help stop a problem that could get out of hand given 10 years or more…so we support 
this with the following reservations: 
1. The cost of new homes must not be beyond the ability of the average wage-earner now 
living in the area to purchase and maintain. 
2. Profiteering on the part of private developers should be discouraged. 
3. Reasonable assurance should be given and a climate established whereby displaced 
persons may be allowed to buy homes outside the renewal area. 
4. A fair price should be paid for homes taken, and after the sale, if the occupants did not 
have sufficient funds to purchase their property, they would he subsidized by the 
government with low-interest loans to assure adequate housing. 
5. Homeowners located in the renewal area whose homes are classified as substandard 
will be allowed to bring their homes up to the present code requirements. 
6. Public housing should be minimal and be designed as not to take on the appearance of 
ghetto housing. 
7. Developers in the renewal area must hire Negroes in all job categories (Patton, 1968). 
  
The major neighborhood group to oppose the project consistently was the Northeast 
Neighborhood Homeowners Association, led by Reverend A. W. Bishop. This North End 
neighborhood had about 70% owner-occupied homes, and a relatively high median age of 50 
years. Thus, not only were residents likely elderly, but a high percentage were unemployed, 
unable to work or on fixed incomes. Their immediate concern was loss of their largest asset: 
their homes. The general theme of opponents to Old Urban Renewal, voiced in an informational 
community meeting held on January 25, 1966 was: 
…they were too old to leave their homes which they owned and purchase news ones. 
They felt they would be forced into renting, and said, ‘I worked hard for my shack, and I 
intend to keep my shack till I die,’ and ‘All my earnings, all my savings are in that home. 
My husband is sick and not able to work, and I’ve already got enough problems without 
losing my home’ (Champaign-Urbana Courier, January 25, 1966).  
 
Due to very limited resources in monetary terms particularly, but also in varying ability to 
understand or oppose the city’s policies, many residents at the time chose the short-range 
personal goals of saving their homes in order to avoid being placed into public housing. They 
understood that the only way to keep their homes was by defeating urban renewal. Public 
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housing and urban renewal appeared as one and the same thing, not mutually exclusive elements. 
Other groups also opposed aspects of the project: the Urban League opposed the construction of 
another public housing project in northeast Champaign, claiming it would only ensure more 
segregation. Other than the CAC, which was established by the City, the League of Women 
Voters was the only organization fully supporting urban renewal. Though both the CAC and the 
LWV periodically voiced opposition or concern for elements in the planning process, their firm 
support for the overall idea did not wane during the plan creation process (Patton, 1968). 
 
4.8 Urban Renewal moves ahead (1964): Primary community concerns continue to be open 
occupancy and relationship to public housing 
In late 1964, after extensive community debate, six urban renewal projects were planned 
at a cost of $8.7 million (Champaign’s share was roughly one fourth) (Champaign-Urbana 
Courier, September 26, 1963). David Gensemer, the newly hired urban renewal project director 
from Arkansas, when asked whether urban renewal would simply rebuild the “Negro ghetto,” 
replied that the purpose of an urban renewal project was not to change the character of an urban 
renewal community but to provide adequate housing for those who need it. He stressed that at 
least two adequate housing sites would be offered to any family forced to move because of the 
execution of the plan, and that urban renewal law requires that they be equal in location, 
proximity to work and price (Champaign-Urbana Courier, November 17, 1964). In 1969, the two 
main stated objectives of Champaign’s first urban renewal project had shifted from ‘provision of 
adequate housing’ to (1) the elimination and prevention of the spread of existing deterioration 
and blight; and (2) provisions for better living conditions within the project area by stabilization 
and conservation of property values” (Daily Illini, March 13, 1969).  
Toward the latter part of February 1965, home interviews were undertaken by the 
relocation officer to determine the preferences and situation of people within the project area. 
The most common question of the people interviewed was, “Where can we move since there is 
no open occupancy in this city?” The people were assured that, although this was a problem, 
progress was being made toward making houses available on an open occupancy basis. 
However, a shortage of low-cost housing both within and without the project area was the 
greatest single problem that faced the relocation efforts. The urban renewal director noted that 
this was one of the areas in which urban renewal becomes a social problem: “most of the people 
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in the area are Negroes, and the agency becomes involved with open occupancy, fair housing and 
integration” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, February 28, 1965). 
Relocation problems were complicated by the existing practices in the assignment of 
housing units of the HACC, through its director, Mr. Harold Sloan. It was claimed that 
applicants were assigned to the housing units on a racially segregated basis. This led the CAC to 
request that the HACC assign public housing on a first-come, first-served basis as to location 
(Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, 
July 7, 1965; from Patton, 1968). 
By the June 2, 1965 meeting of the Neighborhood Committee of CAC, the mayor had 
appointed John Barr, a local realtor, as chairman of the Committee. At this meeting, Mayor 
Dexter informed the committee that the City Council’s interest in the urban renewal program had 
“increased by 80% in the last eight months, and that it wants to see Project I completed.” Putting 
high-level institutional pressure behind the impetus moving the Old Urban Renewal plan 
forward, the mayor drew a line in the sand supporting the location of public housing as a 
component of the urban renewal plan being concentrated in the North End’s renewal area. He 
stated: “I can tell you right now that if the units are not to be placed - in the urban renewal area, 
all meetings on the subject might as well ‘go out the window.’ There will be no urban renewal 
unless these units are built inside Project I” (Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizen's 
Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, June 2, 1965; quoted from Patton, 1968). 
 When the question of the location of public housing was raised at the July 29th meeting 
of the CAC, City Manager Browning asked, “Is integration the goal of the urban renewal 
program or is improved housing?” (Citizen’s Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, July 29, 
1965; quoted from Patton, 1968). He stated that the Federal Housing Act pertained primarily to 
the improvement of housing. The CAC nevertheless forwarded a recommendation to the City 
Council asking that they review the situation concerning an open occupancy policy. 
Additionally, even though City Manager Browning stated that he felt the City Council had 
indicated it was reticent about putting pressure on another public body, City staff recommended 
advocating to the HACC that all vacancies in public housing units be filled on the basis of 
priority without regard to the location of such units. 
John Barr, chairman of the CAC, stated that he thought there could be an urban renewal 
plan to benefit the North End if the people in the area participated in the plan, and “that urban 
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renewal could help the community of Champaign-Urbana, but that it was a grave error to have a 
plan without much participation from the people affected.” Mr. Barr said that urban renewal 
would have an effect upon integration and could possibly create more problems than it solved, it 
was foolish to try to separate urban renewal and integration, and the CAC was for a program that 
fostered integration. The CAC presented the following points as suggestions from the area 
leaders who could adequately represent the people, and stated that the CAC was for a program 
that fostered integration:  
1. There was a need to have more parks in the multi-family area and a buffer zone along the railroad. 
2. The density (dwelling units per acre) was too high. 
3. There should be single family housing units within the public housing. 
4. It was opposed to placing all of the ninety units of public housing in the North End. 
5. All standard housing should be left standing if possible. 
6. A good urban renewal plan can make the North End a better area, but further segregation would 
make this a bad project (Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizen's Advisory Committee, 
minutes of meeting, August 16, 1965; quoted from Patton, 1968). 
 
 The first public meeting on the almost complete plan was held on December 20, 1965, 
where two spectators spoke in favor of the plan, and 30 voiced opposition. One of the comments 
made was: 
One thing that is confusing me is that we’ve all had men come out and tell us one thing 
but when they get back to the west side they talk differently. I’ve heard some people say 
that if this project goes through I’ll make a killing off these Negroes in the North End 
(Champaign-Urbana Courier, December 20, 1965).  
 
Later, others, including the NAACP spokesman, expressed the feeling that placing any public 
housing in the renewal area would reinforce the existing ghetto pattern. Its location near the 
tracks was also opposed in that the one hundred foot buffer was not felt great enough to cut the 
train noise. Homes near the tracks were attacked for psychological reasons as well, as one 
resident shared: “our children, because their faces are black, feel they are inferior. Placing them 
back down by the tracks will strengthen this feeling” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, January 25, 
1966). In an informational meeting in January 1966 held in a local school, residents voiced 
virulent protests against the proposed urban renewal plan, citing worries “that [existing residents] 
were too old to leave their homes which they owned and purchase new ones…they felt they 
would be forced into renting” (Patton, 1968). 
 Finally in early February 1966, when asked if the city would relocate residents outside 
the area, Urban Renewal Director Gensemer said, “we will relocate a family wherever in the City 
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we can find a house they can afford” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, February 1, 1966). The 
tensions around urban renewal and race relations came up early and often in the beginning stages 
of CU’s Old Urban Renewal project planning, and as Mr. Barr explained to HUD:  
Early in the planning period we were advised that urban renewal and race relations were 
two separate problems and we should not try to mix the two. We have learned, however, 
that at least here in Champaign the two problems cannot be separated, and we have kept 
this uppermost in our minds while planning the project. Despite this awareness by the 
City, some of the conflicts have not proved fully reconcilable. The most intense and 
concerted “segregation” charge has involved the proposal to locate sixty units of public 
housing within Project I. This problem has been consistently opposed by civil rights 
groups and others concerned over the possible perpetuation of the ghetto pattern 
(Champaign-Urbana Courier, February 1, 1966).  
 
By March of 1966 general consensus had been reached that urban renewal would proceed, and 
the conversation and debate then shifted towards growing opposition to the existing 
concentration of public housing in the area (Patton, 1968). 
 
4.9 De-segregation in CU begins, with mixed community responses 
 October 18, 1966 was the first record of African American families leaving the North 
End (9 families moved into unidentified “widely separated areas of the community”), which 
Human Relations Commission chairman Donald E. Moyer called “really dramatic” after the 
previous three years of debate and advocacy documented by the Fair Housing Bureau 
(Champaign-Urbana Courier, October 18, 1966). A month later on November 17, 1966 
Champaign’s Urban Renewal Project I was approved to move forward by a 5-1 City Council 
vote. This vote occurred after a three-hour public hearing, in which “councilmen listened to 13 
talks favoring the urban renewal plan and 26 opposing it.” Still claiming a very much mixed 
reception in the broader community, some of the critiques presented were from David Gass, a 
resident living south of the proposed renewal area at 305 E. Park St., who spoke to say, “I’m for 
urban renewal. I think just about everyone here is for urban renewal,” and after waiting for a 
chorus of objections to die, continued, “but one thought is in my mind. You’ve got a part of town 
and you want to clean it up. The majority of people in that part of town will be put within 100 
feet of the railroad tracks” he then admonished the Council: 
…you have chosen to do this because of economic reasons and the image of the city. To 
place people next to the railroad tracks is a sign than Champaign favors cleanliness. The 
council faces a test of whether it supports integration in all forms or can get by with a 
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little here and a little there – with a little paradise next to the railroad tracks (Champaign-
Urbana Courier, November 17, 1966).  
 
Robert Eubanks, another speaker representing the Council for Community Integration stated that 
he supported “the principle of urban renewal, but disagree[d] completely with many elements of 
this plan,” terming it “woefully deficient in social planning,” further arguing that the “social 
causes of slums are just as important as the physical causes” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, 
November 17, 1966).  
With project implementation near, the topic for debate shifted. It now centered on the 
price to be paid for properties that were to be taken. Purchase prices offered by the city were 
determined by appraisals from two private companies, but were termed inadequate by the 
residents who were unable to purchase other homes for the price paid them for their project area 
homes. They were told, however, that the city was operating under the premise that they “should 
pay for what’s there - the as-is condition, including all improvements on the property - but there 
[was] no need to take into account what amount [would be] needed to replace it with similar 
property” (Champaign-Urbana Courier May 21, 1967). This provides another example of the 
deep disconnects between the intent of federal law and its local applications in the North. 
Specifically, the ways local decision-making elites during OUR undermined legislative intent 
geared at residential equality and minimizing harm by attempting to disavow responsibility for 
unequal outcomes resulting from state-initiated displacement of African American citizens. 
 Urban Renewal Project I moved forward in Champaign regardless, and 1969 brought 
additional race-based community challenges in the process of selecting a developer. Creative 
Buildings, a local Urbana firm, already had a contract to build a 72-unit apartment project in the 
renewal area for Mt. Olive Baptist Church. Creative Buildings had promised to help organize a 
black construction firm to help handle the on-site assembly of pre-constructed housing modules, 
but CAC members expressed doubt. CAC Vice Chairman Henry Spies said he “was not sure 
banks would finance such a firm, even with backing from Creative Buildings,” and Chairman 
John Barr said that since the housing modules would be pre-built, “I can’t see what work besides 
a little painting and site preparation remains to be contracted.” Mt. Olive Baptist Church 
Reverend James Offutt argued that the proposal would create jobs for blacks in the Creative 
Buildings factory where the modules are built, as well as on the site. The relocation officer for 
the urban renewal department told the CAC that a number of black skilled craftsmen in CU had 
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been unable to find work, because of trade union discrimination. A committee member said he 
doubted the unions would accept the housing project being constructed with non-union labor, 
and Reverend Offutt scoffed at a statement that some unions had indicated a willingness to allow 
black craftsmen to work on projects in the urban renewal area and to admit them to the unions if 
they “prove themselves.” “That’s ironic,” he said. “I have to ask the person with his foot on my 
neck for permission to work in my own area” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, March 12, 1969). 
The Champaign City Council had the final choice in selecting a developer, but the CAC 
recommended who it considered had the best design - Lippman Associates out of St. Louis. This 
recommendation was made despite not knowing whether Lippman would be willing to make an 
extra effort to employ local people. Reverend Offutt voted for Creative Buildings, saying that 
although most of their construction was done in the factory, all but the carpentry was handled by 
subcontracting firms, and that “blacks w[ould] be employed in all phases of construction of 
North Mt. Olive Manor” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, March 12, 1969). 
Roy Murphy, president of Creative Buildings appeared before City Council during 
budget hearings later that year to protest his company’s treatment in the bidding process, arguing 
that he felt “there had not been a fair opportunity to bid openly and competitively on the housing 
projects” (Daily Illini, April 16, 1969). A member of the Urban Renewal Citizens Advisory 
Commission Harry Spedes said the specifications were provided by the Federal Housing 
Authority, and the CAC’s recommendations for a developer were based on “what they believed 
would be the best plan for the area” (Daily Illini, April 16, 1969). Robert Pope, a conservative 
Council member on record as opposing Champaign’s Urban Renewal project, argued that 
critiques were unfounded, as all local construction companies would naturally benefit from urban 
renewal, “even those which will not receive any of the contracts, such as those owned by several 
of the city councilmen,” because “if certain companies are engaged in federal projects, fewer 
companies would be left to handle the normal business” (Daily Illini, April 2, 1971).  
This reasoning, of local market contraction and competition effects, does not engage with 
the real structural violence issue here – that local prejudice against African Americans went so 
deep locally that it affected trade union membership, which directly affected skilled black 
laborers’ local earning capacity, and led to contracting preference to the direct benefit of white 
laborers and businesses at the expense of blacks. This is the precise definition of accumulation 
by dispossession, and is yet another example of the power that structurally embedded social bias 
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has to constrain life outcomes on multiple fronts simultaneously.  
 
4.10 Tense race relations and housing debates in Champaign after Old Urban Renewal 
The Council runoff in 1969 provides further insight into the local racial, housing and 
political tensions that made up the structural violence of Old Urban Renewal in Champaign. For 
the first time in Champaign history, two black candidates vied for a City Council seat: James 
Ransom, a “black unity candidate,” and Joe Somers, a “veteran North End politician” and a 20-
year justice of the peace. The Daily Illini reported on February 7, 1969 that Somers was being 
“encouraged to run by the city’s status quo group to split the black vote and prevent any black 
from sitting on the council.” Somer’s politics seem to support this assertion, calling for “strict 
enforcement of zoning and housing codes,” and unwavering support for local policing: 
“shoplifting has become such a problem locally that I favor an ordinance making this offense a 
city violation in order to permit a speedy disposition of these cases” (Daily Illini, February 7, 
1969). Ransom on the other hand, thought “there should be more involvement by the blacks and 
poor whites in the policy making of city government” (Daily Illini, February 7, 1969). Somers 
lost the race to Ransom. 
Local racial tensions escalated after an event at the Moose Lodge at 124 West White 
Street which began April 19, 1969 when a black musician, Maurice McKinley, was denied a 
drink in the club bar. McKinley had arrived before other members of the combo with which he 
was supposed to play to set his equipment up, and when he went to the bar to purchase a drink, 
he was refused. Dick Davis, a Concerned Citizens of Champaign (CCC) member, said that 
although food is cooked and served by black people on the third floor of the building, blacks are 
not served as guests at the bar on the lower level. Blacks were able to visit the club as members 
of organizations, but the charter limited membership only to Caucasians, and further required 
that a member be married to a Caucasian (Daily Illini, May 20, 1969). In early May 1969 a group 
appeared before City Council suggesting the city pass an ordinance prohibiting any city 
employee or official from belonging to any “racist organization such as the Moose Club” (Daily 
Illini, May 7, 1969). At the time, three members of Champaign City Council were Moose Club 
members, and a professor of Political Science at UIUC along with members of a local Citizens 
for Racial Justice group called for their resignations.  
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Ransom was shot and wounded with a 20-gauge shotgun through a window three months 
after his election (Daily Illini, May 13, 1969), and a few weeks later Ransom withdrew his 
resolution condemning organizations that restrict membership on the basis of race “because it 
wasn’t strong enough to have any effect,” and then further stated he was “not planning to draft a 
stronger resolution.” At the time, Mayor Virgil Wikoff, Councilmen Seely Johnston and M. G. 
Snyder were members of the Moose, and Wikoff argued that he joined Moose 15 years prior, and 
his membership had not affected any of his decisions. The Council simultaneously approved the 
sale of a 5-acre tract in the urban renewal area to the HACC for the construction of 60 units of 
public housing (Daily Illini, May 21, 1969), against the explicit and widely vocalized wishes of 
community residents.   
Another instance of community racial tensions focused on the Champaign-Urbana 
chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). This 
organization tried to stop all construction campus wide because of discrimination in contractor 
hiring policies. Ernest Westfield, president of the local NAACP said they would try to initiate 
court action to stop construction because of discrimination in construction companies and unions 
in the area. Westfield said there were other racist organizations the NAACP planned to attack 
locally, but the Moose Club forced the NAACP to act because of the incident with Morris 
McKinley (Daily Illini, May 20, 1969). 
John Lee Johnson, then-chairman of the CCC, supported these efforts, arguing that the 
size of the 3,000-member roster of the Moose Club meant that there were at least 3,000 racists in 
this town at the time. The CCC also recommended the formation of a student union for black 
Special Education Opportunities Program (SEOP) students and other black University students 
to protect their interests in relation to individuals, agencies or the whole University as necessary. 
A program to improve academic counseling for SEOP students was also suggested. Johnson said 
he talked to students who said they had trouble getting counseling appointments making 
schedule changes or learning University procedures. Johnson said these problems should be 
resolved for the benefit of incoming new students, many of whom resided in 
Northeast Champaign. Another agenda item asked that CCC meet or correspond with John 
Burrell, director at the time of the newly-completed Krannert Center for the Performing Arts, as 
to the role blacks could play in the utilization of the facility, just finished in 1969. The committee 
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noted that no black events or artists had been scheduled to perform in the Center (Daily Illini, 
April 30, 1969).  
These events indicate a changing racial climate with more widespread and organized 
community advocates, but one still very much mired in discrimination and community resistance 
to real racial integration. This community resistance, as Council member Ransom discovered, 
was still strong enough to provoke violence. Public housing, urban renewal, and university 
policy all dovetailed in Champaign to create community tensions around the issue of race in 
employment, housing, and access to community amenities. 
By May 7, 1969, 106 out of 135 total families targeted for Phase I of Old Urban Renewal 
in Champaign had been relocated, and “when the project first started only four realtors 
cooperated with the relocation office. This compares with over 113 realtors and agencies listed in 
the Champaign-Urbana area” (Daily Illini, May 7, 1969). Debate in Champaign persisted over 
the role and placement of public housing relative to urban renewal areas in the North End. In 
September 1971, over 200 citizens from Champaign’s North End attended a Champaign City 
Council meeting in a protest against a proposed urban renewal public housing project. “The 
north side of Champaign, declared a spokesman, is already over saturated with public housing. 
As a result of increased density, he continued, crime rates will increase, traffic will become 
unmanageable, sanitation problems will become worse and property value will decline greatly” 
(Daily Illini, September 22, 1971).  
Affordable housing tensions in the community continued into the 1970s, and in late 1973 
Champaign County Housing Authority executive director Edwin Finney explained his position 
on locating public housing units: “There’s no neighborhood that can stand 50 or 60 low income 
families. A neighborhood will help one or two deprived families in an area, but if more move in, 
the neighborhood will move out” (Daily Illini, December 14, 1973). Public pressure against 
concentrated public housing was so intense, that when the City of Champaign and the housing 
authority tried to build two projects, one directly west of the urban renewal site on North Harris 
Street near Spalding Park as it crosses Bradley Avenue just east of Prospect Avenue, and one on 
North Fourth Street in the middle of the urban renewal project area west of Douglass Park and 
south of Bradley Avenue, they abandoned both projects. Local neighborhood protests centered 
on the belief that “public housing would bring higher crime and juvenile delinquency rates to the 
area.” Jim Williams, director of the Champaign Department of Environmental Development in 
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1973, described the protests as basically racist: “the residents were concerned about black 
minority people in the area” (Daily Illini, December 14, 1973). Two of the most vocal leaders of 
that protest were Jim Cross, a Champaign fireman, and his wife Linda, who lived a block away 
from the proposed North Harris Street site. The Crosses raised a zoning petition later passed by 
the Champaign City Council to prohibit additional public housing projects north of University 
Avenue. They contended that the city dumps the public housing projects north of University 
Avenue “because other areas of Champaign have the prestige or influence to stop such projects” 
(Daily Illini, December 14, 1973). 
As national public housing debates began moving away from supporting the dense 
concentration of low-income housing in communities, so did Champaign’s siting practices. 
Champaign City Council member John Lee Johnson, a longtime local black activist and 
advocate, made a clear distinction between the housing he sees as best for Champaign and the 
scattered housing which he says places the poor throughout a city, saying: “if area A has a 
problem to correct you don’t correct the problem by moving everyone to Area C.” Champaign’s 
Better Housing Commission chairman Henry Spies further argued that Champaign did precisely 
that during its relocation of 270 families as part of the Old Urban Renewal program, with 
observed negative results:  
There were…problems with that scattered project: for those without cars, the breakup of 
congregations, a stabilizing force in a community, and a loss of some political power 
when persons with similar interests are separated…These people need some political 
clout, and they need the stabilizing influence of the churches (Daily Illini, February 2, 
1974).  
 
Federal housing trends continued to affect the supply choices involved in public housing 
provision locally, as Spies reported in 1974, saying after a conversation with a Houston-based 
HUD representative inquiring about grant funding for new construction of public housing being 
cut off: “I really think the present administration leans toward rent subsidies rather than the 
conventional form of public housing.” This contraction of supply began in Champaign as “3,000 
– 4,000 persons [remained] in need of better housing. That tells you that there are not enough 
sites to meet the needs,” according to John Lee Johnson (Daily Illini, February 2, 1974). 
 Old Urban Renewal in Champaign was fraught with racist institutional and community 
tensions, and unequal power dynamics between community and resident advocacy groups and 
elected officials on City Council and the Mayor of Champaign. Rationales and justifications 
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based on race about inherent ability and devaluation of citizen’s needs and realistic alternative 
opportunities and options were frequent during this period in CU’s history. It is very clear that 
despite widespread mobilized and often vocal protest by African American residents and their 
local allies of the potential ramifications and unequal treatment of different options considered, 
the City staff and elected officials responsible for Old Urban Renewal in Champaign had their 
own opinions and agendas, and simply disregarded the voiced preferences of an entire group of 
its citizens.  
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CHAPTER 5 
URBAN RENEWAL IN CHAMPAIGN: MUNICIPAL RATIONALES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Because of the reliance on historical sources, primarily archival news records, evaluating 
the constrained decision-making space of local elites and government officials in the first round 
of Old Urban Renewal in Champaign, IL is difficult. Assertions and assumptions based on 
verbiage in news articles’ selected quotations bias both interpretation and analysis, and the 
temporal distance makes it hard to rely on first-person narratives as another source from which to 
evaluate credibility and accuracy of reporting. There are missing pieces of key information in 
understanding the speculative real estate market at the time and its keys players, which limits a 
thorough analysis of the Champaign’s constrained fiscal policy space during Old Urban 
Renewal. In the creation and evolution of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan, which has 
occurred more recently, there is much more, and more recent, information to investigate about 
causality, motivations, and the planning rhetoric surrounding the neighborhood redevelopment 
decisions. The ‘plausible’ fiscal policy space of the City of Champaign, while still incredibly 
complex, is more easily understood and accessible in this modern planning process.  
I posit that the power and politics operating in the decision-making spaces in the City of 
Champaign in regards to its most recent neighborhood redevelopment plan constitute a 
‘paradigmatic case study’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006), which highlights the more general characteristics of 
the local community in question. Case studies provide lenses through which to tell stories, and 
storytelling, as alluded to in the introductory chapter, is inherently central to and constitutive of 
planning practice. Narratives operate as filters for understanding, reflect power dynamics at play, 
help identify dominant cultural norms, and can guide us as planners to be ever self-reflective 
(Sandercock, 2003). Many researchers have noted that narrative is an ancient method and 
perhaps our most fundamental form for making sense of experience (Mattingly, 1991; Novak, 
1975; see also Abbott, 1992; Arendt, 1958; Bal, 1997; Carr, 1986; Fehn, Hoestery, & Tatar, 
1992; Rasmussen, 1995; Ricoeur, 1984). 
According to Adler (2005), research must begin with what it is that social agents, as 
opposed to analysts, believe to be real. The dialectical constitution of knowledge and reality begs 
for a process-centered approach like the one I have used in interpreting interview results as part 
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of the case study contained here. Through interpretation, subjective meanings become objectified 
as part of a larger intersubjective context – objectifying meanings, and upscaling relevancy, 
involves asking not only what something means for a specific individual, but relating its meaning 
within a larger hermeneutic circle of interpretation by relation of individual parts to the whole, 
and then again relating the whole reciprocally back to understand the structure’s effects on the 
individual. This is part of the narrative contained in the succeeding two chapters, in which I have 
traced the historical evolution of both subjective and intersubjective meanings of housing 
segregation, code enforcement and policing practices, and social bias in the North End of 
Champaign-Urbana to explain how the constrained fiscal and racial contexts for the Bristol Place 
component of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan evolved. Historical methodologies involve 
identifying the historical processes that create specific social contexts, and as all social realities 
are the result of political and social processes rooted in history, tracing them requires narrative 
explication. As Pouliot (2007) explains in relation to constructivist social science research:  
…explanatory narratives order variegated meanings and practices in time around a 
number of “plots” or causal stories. Like counterfactual analysis, causal narratives reason 
backwards in order to understand why the branching tree of history has taken one 
direction instead of others (ref. Lebow, 2000). Inside the constructivist style of reasoning, 
thus, historical analysis and interpretation go hand in hand. 
 
This construction of simultaneous subjective and objective knowledge makes better sense of 
complex socio-historical realities, and lends itself well to explicating in particular FPS elements 
(3) - (5).   
It also follows that power must play a crucial role in the construction of social realities. 
Power, in short, means not only the resources required to impose one’s view on others, but also 
the authority to determine the shared meanings that constitute the identities, interests and 
practices of states, as well as the conditions that confer, defer or deny access to ‘goods’ and 
benefits. Because social reality is a matter of imposing meanings and functions on physical 
objects that do not already have those meanings and functions, the ability to create the 
underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play, and to be able to get 
other actors to commit themselves to those rules because they are now part of their self-
understandings is perhaps the most subtle and most effective form of power (Adler & Barnett, 
1996). This means that there is a very strong relationship between knowledge and power; 
knowledge is rarely value-neutral but frequently enters into the creation and reproduction of a 
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particular social order that benefits some at the expense of others.  
Traditional public policy domains (education, policing, sanitation, transit, etc.) now 
contain a more diverse body of players (“ed and med” institutions, organizations from the 
philanthropic sector, nonprofit intermediaries, and business organizations, among others), and 
the public policy domain has expanded to now also include economic development (ED) as an 
over-riding priority for cities. Directly a result of federal retreat from social support and funding 
for neighborhoods in distress, the new diverse players who control resources are increasingly 
empowered and have emerged as key participants and new investors in place-based investments. 
Economic imperatives in the post-industrial United States are less distinct from social policy 
imperatives, and economic development is no longer seen as a discrete and privileged policy 
domain – policing, education, employment and others are now factors in ED initiatives, but ED 
remains the central priority in most cases.  
As a result, there are more varied and complex assortments of policy tools available to 
local governments, ranging from comprehensive community initiatives through transit-oriented 
development, community benefits agreements, and mixed-income redevelopment projects. As 
cities have become more entrepreneurial, governance arrangements begin more and more to see 
neighborhoods as investment sites and as economic units - e.g. Business Improvement Districts, 
TIF-eligible areas, etc. This new era of post-industrial politics with greater actor fragmentation 
requires much higher levels of coordination and strategic activism among disadvantaged 
neighborhoods to organize against such pressures. One of the primary results of increased 
economic development imperatives in the face of increasing federal retreat from financial 
support for social programming is that the use-value – exchange-value dichotomy involved in 
property disputes increasingly results in exchange values being privileged over use-values. This 
means that materially, neighborhoods with more capacity and market potential are best situated 
to take advantages of institutional representation. As a result, the survival of urban 
neighborhoods may not rest entirely on the willingness of residents to participate, but on what 
options the state has put forth to begin with (seen in its constrained FPS), and what groups are 
funded to propose and make changes to the status quo. 
Austerity politics combine with structural inequality (distressed neighborhoods 
systematically disadvantaged in attempts to participate in local politics) to produce contemporary 
structural violence. The Housing and Land Use Goal of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan and 
	   81 
its politics and partners, beneficiaries and benefactors, provide insight into the structural 
decisions that make governments decide who among its citizenry to advocate for and how far 
that advocacy extends. In the words of Ta-Nehisi Coates, I put “elegant racism” at the center of 
this understanding. 
This chapter provides historical insight into Champaign’s governance and then traces the 
evolution of the BPNP through information gathered from institutional interviewees and city 
documents. I begin with an overview of Champaign’s council manager form of government, 
continue with a brief community development services history, and then begin tracing narratives 
about how the Bristol Place redevelopment plan came to exist in its current form, detailing some 
of the controversies around its primary contained components. 
 
5.2 Council-Manager Governance: “Champaign is a well-oiled machine”  
The history and management style of the City of Champaign should be understood 
through the lens of the dynamics involved in the decision-making space dictating City actions 
and previous neighborhood interventions. The official leadership of the City, the form of 
government dictates the dynamics that take place between executive leadership and institutional 
leadership. Evaluating FPS element (5), the “political culture” of the city, helps provides this 
lens, in order to interpret and evaluate governance in the City of Champaign.  
Much is contested in mayoral forms of government. The council-manager form contains 
different dynamics, and is often much more cooperative and routinely used in suburban 
communities with more money. As structural dynamics influence political relationships, the 
nature of the relationships directly affects how places perform. The City of Champaign is 
organized around the council-manager form of government (as opposed to mayor-council or 
commission forms), with an elected 9-member City Council, composed of the Mayor and both 
three “at large” and five “district” officials. The Council members each serve four-year terms, 
and the city manager and the ten department heads who serve under her supervision direct the 
executive and administrative functions of the City (see organizational matrix in Appendix D.1). 
The city manager form of government began in an era when progressives were trying to bring 
principles of good business to government by asking, “why aren’t we hiring a CEO to run our 
City like I would to run my company?” Many early city managers across the country came from 
hard technical business backgrounds like engineering and finance, according to current City 
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Manager Dorothy David. Essentially the model is most similar to a corporate management 
model: an elected City Council hires a business professional to run the day-to-day operations of 
the city.  
Some argue that this is less democratic. The City Council hires and fires one person, but 
all other personnel hiring and firing is the city manager’s responsibility. The city manager’s 
power is limited by city code and city ordinances, among other things. Elected officials have no 
influence over the hiring or firing of other City staff such as department heads. This encourages 
service provision and organizational stability across political tenures, as staff does not turnover 
according to election cycles. As Ms. David puts it, “thus the person actually running the city is 
not elected to be responsive to the people - the position is outside of electoral politics.” The 
current City Manager Dorothy David argues that this form of government is actually more 
democratic, because a local citizen does not have to quit their job to run for office and represent 
the community. Having a full time professional CEO allows anyone to serve on the policy-
making body of the City (the City Council), rather than limiting the candidate pool to only 
professional politicians or people who have the financial resources to serve in a full time City 
government role. According to Ms. David, Champaign’s City Council sets all of the laws and 
policies of the City and remains responsive and accountable to the citizens, and the City Manager 
serves at their will and is required to implement the direction that they set.  
In many ways, this arrangement seems optimal, as running a city requires specific 
professional expertise, and due to its position as a public service provider funded by tax-paying 
local residents, it also requires significant accountability to taxpayer expenditures. In 
Champaign, the City Manager is the CEO of a $100 million corporation. As current City 
Manager Dorothy David puts it: 
We really are a conglomerate of many different companies that provide services to the 
public – there are all kinds of services that I am running that have no relationship to one 
another. What it takes to run a fire department is radically different than what it takes to 
run snow removal. There are very technical pieces, law and policy, and other things you 
need to know to run a City well. So, elected officials don’t necessarily have the 
knowledge or expertise to run the day-to-day services of City government. They are 
experts in what the community/citizens need and want and they provide that direction to a 
professional staff who are trained to deliver the services. 
 
Ms. David has built a whole career, education and set of skills and experience in this field, and 
argues that in the council manager form of government, citizens don’t have to quit their jobs in 
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order to choose to serve and run for office. The Champaign mayor at the time of our interview 
still had a full time job at the University of Illinois – he came in and provided leadership along 
with 8 other elected officials. Ms. David continued, with a clearly stated caveat about being 
admittedly biased as the current City Manager: “To me, this form of government affords every 
citizen a fair opportunity to run for office and be elected to serve. Our 9 elected officials all serve 
equally.”  
The mayor in Champaign thus does not have total ownership because he or she is just one 
of nine votes, but as other Council members I interviewed shared, the Champaign Mayor does 
have a great deal of influence nonetheless; he/she convenes all meetings, decides what order 
people get to speak, how long, and in what order. There is a lot of power in facilitating the public 
dialogue, of being the facilitator and convener of the other eight participants. The mayor also has 
more of a time commitment than other Council members, being the primary “face” of the 
community, and more often people want him/her present at more meetings than other Council 
members.  
In contrast, Mayor Laurel Prussing in bordering twin city Urbana would argue 
differently, because Urbana has a strong mayor as their CEO in a mayor-council form of 
government. They also have partisan ballots in Urbana – according to current City Council 
members interviewed, Champaign is non-partisan on the ballot, which one longtime Urbana city 
staff member (who started working for the City of Urbana in 1995) says in this local community 
is synonymous with being “more Republican.” In Urbana the staff facilitate the political actors, 
and project (and sometimes staff) turnover often follows election cycles. The same Urbana staff 
member argued the opposite of Ms. David’s position on the council-manager form being more 
democratic, saying that in the strong mayoral form in Urbana, “there is much more participatory 
governance due to the mayoral electoral accountability – in Urbana, the mayor runs the show, 
and in Champaign, the staff run the show, and mayors are only a ceremonial position. 
Champaign’s City Council relies on Champaign staff in decision-making.” This arguably affords 
Urbana citizens more direct input into local governance processes via electoral veto power at 
regular temporal intervals.  
Champaign has had a council-manager form of government for a long time, and its 
Council members have also historically served very long successive terms. Current City 
Manager Dorothy David’s predecessor Steve Carter was in office for 28 years. The term lengths 
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of Champaign’s City Council members vary, but some leadership legacies persist back two to 
three decades as well. Current Council member Michael LaDue has been on Champaign City 
Council the longest – 28 years. Two other Council members interviewed as part of this research 
served for seven years and 20 years, respectively. A map of the Council Districts can be found in 
Appendix D.2.  
Politics do change over such long tenures, and according to one Council member, “if you 
make someone mad along the way, five council members could get together and they could fire 
you.” Ms. David and the City Council members interviewed here agreed that Champaign’s 
governance and management philosophy has been that staff “doesn’t want to get in the vote 
counting business.” Champaign staff members need to make sure they have a minimum of five 
votes to support any proposal, but Ms. David does not go to the table trying to count five, she 
says she goes to the table trying to count nine – she and the staff under her actively try to craft 
policy recommendations so the Champaign City Council can reach consensus. As she puts it, 
“you want to be responsive to the input of all Council members because that is your best 
assurance that you are being responsive to the public.”  
Critics from Urbana say that in Champaign, the staff run the show, the mayors are a 
ceremonial position, and City Council relies on their staff in all of its decision-making. But as 
one Champaign City Council member with a 20-year tenure put it: 
As a city councilmember, I am concerned about city policy and help set city policy, but it 
is not my full time job. I trust judgment calls made by staff and department heads. The 
nitty gritty of how deals get hammered out – I don’t understand all of that. I don’t think I 
need to - I have a great deal of faith in our city manager, the department heads, planning, 
finance, neighborhood services, etc. Champaign has a strong city manager who we have a 
great deal of faith in, she in turn hires qualified department heads and we trust them.  
 
And as another City Council member interviewed said admiringly of the organizational 
partnerships that have evolved in Champaign, “Champaign is a well-oiled machine – the 
City Council sets priorities and goals and the staff carries them out.”  
 Both forms of government have advantages and disadvantages, but almost anyone 
who is from the CU area will explain that Champaign has historically been more fiscally 
and politically conservative, while Urbana has been more progressive and claimed better 
democratic participation and service responsiveness to its residents.  
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5.3 Shifting Eras in Champaign Service Provision Ethos (1990 – 2000): More Holistic Planning  
Similar to other communities across the U.S., community tensions and debates around the 
intersection of race and affordable housing persisted through the political eras of the 1970s and 
1980s in CU, the detailed elucidation of which are beyond the scope of this paper. According to 
the current city manager, who arrived in Champaign in 1994 as the Neighborhood Services 
Director, became Assistant City Manager in 2007 and then City Manager in 2013, the City of 
Champaign’s philosophy about funding distribution across city neighborhoods began to shift in 
the early 1990s. CDBG funding, which replaced federal-level neighborhood revitalization Urban 
Renewal funds after 1972, was limited to only low-income areas of Champaign. There was a 
sense among local staff and city officials that the City had been receiving and pouring federal 
funding into the same low-income places, and yet 15 years into the steady stream of federal 
funding, the same areas were still all designated ‘low-income’ according to federal HUD 
guidelines. City council members began asking: “are we making a difference?” Particularly 
council members from those districts that were not eligible for CDBG funds based on income 
guidelines began to question in the early 1990s why resources were not being spent to address 
neighborhood needs in their districts. 
The concept of ‘neighborhood wellness’ originated in the late 1980s as part of a citywide 
planning effort to promote healthy and stable neighborhoods. Prior to this planning effort, the 
City had concentrated its housing rehabilitation programs, intensive code enforcement, and 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)-funded capital improvements almost exclusively 
in the northeast section of the City, the location of the Old Urban Renewal process described in 
Chapter 4. By the mid-1980s, grants that had been available for these costly urban renewal 
clearance projects were no longer available, so in 1985, the City Council moved to expand 
community development activities citywide (NWVR, 2006-2010).  
This concern about how to address neighborhood needs outside of low-income census 
areas gave rise to the City of Champaign’s Neighborhood Wellness Plan (NWP), which was a 
citywide approach to identifying neighborhood needs and strategies. It was ground breaking for 
its time and led to the creation of the Neighborhood Services Department (NSD) in local city 
government in 1992. According to City officials interviewed, there was internal debate in the 
early 1990s about whether the implementation of the NWP should belong as a division to the 
Planning Department, or whether the City needed a new and separate organizational unit 
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dedicated to this new approach to City service provision. The Planning Department put together 
a Neighborhood Analysis Report in 1991 that measured wellness indicators on a scale of 
standards for the defined planning areas. The Wellness Plan assesses the physical and social 
conditions of each of the City’s neighborhoods. Data is collected and analyzed in the following 
areas: housing conditions, real estate market trends, property maintenance, population and 
demographic characteristics, civic involvement, household economic conditions, infrastructure, 
and public safety (AAP, FY10-11). In 1992 in conjunction with the creation of the Neighborhood 
Services department, the City Council adopted the Neighborhood Wellness Action Plan, 
identifying strategies targeted at the needs of specific neighborhoods (NWVR, 2006-2010).  
Wellness indicators were measured by neighborhood through the Neighborhood 
Classification System. This system places each planning area in one of four categories: Healthy, 
Conservation, Preservation, and Restoration. Each classification represents a stage in the 
neighborhood change process and reflects the type and intensity of physical problems and the 
extent to which residents possess the means to improve neighborhood conditions. Detailed 
definitions of the classification categories can be found in Appendix D.3, and a comparison 
between planning classifications by neighborhood in the City of Champaign between 1990, 2006 
and 2008 can be found in Appendix D.4. 
According to one top-tier management city official, restoration and preservation areas in 
Neighborhood Wellness are those with higher evidence of neighborhood problems and generally 
poorer property conditions. One City staff member I spoke with critiqued the NWP initiative, 
saying that its primary weakness was that it was not set up to measure progress towards stated 
goals moving forward. There was a huge effort in data collection and analysis in the mid to late 
1990s, and then again in 2005-2006 when the City hired an intern, who along with a planner 
from the Planning Department, was assigned to do an update/refresh of plan involving primarily 
data collection and re-classification of neighborhoods.  But those efforts are currently not 
ongoing – it is nobody’s job to be measuring things on a routine basis.  
A city planner critiqued the NW indicators themselves, saying that NW indicators guided 
Champaign’s planning into the 2000s, but in the last 6-7 years they have not been a deciding 
factor because they “are not great holistically.” He gave the example of sidewalk evaluation to 
illustrate. One of the NW indicators measured the condition of sidewalks (cracked, broken, 
disconnected), but ‘no sidewalks’ is not included in the rating system. This means that 
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neighborhoods without sidewalks are indistinguishable from neighborhoods with disconnected 
sidewalks, according to the NW indicators, and thus does not provide an entirely accurate picture 
of neighborhood quality. He also critiqued the reliance on evaluating property value in an area in 
determining whether a neighborhood is “healthy,” saying that rising home values often means an 
area is wealthy, but “does not necessarily provide information about localized city infrastructure 
quality or other relevant planning issues.”  
 
5.4 The Bristol Place Neighborhood Plan: Overview & Context 
The precise date of the creation of the Bristol Place Neighborhood Plan varies based on 
which sources are consulted. When asked the question, “When did the Bristol Place 
Neighborhood Planning process begin?” my interviewees gave vastly different time frames – 
some said the planning process began in 2008, 3 years before the Plan was released in 2011, and 
some said it has been in the works for decades, since the early 1990s. I have bounded this 
particular case study around the largest neighborhood timeframe discussed by interviewees: from 
1990 – 2015. While the majority of the actual planning process likely occurred in the last seven 
years (2007 – 2014), it is important to understand the peculiar stagnation in the local community 
culture and as a result in its governance over the course of the 1990s and into the early 2000s, as 
well as very recent more progressive shifts in the last 2-3 years. 
The official Champaign City Council Goal regarding the Bristol Place neighborhood was 
created in 2007 under the City Council Vision + Goals statement for 2007-2012: “Develop a 
Redevelopment Plan for the Bristol Place Neighborhood.” The first round of official public 
participation input process occurred between 2009 and 2010, during which a Neighborhood 
Services Advisory Board was created and four meetings were held, six resident input 
neighborhood meetings were held, one neighborhood survey was distributed, and ‘neighborhood 
stakeholder interview sessions’ occurred. This first official part of the planning process 
culminated in February 15, 2011 when the City Council adopted the Bristol Park Neighborhood 
Plan14 as an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan, calling for targeted reinvestment in the form 
of infill development and rehabilitation of deteriorating properties.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Terminology note: The original neighborhood plan was named “Bristol Park,” and encompassed three different 
neighborhoods into a single planning area, of which the sub-area “Bristol Place,” the primary focus of this narrative, 
is only one. The larger community plan is therefore still for “Bristol Park” in its entirety, which includes the three 
neighborhoods of Shadow Wood, Garwood, and Bristol Place. See plan area maps in Appendix D.13 for distinction. 
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Specifically, Goal #3 of the 2011 BPNP “Housing and Land Use” involved short-term 
objectives of “promoting well-maintained properties in the neighborhood and providing the best 
land use mix for the neighborhood as shown on the Future Land Use Map (see Appendix D.5),” 
a medium-term objective of promoting a balanced mix of home ownership and rental units,” and 
a long-term objective of “redeveloping underutilized properties (vacant or blighting)” (2011 
BPNP). The implementation strategies listed involved creating a targeted rental inspection 
program, among others.  
In early 2012 however, the city shifted to a policy of forced residential displacement, 
demolition and redevelopment. City staff I interviewed claimed the shift, from Preservation 
(targeted reinvestment and rehabilitation) according to the 2008 NWP update (see Appendix 
D.4), to total Restoration status requiring demolition and redevelopment, came from a process of 
combined internal investigating and community outreach. The results of the internal 
investigating that occurred, NSD Director Kevin Jackson said concluded: 
…the likelihood the City could turn the entire neighborhood around with spot infill 
development over time was not likely – if the City wanted to turn the area around, the 
best way to do it was the clear it…Technical experts looked at the economics of the 
issue, that the tenure of neighborhood was 70+% investor-owned and low property 
values and extreme safety issues (violent crime concentration), and also had to take into 
account that the City and NSD has other neighborhoods to serve as well. NSD and the 
City wanted to invest in areas that will actually be successful expenditures. Infill would 
be a sunk cost. Folks are living in bad conditions. It is unlikely that we could rely on 
code enforcement to get investors to rehab the houses. Experience bears out that that 
approach could take 20 years to fully resolve current issues, which was an untenable 
solution, given that folks are living in bad conditions. 
 
And as another Planning Department employee put it: 
Previous city intervention involved a whole lot of carrot in the way of funding for home 
improvement programs. We could have tried to direct more local money towards 
reinvestment, but it was recognized that only so much could be put in – City asked, ‘what 
is the threshold for value returned?’ Burdensomely high improvement was determined to 
be needed in the Bristol Place area. 
 
A city planner further explained in my interview with him that crime was not the number 
one reason for moving forward with the Housing and Land Use approach of the BPNP, the 
condition of the existing infrastructure and housing stock was. Both Planning and the 
Neighborhood Services departments evaluated the condition of the housing stock and whether it 
could be fixed, and “often found liens on properties for lack of payment.” The results of 
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windshield surveys done by NSD, combined with Robbie Boyer & Marissa Dolin’s existing 
conditions report included in the 2011 BPNP pointed to the fact that the integrity of the existing 
physical structures and property values had both dropped dramatically, and as one Planning staff 
member characterized them, the NSD’s housing reinvestment programs were just “$15-20k 
band-aid fixes.” One feature phrase of many City employees when discussing why the nature of 
BPNP solution changed involved “the existing planning tools in the toolbox failing to address 
neighborhood problems adequately.” These planning tools referred to were primarily programs 
targeted at owner-occupied properties however, the implications of which I discuss in more 
detail in section 5.6 below.  
Current NSD Director Kevin Jackson said that the “broad objectives and goals [of the 
BPNP] were human development and public safety” from the very beginning, and that that has 
not changed. The NSD claims that the BPNP is “still a redevelopment plan and not a clearance 
plan, it is still a plan for affordable housing.” He stated that the City is in the business of 
facilitating the development of affordable housing – the BPNP needed to be an affordable 
housing project because of housing needs identified in the larger community. Kevin shared that 
he thought it would be unlikely that a private developer would choose to redevelop the area as an 
affordable housing project of their own volition.  
The plan since this policy shift in early 2012 has generated much community 
controversy. In detailing the timeline of events leading to its current implementation stage, I use 
news articles, city documents and my own interviews with resident, neighborhood and 
institutional stakeholders. 
 
5.5 Initial Bristol Place Neighborhood Plan Approval: February 2011 
Since 1985, the Champaign City Council every two years has adopted a City Council 
Vision and a set of Goals, each of which has corresponding actions assigned, that provide 
direction in allocating City fiscal and staff resources in the best interests of the citizens of 
Champaign (CB 2007-303). The process includes a variety of public input methods, including 
workshops for board and commission members, and feedback from City staff on current goal and 
project status. The Vision statement in 2007 at the time of the initial Council goal for Bristol 
Place the was:  
Champaign is a vibrant Midwestern City with an active center city and healthy 
neighborhoods. The City is designed for quality and sustainability, and has a growing local 
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economy. City residents are safe, enjoy a great quality of life, 1st class educational 
opportunities, and easy mobility. Champaign is an inclusive community that welcomes all. 
 
The first mention in publicly available documentation about a plan for the Bristol Place 
neighborhood, as mentioned above, is from the Resolution Adopting City Council Vision and 
Goals for FY 2007-2012 (CB 2007-303). Goal #3 was “Our Community Has Healthy 
Neighborhoods,” and included things like a comprehensive housing strategy and developing a 
funding and staffing plan for ongoing implementation of multi-family common area inspections 
along with developing a redevelopment plan for the Bristol Place neighborhood. Goal #5 in this 
same document was “Our Community Has Balanced and Sustainable Growth,” and listed the 
following three components as strategic directions to meet this goal: 
1. Develop a fiscal impact analysis of new development and adopt a development cost 
recovery policy. 
2. Develop land use and development policies to positively impact the environment and 
promote long-term sustainability. 
3. Implement programs and strategies to increase commercial and residential infill 
development.  
 
On December 12, 2008, Council was provided an Information Only memorandum that 
contained an existing conditions report of the Bristol Place neighborhood prepared by Robert 
Boyer & Marissa Dolin, graduate students in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at 
the University of Illinois. This report detailed existing land use and zoning, population 
characteristics, property conditions, public infrastructure quality, transit access, public safety 
concerns, and existing City programming offered in the area.  
The Neighborhood Services Advisory Board (NSAB) met on January 22, 2009, before 
the City embarked on a series of public participation input sessions addressing issues in the 
Bristol Place neighborhood. The NSAB consists of seven members appointed by the Mayor and 
approved by City Council to assist in the articulation of citizen concerns and direction for the 
expenditure of Community Development Block Grant funds, as well as other local, state and 
federal funds available to the City for improving housing opportunities for low- and moderate-
income people. There is no record publicly available online of the notes from any of these 
sessions. On February 10, 2009 an “Open House” event was held at the Apostolic Faith Church 
to share the results of the Boyer & Dolin Existing Conditions report conducted during 2008, and 
gather information from residents about the neighborhood and what changes they would like to 
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see addressed. 470 invitation flyers were distributed door to door, and only 15 people 
participated in the open house event.  
In the spring of 2009, 40 surveys were completed by residents and collected by staff, 
asking 10 questions on safety issues and asking residents to describe what they liked and what 
they would like to see change about the Bristol Place neighborhood. Two public meetings were 
held in April 2009 to share survey results and gather ideas for the plan vision, goals and 
objectives. Staff met individually with neighborhood business owners, local for-profit and non-
profit developers, property owners, Unit 4 School District Staff, Champaign Park District Staff, 
and the Housing Authority of Champaign County throughout the summer of 2009. The purpose 
of the meetings was to seek stakeholder input into the plan and to gather their ideas on 
improvements in the neighborhood (BPNP, 2011). 
In early December 2009 a joint NSAB and neighborhood meeting was held at Human 
Kinetics (a publishing business located in the neighborhood) to share issues gathered and 
discussed from both residents and other stakeholders. February 11 and March 11, 2010 were the 
dates of the next two NSAB meetings, and on April 26, 2010 another joint NSAB and 
neighborhood meeting was again held at Human Kinetics, to share and discuss the draft BPNP. 
Most discussion that followed focused on public safety and housing issues, which were 
summarized in the following way for a City Council Study Session dated September 24, 2010: 
In particular, regarding public safety, some residents expressed interest in a greater police 
presence with an emphasis on proactive community-oriented policing and interaction 
with the residents when the area is patrolled. However, other residents were 
uncomfortable or not interested with the suggested solution. Another concern, regarding 
housing by residents included finding effective ways to hold landlords accountable for 
the maintenance and appearance of their properties as well as unlawful tenant behavior 
(SS 2010-059). 
 
On June 7, 2010 the City held a social event that 75 adults and children attended in 
Bristol Park (the city park located in the Bristol Place neighborhood that the plan was named 
after) to further discuss draft objectives and outcomes. On May 19, 2010 the Plan Commission 
was presented with a memo introducing the draft goals and objectives of the redevelopment plan, 
given “input gathered from neighborhood stakeholders comprised of the residents, business 
owners, school and park districts, local developers, and City Staff” outlining the “desired 
changes to this neighborhood” (09/17/2010 Report to Plan Commission). The plan was originally 
designed to “be a holistic plan that addresses physical issues, such as vacant lots and declining 
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housing stock as well as social issues, such as the need for more activities for children in the 
neighborhood,” according to the 9/17/2010 Report. The plan contained five areas to be 
addressed: housing and land use, human development, parks and open space, public safety, and 
transportation.  
The plan was shared at two final Plan Commission meetings on September 15 and 
December 1, 2010, with the NSAB on December 9, 2010, and then at City Council Study 
Sessions on September 28 and December 14, 2010 before the City Council adopted the February 
11, 2011 BPNP as an official amendment to the City’s Comprehensive Plan (SS 2010-072).  In 
the Report to the Plan Commission from the Planning Director dated September 17, 2010, the 
Housing and Land Use Goal for the neighborhood lists three example implementation measures:  
(1) Targeted rental inspection 
(2) Applying for designation as a Neighborhood Revitalization Strategy Area from HUD  
(3) Programs to encourage home ownership in the area  
 
None of these or any other proposed implementation strategies listed under the other four goals 
for the neighborhood involved the use of eminent domain, residential displacement, demolition 
or reconstruction of existing homes or other neighborhood structures. All recommendations 
listed, responsive to previously gathered public input, were infill facilitation and community 
programming suggestions.  
 
5.6 Changes made in early 2012: Bristol Place residents to be displaced, homes demolished 
On February 15, 2011 the City Council adopted the BPNP as an amendment to the 
Comprehensive Plan (CB 2011-028). The roughly 1-year time period between February 2011 
and January 2012 marks the timeframe during which the City shifted its focus and plans for the 
Bristol Place neighborhood. The official documentation of this shift and its rationale is at best 
unclear, and at worst, deliberately opaque. Table 1 in Appendix A lists the public and community 
input meetings for the BPNP contained in the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 AAPs whose meeting 
minutes and public comments I evaluated and asked interviewees about to try and determine how 
this displacement and clearance decision came about.  
The members in attendance at the first meeting listed ended up turning into the Bristol 
Park Steering Committee, which coordinated and led all community input throughout the rest of 
the planning process as strategies for achieving the housing and land use goal were “debated.” 
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The November 16, 2011 focus group discussion for the BPNP, other than City Council and Staff, 
was attended by Champaign resident and local entrepreneur Seon Williams, Reverend and 
Mother Giboney (Apostolic Faith Church leaders), Reverend Eugene Barnes (Metanoia Centers 
– faith-based housing and mini social services organization started in 2001), Edward “Zig” Isaac 
(Shadow Wood Property Manager) and Dr. William Patterson (founder and co-director of Youth 
Media Workshop, creator of Hip Hop Xpress, and educational policy professor at UIUC) as well 
as two members of Human Kinetics staff. 
 
5.6.1. Metanoia, Reverend Barnes, and historical City actions in Bristol Place neighborhood: 
Reverend Eugene Barnes, pastor of New Life Church of Faith in Urbana, started 
Metanoia Centers on Clock Street in the Bristol Place neighborhood in 2001 with Reverend 
Charles B. Jackson, a fellow community organizer and former pastor of Bethel AME Church. It 
has functioned as a community center, hosting at one time an after-school program and now a 
technology center for neighbors. But Metanoia's primary mission is housing: building homes, 
persuading banks to invest in poor neighborhoods, and helping homeowners avoid foreclosure. 
The organization is allied with the Central Illinois Organizing Project in Bloomington, which has 
been instrumental in persuading large banking interests such as National City, Bank One and 
Union Planters to begin reinvesting in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods under the 
provisions of the federal Community Reinvestment Act. Metanoia created a “1 percent, $500 
down” mortgage lending program with National City in the early 2000s, a breakthrough in 
opening up home ownership to a previously ineligible class of citizens. Essentially, prospective 
buyers need only $500 or one percent of the purchase price from their own savings for a single-
family home, including homes that need renovation. The remaining two percent down payment, 
if necessary, can come from other sources, such as a relative or a nonprofit or government 
agency. The loan incentive program was actually launched in July 2003 in Springfield, and in the 
first five days, National City did $10 million worth of business, but the bulk of the loans 
originated in the Springfield, Peoria and Bloomington areas (News Gazette, October 23, 2003). 
Nationally, Metanoia helps empower communities in economic and social crises-high 
unemployment, drugs, violence and poor housing. From 2005-2008 in Champaign, Metanoia 
partnered with the mostly Latino population in the Shadow Wood Mobile Home park to try to 
bring the two communities together. A technology center, with donated computers from Human 
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Kinetics, was set up in 2007 to provide Internet access and after-school help to Shadow Wood 
families (News Gazette, November 7, 2008).  
Barnes, who got his start in the civil rights movement, says partnerships among citizens, 
government, clergy, nonprofits and corporations are the key to improving neighborhood 
conditions in the Bristol Place area: “That’s what community organizing is all about” (News 
Gazette, December 7, 2008). Metanoia has conducted neighborhood walks at night, joined forces 
with the Apostolic Faith Church on Bellefontaine Street, and organized cleanup days. The City 
has had a poor track record on responsiveness to this neighborhood’s needs, which has 
contributed to much of the now-labeled ‘blight’ that currently exists. For a clean-up day in July 
2002, Metanoia went to its own expense to rent a dumpster, even though the city provides them 
in other neighborhood clean-ups when there is a neighborhood group officially registered with 
the City. The City requires a registered neighborhood organization to apply for Neighborhood 
Coordination’s Small Grant program in order to shoulder the cost of a dumpster for a single 
weekend (City of Champaign’s Neighborhood Services Code Compliance Community Outreach 
and Education on Neighborhood Cleanups). Metanoia also lobbied city hall in 2003 to change 
the one-way streets that “act[ed] as a maze contribut[ing] to a sense of enclosure,” and delivered 
96 signatures of people who wanted the one-way streets changed back to two-way, but the 
proposal was rejected. It took another 7 years before the City responded and returned all streets 
in the neighborhood back to two-ways in 2010. Metanoia staff at the time said they weren’t very 
happy with the lack of response they had received from the city (News Gazette, March 23, 
2003). 
Despite disagreement, then-Neighborhood Services Director Dorothy David (now City 
Manager) said that Metanoia Centers “represent a tremendous positive” in the neighborhood. In 
2003, the city provided three vacant lots to the center to build homes in the neighborhood, plus 
$84,040 in federal Community Development funds (HOME) for down payment assistance (CB 
2002-193; CB 2002-194; CB 2004-016). In a city solicitation for residents to apply for home 
improvement grants in 2003, only two people from the Bristol Place neighborhood responded, 
and one “did not qualify” because the needs of the house exceeded the $25,000 spending limit 
(News Gazette, March 23, 2003). Currently, these three originally City-donated vacant lots (119 
E. Roper, 202 E. Bellefontaine & 208 E. Bellefontaine) house three owner-occupants, although 
202 Bellefontaine ended up being sold to Habitat for Humanity and currently houses a “working 
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towards ownership” owner-occupant (News Gazette, June 17, 2012).  
Patricia Martin, a resident and former organizer of the center, said she found that people 
in the neighborhood didn’t respond to City efforts because they were mistrustful. Martin did 
much of Metanoia’s early legwork in establishing contact with neighbors, running after-school 
programs and acting as an intermediary between residents and social services. “I had to first 
convince them I wasn’t trying to get anything out of them,” she said in 2003. Besides the houses, 
success from 2001-2003 came in getting five women off the street and into drug treatment, in 
signing up 26 children for after-school programs and in getting 28 houses signed up for a 
beautification contest. “We're trying to get the kids to help with painting, picking up trash, fixing 
gates, mowing, planting flowers, little things that make a big difference,” she said (News 
Gazette, March 23, 2003). 
 In 2003, Barnes was quoted in the same News Gazette article as saying: “This is an area 
no one seemed to want to be involved in. There’s open drug dealing, prostitution, gambling, 
threatening behavior. You see the older residents come out in the morning, but by afternoon, 
everybody’s back in, and that’s where they stay. It’s tantamount to terrorism by default.” 
Reverend Barnes said seven years later in 2010 that 90% of the problems that have existed in the 
Bristol neighborhood (open-air drug sales and prostitution specifically) have been eliminated. He 
was quoted in a News Gazette article dated December 14, 2010 as saying, “we’ve been able to 
stabilize it from the way it used to be,” and with his own background as a community organizer 
hoped City officials would include all of the Bristol Park Redevelopment project’s stakeholders 
in decision-making, which he reported somewhat differently from the City’s stakeholder list 
mentioned above, as consisting of “community members, labor unions, environmental and faith-
based groups and affordable housing advocates” (News Gazette, December 14, 2010). The City’s 
list, from the September 2010 Report to Plan Commission mentioned above, consisted of 
residents, business owners, school and park districts, local developers, and City staff members.  
 
5.6.2. Community input disregarded as City moves ahead with its redevelopment plans 
The first community input meeting to be held after the February 2011 approval of the 
BPNP was the November 11, 2011 focus group meeting listed above, and the focus of 
discussion, according to minutes contained in the 2012-2013 AAP, centered around the BPNP’s 
housing and land use goal. Reverend Barnes voiced concerns at the time about possible pushback 
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on relocation and total clearance, urged a ground-up rather than a top-down approach to 
community revitalization, and wanted to put protections in place to eliminate the prospect of real 
estate speculators in the area. 
 On December 20, 2011 the first Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee took 
place, with a stated goal of “providing advisory and community liaison support to City Staff to 
support implementation of the February 2011 BPNP” (12/20/2011 Bristol Park Neighborhood 
Steering Committee Meeting Notes; quoted from AAP, FY12-13). There were no attendees to 
the January 11, 2012 Shadow Wood resident meeting, and the next publicly available meeting 
document dated January 17, 2012 already references acquisition and relocation as Greg Skaggs’ 
response to an audience members’ question about her residency in Bristol: “Woman in the 
audience said we are in Bristol. How does this affect us? Greg stated by Acquisition/Relocation. 
If approved by Council, then specific of your needs and relocation will be negotiated” (January 
17, 2012 Bristol Park Neighborhood Non-Profit Organization and Business Owner Meeting 
Notes; quoted from AAP, FY12-13).  
Between February of 2011 and January 2012, something changed in the City’s approach 
to the infill development and City programming housing goals laid out for the Bristol Park 
Neighborhood Plan dated February 2011. And there is very little documentation to show for 
either any resident input, or 3rd party “technical expert” reports or documentation alluded to by 
Kevin Jackson above to support the changes made. Within a month of the very beginning of the 
public participation process supposedly led by the Bristol Park Steering Committee, City official 
Greg Skaggs was documented as explaining to a Bristol Place neighborhood resident at the time 
that they would be displaced from their home, essentially telling her what was going to happen 
and giving a “more details to come” response. There is no publicly available documentation of 
any public meetings or notes of city staff or council member discussion during the time period 
from February 2011 to January 2012.  
The Neighborhood Services Advisory Board meeting videos available during this time 
period are for meetings held on 1/13/11, 3/10/11, 6/9/11, 10/13/11, and then only two meetings 
during the year of 2012 were dated 9/13/12 and 10/11/12, respectively. The only NSAB agenda 
that lists a discussion item related to Bristol Place was dated December 18, 2011: “staff will 
provide the Board with a status update on the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan and 
Implementation Strategy…staff will also request that the Board designate one of its members to 
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participate on the Bristol Park Steering Committee,” but this December 2011 meeting was never 
held. The first NSAB meeting for 2012 dated January 12 stated in its minutes:  
Greg presented the housing analysis of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan. Suggestions 
for each of the neighborhoods were presented. John then presented how the development 
of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Steering Committee was developed. After 
discussion, the board came to a consensus and showed support of the plan (January 12, 
2012 NSAB Meeting Minutes; quoted from AAP, FY12-13). 
 
It is unclear from this language and lack of earlier or more explicitly detailed documentation 
what exactly the board came to a consensus to support at this time, but given the City’s focus on 
housing decline and “blight” as justification for clearance four months later in the first City 
Council study session where the plan in its near-final form was presented by staff, it is likely the 
‘suggestions for each neighborhood’ were the same as those presented during the May 2012 
study session, which are elaborated below.  
In addition to the gap in a paper trail of public documentation in the official planning 
process, in email correspondence retrieved via FOIA, local activist scholar and reporter Brian 
Dolinar reported: 
It appeared from email correspondence that by January 2012, Ed Bland and Champaign 
city staff were already working together to redevelop Bristol Place. On January 13, 2012, 
Patty Smith, HACC’s Director of Capital Programs, sent an email to her boss, HACC 
Executive Director Ed Bland, HACC consultant Cindi Herrera, Champaign community 
development specialist Greg Skaggs, and developer for The Benoit Group, Torian 
Priestly. Smith had met earlier in the week with the City of Champaign who wanted to set 
up monthly meetings to discuss ‘Champaign development issues.’ She proposed meeting 
before HACC Board meetings in the housing authority building, ‘since we will have so 
many commitments back to back’ (Urbana-Champaign Independent Media Center, 
September 17, 2012). 
 
These pieces of evidence all point to the fact that the planning decision-making process 
was already much further along than the public participation process timeline would initially lead 
an outsider to believe, as the Steering Committee and the majority of the public input sessions 
listed in the 2012-2013 AAP had yet to occur. The input these public meetings did collect 
correspondingly seemed to go unheard by those crafting the details of meeting the housing and 
land use goal laid out in the original February 2011 plan, which also supports the fact that some 
vital decision making had already occurred behind the scenes.  
All of the City staff and most of the institutional stakeholders I interviewed denied that 
crime rates had much of anything at all to do with the displacement and redevelopment decision, 
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instead referencing “blighted structures” and declining property values as the primary reasons. 
As one City Council member I interviewed put it: 
Race touches the BPNP – it becomes a really sensitive thing. Every time an issue comes 
up that involves a part of town where large amount of blacks live, race enters into the 
equation. Arguments get more cautious, and comments get more careful and there are 
hidden agendas and third rails that people don’t want to step on. Those kinds of issues 
can make an otherwise difficult problem into an even more difficult problem. 
 
A primary theme that came out unmistakably in the Steering Committee’s community 
survey responses, my own interviews with residents, as well as input from public participation 
during City Council study sessions, was that many residents in the neighborhood (often those of 
longer tenure and many homeowners) felt a strong sense of community in the Bristol Place 
neighborhood and liked the location, but were fearful of the recurrent crime. However, 
respondents resoundingly stated beliefs that the “riff raff” came from outside the neighborhood, 
not from neighborhood residents. Area resident attendee comments from the January 25, 2012 
Garwood property owners meeting also supported this:  
[You will] never change home value when people perceive this area as violent, etc. There 
are lots of police and court reports where people have provided an address in this area, 
but if you look at the lease that person is an 18 y.o. male (AAP, FY12-13). 
 
Another audience member, a property owner in Garwood, said, “You cannot attack good tenants 
when there are guys in windbreakers talking to cars for five minutes (drug dealers).”  
 Many Bristol Place residents as part of Dr. Andrew Greenlee’s research agreed, saying 
that crime may occur in their neighborhood, but those perpetrating it do not reside there: 
…What I saw living in Bristol Place, it wasn’t always the people that lived in there that 
was doing all the damaging, it was the people that the people that lived there allowed to 
come in to visit them that was doing all the damage.  Because a lot of fights that were 
going on and shooting up was going on, it was people that didn’t even live in the 
neighborhood, but they brought all the drama to the neighborhood, and you know, so you 
know, and we can't – we – all of us, we can't control other people coming, but we try. 
 
…I mean you could give people – I think if they gave them a grant to clean up, do better 
in their properties that’s better. Why tear down and build?  I mean in this area here there 
have been some shooting going on and people getting killed and hurt.  But it don’t make 
no sense and it’s not the people that live in the area.  It’s the people that come across over 
here. They come across the [railroad] tracks. 
 
…They have some bad parts about the neighborhood, but most of the bad parts do not 
come from the people who live in the neighborhood; it’s from people who come into the 
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neighborhood and cause – and wreak havoc and mayhem and whatever.  Most of – I’d 
say 99 percent of the time anything that happens over here that’s criminal has to do with 
someone who doesn’t live in this area. 
 
And it is not just existing Bristol Place and Garwood area residents who share this perception, as 
one of the city residents who commented during the May 2012 Council study session who was 
voicing support of the plan said, “95% of the people in that area are strong, have unfortunate 
circumstances and are law abiding citizens. If you disperse 100% of these people, you disperse 
5-10% problems but the rest are good hard working citizens, very, very good people.” 
In addition to resident perceptions, which opponents may dismiss as merely subjective 
judgments, arrest notices from the News Gazette from 2003 – 2013 support the assertion that 
drug-related criminality rhetoric often used to vilify the area stems from transactions that may 
occur in the neighborhood but that occur as a result of actions of individuals who do not reside in 
the neighborhood: 
Jameson Johnson, 19, who listed an address in the 800 block of East Pennsylvania 
Avenue, U, was arraigned Friday on a Class X felony charge of possession with intent to 
deliver a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a public park. Champaign police 
arrested Johnson in the 1300 block of North Champaign Street about 2:30 a.m. Thursday, 
court records show. Johnson was arrested in the vicinity of Bristol Park (Drug charges 
brought in 3 separate cases; News Gazette, October 7, 2003). 
 
Dorian Benton, 27, who listed a Centralia address, was arraigned Tuesday on a Class X 
felony charge of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance within 1,000 feet 
of Bristol Park on North Market Street in Champaign (News Gazette, August 4, 2004). 
 
William D. Dixon, 43, who listed an address of the 0--100 block of Willow Court, was 
arrested Wednesday in the 1200 block of North Champaign Street after he allegedly fled 
from Champaign police. He was charged Thursday with unlawful possession to deliver 
heroin and cocaine, both Class X felonies because the offenses allegedly occurred within 
1,000 feet of Bristol Park. If convicted, he faces a mandatory six to 30 years in prison 
(Champaign man has felony drug case; News Gazette, June 30, 2011). 
 
Randy Willis, 40, who listed an address in the 800 block of North State Street, was 
charged Friday with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance within 1,000 
feet of Bristol Park. A Champaign police report said between October 2012 and March 
2013, Champaign police narcotics agents arranged five separate purchases of crack 
cocaine from Willis at a home in the 100 block of Bellefontaine Street. (News Gazette, 
April 5, 2013: Champaign man facing crack cocaine charge). 
 
Andrew Greenlee, a Professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at 
UIUC, and Stacey Tutt, director of the Community Preservation Clinic at the UIUC Law School, 
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both members of the Steering Committee, conducted a survey of Bristol residents from March 
10-12 of 2012 whose highlighted results were presented at the last Steering Committee meeting 
listed in the 2012-2013 AAP (SS 2012-024). Out of 69 occupied units, 43 people participated in 
the survey (a 62% response rate). The survey found that the average length of stay at their 
current residence for renters was 3.75 years, and for owners was 27.75 years. Of the 15 
households who reported being homeowners, 8 reported living in their current home for more 
than 30 years. Approximately 50% of the residents surveyed stated that they desired to return to 
a redeveloped Bristol Place community (SS 2012-024). In addition to providing vital information 
about the housing cost-burden, income, and residential tenure demographics of residents in the 
area (which I discuss later), the survey asked respondents what they liked about their 
neighborhood and what they would like to see change. The positive responses had to do 
primarily with a sense of community, family connections and history in the neighborhood, a 
sense of community and relationships with neighbors, recent improvements in terms of safety 
and a sense of peace and quiet, and the central location and proximity to parks. The desired 
changes reported were reduced crime, increased youth activity opportunities, better lighting and 
sidewalk infrastructure, and an improved external perception of the neighborhood (March 8, 
2012 NSAB Meeting; quoted from AAP FY12-13).  
My interviews conducted two years later in 2014 as part of an expanded research project 
Dr. Greenlee is working on echoed many of these themes summarized by the original 2012 
survey: 
…Well, all of my life I have lived here.  I was raised here as a baby and grew up.  This is 
the area there.  We was all here, when we was younger here.  And we raised our 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren right here in this area. So everybody really been – 
this has really been our neighborhood where we've been living at all our lives.  We grew up 
here and then had our families and stuff here. [My mom is] She's 80. She don't like the idea 
of moving. Disturbing to her. She does not like it at all. 
 
…It's just – I don't know.  So a lot of people just coming into your neighborhood and make 
it their neighborhood, so that makes everybody think your neighborhood is a bad 
neighborhood.  So that makes people want – I mean what is their purpose?  What is their 
purpose for moving everyone out?  I don't understand that either. 
 
…There are people in this neighborhood, as you say, that have been here forever, and to 
them it is a great neighborhood.  And to me, I think it's a very convenient neighborhood; 
it's close to downtown, it's got good public transportation, it's close to the mall.  And it’s 
not overly – I don’t think it's an overly dangerous neighborhood. 
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…Yes, there is crime, but there’s crime all over.  You know, there are – I think more could 
be done with some of the crime than what we do.  I mean there’s been shootings, you 
know, down the street here.  There’s been – there was a murder here last year over on 
Roper, a boyfriend of a gal, you know, stabbed her to death or whatever.  You know, those 
things happen, but, you know, it’s probably – it happens a little more often in this 
neighborhood, I think, and I think it has to do with the socioeconomic level of most of the 
people here. You know, in a neighborhood where there’s a lot of people that are 
underemployed or on assistance and all this kind of stuff, I think there tends to be more 
crime than in a neighborhood where everybody has a good paying job and, you know, 
they’re not wanting for anything, they’re not – there’s people in this neighborhood who 
would literally steal for food, I mean ‘cause they don’t have anything. 
 
These neighborhood resident comments, area resident input, and arrest records beg the 
critiques raised by Terry Townsend and other community advocates throughout this decision-
making process in local news articles: “What is being proposed is the breakup of a community. 
Clear and simple, you’re going to gentrify that neighborhood. This is the breakup of an African-
American community.” Reverend Barnes was quoted in the same article as saying “he sees it 
differently,” having been in the neighborhood since the demolition of the infamous “Green 
Apartments,” he said that the area is much improved since the Green Apartment days, and the 
residents who remain deserve better: “These people are part of the city. They’re part of the 
citizenry. They deserve the same kind of attention as the people down in Devonshire” (News 
Gazette, June 17, 2012). 
These allusions to recent improvements in crime reduction and neighborhood peace and 
quiet by those who lived in Bristol Place at the time remained largely unconsidered by the City 
as it went forward with its “public participation” sessions. Public participation, as too many 
planners know, is not only about the quantity of meetings held, but about their quality – the 
attendance, the input received, and most importantly and most relevantly here, whether that input 
is then considered and incorporated into final decision-making. When I questioned residents 
about what their thoughts were about the meetings, responses varied, but were often negative: 
[Q: What were your thoughts about City-led community meetings about this redevelopment 
plan?]	  	  
…Bullshit. I mean why would you want to tear down – it’s older people in this 
neighborhood been here. They’re set in their ways and everything.  Why you want to 
move these people from where, their homes? To build something that’s going to cause 
trouble? You’re going to have more trouble.  
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…Well first, the brunt of it I got when I started going to the meetings. But it seemed like 
it was the same information over and over again. So I stopped going to the meetings. 
Then there was the rumor out that if you don’t come to the meetings, if they don’t – 
because they had a sign-up sheet. So those people that were more involved and coming 
to their meetings would be taken care of first as opposed to the people that didn’t show 
up at all. So I don’t know how true that was. But there was a sign-in sheet. So I was like, 
‘That’s not fair. Maybe I don’t have anywhere to get there or maybe I’ve got some other 
appointment that I have to go to, plus you guys ain’t telling us nothing.’ And so, those 
meetings not only were for Bristol Park. They were also kind of like neighborhood 
meetings and the police would be there and stuff, and if you had any problems on your 
block you kind of let them know, which was a good thing, but ain’t nobody going to talk 
about nothing in this neighborhood. You know how that is. 
 
  At one of the best-attended major public input meetings and in “a final attempt to reach 
out to residents and owners in the Bristol Park neighborhood who were not previously able to 
attend the other neighborhood meetings,” the February 18, 2012 public event held at Stratton 
Elementary was attended by 118 neighbors, volunteers and committee members to discuss the 
City’s housing strategies plan for the neighborhood (SS 2012-024). This meeting concluded with 
staff seeking feedback through comment cards with two questions: “Do you reside in Bristol or 
Garwood?” and “Are you supportive of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Proposed Housing 
Strategies?” The Neighborhood Services Advisory Board 3/8/12 minutes state that 30 comment 
cards were received, of which 7 were negative, and elaborated that some of the comments 
focused on trust and prices for the homes. However, in the May 4, 2012 housing goal 
implementation study session memo to then-City Manager Steve Carter, the results of the 
comment cards were tallied as “a total of 33 comment cards received with only 7 negative 
responses.” But in the appendix provided (see Appendix D.6), which included a matrix of 
response breakdowns, there were in fact only 29 comment card responses received, one of which 
was classified as “other” rather than a yes or no, and 4 responses of which could not be identified 
by neighborhood.  
Given the wording of the questions asked, it seemed City staff was trying to gauge 
whether current residents in either of the affected neighborhoods of Garwood or Bristol agreed 
with the proposed housing strategies presented and outlined in the meeting. If this is the case, 
then the actual tally of responses should have been 18 in favor (75%), 6 against (25%), and a 
total of 24 reasonably reliable responses. Not having a record of the number of resident attendees 
versus volunteers and committee members, 24 responses/118 is a 20% response rate; even 
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29/118 is only a 25% response rate, and even if the 118 total number is reduced by known 
Steering Committee membership averaging around 15 members, 24 responses gives a 23% 
response rate, and 29 responses gives 28%. Neither of these come even close to the 62% 
response rate of the much ore in depth survey done by the Steering Committee, whose responses 
indicated more a desire for better City services provision for the neighborhood in the way of 
streets, lighting, illegal dumping enforcement, property code enforcement, and more effective 
policing, in addition to explanations of intense emotional valuation of their neighborhood and its 
residential history. 
In email correspondence retrieved via filing a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request, local university activist, African-American history scholar and reporter Brian Dolinar 
reported that he uncovered correspondence during this time dated March 29, 2012 between NSD 
Neighborhood Programs Manager Kerri Spear and Kevin Jackson where Kerri sent Kevin a news 
report from Housing Affairs Letter about cuts to housing authorities across the country, 
speculating, “This may explain why Ed is reluctant to ‘add’ more vouchers to his inventory” 
(Urbana-Champaign Independent Media Center, September 17, 2012: Emails reveal Champaign 
city staff working behind the scenes to level Bristol Place). This allusion to discussions with 
Housing Authority Director Ed Bland on a component of the eventual Bristol Place land use plan 
that had not yet materialized in public forums – the use of Housing Choice Vouchers (HCVs) to 
relocate residents living in the Bristol Place area – is discussed in detail in section 5.6.3 of this 
chapter. 
The next official City documentation of progress on the housing strategies goals was 
made on April 10, 2012 during the Annual Action Plan Council Study Session (SS 2012-024). 
This document contained language under Goal 2 (“eliminating blighting conditions in the City’s 
neighborhoods”):  
In FY 2012/13, the City anticipates moving forward with the Bristol Park Neighborhood 
Plan. Some activities, including the Lot Acquisition/Clearance Program, meet other goals 
(i.e. Goal 4) - and therefore will be listed only once under another goal. The plan 
recommends the City acquire, through voluntary acquisition when possible, up to 76 
parcels in the Bristol Place neighborhood due to the overall housing and public safety 
conditions of the neighborhood. This plan was not yet approved by City Council at the 
time of this Annual Action Plan (scheduled for May 8, 2012 study session).  
 
Despite the plan “not having been officially approved,” all language seems to indicate that it 
would be and that the City was moving forward assuming that it would be. 
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 Goal 4 referenced above from the 2012-2013 AAP is to “preserve the character, value, 
and marketability of the City’s older neighborhoods,” and sub-part b) is to “develop new 
activities to improve neighborhoods identified in the Wellness Plan as having the greatest need 
for public sector intervention.” Then, after a brief reference to funding issues, the following 
statement was made justifying why acquisition and complete redevelopment is necessary:  
Widespread neighborhood improvement will occur when services and resources can be 
concentrated in a given area over a significant period of time and are delivered as part of 
a well planned redevelopment strategy. Declining neighborhoods could be revitalized 
with this level of intensive service delivery. However, existing community development 
funding is not sufficient to address this redevelopment need (AAP 12-13). 
 
It then goes on to again say specifically that the housing and land use goal will be further 
discussed in a May 8, 2012 City Council study session, but that “due to the extensive needs of 
Bristol Place subdivision, staff estimates a five year schedule to acquire and complete 
redevelopment.” The 2012-2013 AAP continues to move full speed ahead in its assumptions for 
residential relocation, structural demolition and redevelopment approval, and an attachment 
under the Neighborhood Revitalization (NR) HUD CPMP Project Tables section lists the 
following as an explanation for the proposed earmarked $30,000 in NR funds: 
This program allows the City to identify properties creating a blighting influence on the 
surrounding neighborhood, acquire those properties, and clear them for affordable 
housing and/or mixed-income development. This can be accomplished with existing tools 
or in partnership with approved neighborhood improvement plans, including the new 
Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan, which will require the acquisition, relocation and 
demolition of existing units.  
 
 In sum, the 2012-2013 AAP contained 3 funds specifically already packaging money for 
the BPNP: Maintenance of City-owned Properties ($10,459), Code Enforcement salaries 
($40,000); Neighborhood Revitalization ($30,000). In early 2012, City staff had already begun to 
earmark funding in order to plan for the eminent domain-based redevelopment housing and land 
use strategies they had proposed, in advance of the public or City Council officially approving 
them. As Greg Skaggs later succinctly summarized of their strategy in a June 2012 interview, 
“the strategy is kind of a replace Bristol (Place), repair Garwood” (News Gazette, June 10, 
2012).  
 In addition to the official documentation gap from February 2011 to January 2012 and 
ahead-of-public-input-schedule earmarked funding and decision-making language in later 
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official documents, a report on the “Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan” by City Manager Steve 
Carter dated May 4, 2012, spoke as if a partnership had already been formed, saying “the 
Housing Authority is currently drafting an intergovernmental agreement that provides for 
Section 8 vouchers for all eligible households” (IMC, August 24, 2012: Champaign Housing 
Authority considers demolishing a third black neighborhood). 
The widely anticipated and documented major City Council study session ostensibly 
discussing and gathering input on implementation alternatives for the Housing and Land Use 
goals of the BPNP proposed by City staff was dated May 8, 2012. At this meeting, City staff 
presented to Council recommendations they claimed were the synthesized results from the 
previous year of public meetings input. In this study session, Greg Skaggs, the then-NSD lead on 
the Bristol Place project stated that the City had three neighborhood redevelopment options: (1) 
maintaining the status quo - providing maintenance and baseline services, and no new 
investment; (2) what he called “neighborhood revitalization” - administered through 
programming and rehab to make basic improvements; and (3) what he termed “neighborhood 
reconstruction” - wide scale clearance and redevelopment.  
Staff recommendations then presented for the three neighborhoods in the planning area 
covered by the BPNP included all three redevelopment options. Shadow Wood, as a privately 
owned mobile home park that is 95% owner-occupied (although each mobile home technically 
leases land) was designated as a stable area whose biggest need was a storm shelter. City 
discussions about locating Fire Station 3 in this neighborhood according to the proposed land use 
plan (see Appendix D.7) would in effect “kill two birds with one stone,” providing larger 
community center space in the same structure, which addressed resident needs gathered through 
public input processes simultaneously with fire services needs.  
City staff recommended that the Garwood sub-area neighborhood be targeted for 
neighborhood revitalization, as Skaggs stated that “some homes need a lot of work, but existing 
City programming can bring it up to a healthy status.” The staff felt that improvements could be 
made with existing housing rehab programs to enhance and maintain the current character of the 
Garwood neighborhood.  
Bristol Place, on the other hand, staff now formally recommended be targeted for 
neighborhood reconstruction. The rationales presented at this study session for this decision have 
not changed since, and included property values and existing structures that had collectively 
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declined further than Garwood’s, and increased vacant properties by abandonment which had 
turned into blight and were housing illegal activities in the neighborhood. In Bristol Place, staff 
said that home values are so low that property owners complain that the neighborhood does not 
provide enough return on investment to put money into existing properties, so owners do not 
invest additional funds and properties continue to decline with negative effects on both the 
immediate surrounding structures and the larger neighborhood.  
In this May 8, 2012 study session before Council, Skaggs detailed a single 10-year-old 
infill project that the City had been involved in as a representative example of the City’s poor 
return on investment of public funds. According to Skaggs, the City invested an unspecified 
amount of funding in bringing a home in the neighborhood up to an initial post-improvement 
assessment value of $95,000, then it ended up being foreclosed, went through two different 
ownership transitions, and in 2011 sold for $27,500. Its value continuing to decline, it was then 
assessed at $26,900 in the next year. This example is an interesting choice to use as an example 
by the City, because (1) the timeframe of the City investment goes back an entire decade, with 
no more recent examples of infill investment failing with such significant results; (2) he did not 
actually provide the dollar amount of City funding invested, how it was invested, or how this 
investment fit within any larger plan for the neighborhood; and (3) he only elaborated on the 
particular circumstances of this example property after being questioned further by Council 
member Marci Dodds. The reason for (1) is that after this initial investment in the early 2000s, 
the City has only invested funding in one other infill project partnership with Habitat for 
Humanity in 2010 by purchasing and donating a vacant lot at 607 E Beardsley to build a home 
on (CAPER, FY2010-2011). Beyond this, the City has not invested any further funding in infill 
development in the neighborhood beyond their existing collection of NSD housing programs, the 
disproportionate majority of which are geared towards homeowners, who as they widely argue 
are not the problem properties in this neighborhood – slumlord managed rental properties were 
documented by the City as being the most blighted and problematic. You can see just by walking 
through the neighborhood which homes are owner-occupied – they have flowers, nice 
landscaping, neat grass and no debris on lawns or driveways – they look well cared for. As for 
(2), the investment made by the City was a donation to Metanoia Centers of three vacant city-
owned lots and $84,040 in federal CDBG funds to be used for income-eligible (below 80% AMI) 
down payment assistance, but that amount was actually divided between three properties, of 
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which the referenced was only thus one. Additionally, regardless of Skaggs’ quoted “$95,000 
assessed value,” the Champaign County Assessor’s records show a sale price from 2003 of 
$82,426 (see Table 8). As for (3), this home and example (at 119 E. Roper) does not seem a 
particularly helpful representative example (which was how it was presented in the study 
session), as the original person Metanoia Center qualified to put in there was James “Ervin” 
Allen, a 69-year-old blind, crippled man who passed away tragically only a year after he moved 
into the first home he had ever owned (News Gazette, July 19, 2004: Local man realized dream 
before he died). This left the structure vacant for a while, and as Greg did then elaborate when 
pressed by Marci, the Urban League looked into leasing or purchasing it for someone who then 
ended up falling out of their program, upon which according to Skaggs “one problem after 
another led to vacancy led into foreclosure.” The Urban League of Champaign County had a 
lease-purchase program but they closed in November 2008 after being the first staff paid 
organization attending to the human/civil rights needs of black citizens locally since around the 
time of Old Urban Renewal in 1961. While this property is undeniably a stark example of 
precipitously declining neighborhood property value (Allen bought it for $82,426 in 2003; it sold 
for $62,873 in 2006 and $55,000 in 2007), the house was last purchased in 2011 and has had a 
stable assessed value as well as being occupied by the same homeowner for the last four years. 
Skaggs went on to say that “Metanoia Center has one other home in the area whose residency 
has held steady through the years, but it is still losing value.” And continued, citing “local 
appraisers and realtors” explanations that property values had declined because of the perception 
of the neighborhood within the larger Champaign area housing market. The May 4, 2012 
Housing Goal Implementation memo elaborates, “site clearance and reconstruction is supported 
by some property owners, local lenders, Realtors©, and the Champaign County Housing 
Authority” (SS 2012-024). 
The two houses (three lots) listed above represent a single lot-by-lot infill approach and 
in the context of the number of structures in the area that are in decline, the City claimed these 
infill investments had not been forceful enough of a tool to have positively impacted surrounding 
values. Clearly, this is true, but just as clearly when you look at the details of the neighborhood 
programs offered in the area, which as the City has emphasized many times over is one of the 
main reasons contributing to the blight that has led to the decision to demolish the entire area, the 
area is only 30% owner-occupied. Almost all of the City’s housing funds available are geared at 
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and for improvements to owner-occupied structures. The City has framed this decision and 
debate as a simple return on public investment evaluation. Skaggs went on in the May 8, 2012 
session to claim, “for the last 12 years [we] have been providing infill development. Look at the 
money we have put in, [we] have to ask is this a good use of public funds when it isn’t having 
the effect on the neighborhood to bring values up in neighborhood.” The conclusion that 
neighborhood investment cannot be stimulated under the existing conditions in Bristol Place was 
thus made to City Council and to the public.  
This was part of the narrative repeated by almost every City official I interviewed, who 
when asked about the primary rationale behind the clearance decision focused on the 
combination of poorly aging housing stock (declining property values) and ineffective infill 
investment being the least cost-effective way to improve the neighborhood as being the deciding 
factors in the City’s displacement, clearance and rebuild redevelopment decision for Bristol 
Place. One Planning Department staff member explained it as:  
It’s going cost too much and we’re not going to make headway. The housing stock’s too 
old. There’s just too many problems there anyway. Planning & NSD evaluated the 
condition of housing stock and whether it could be fixed. Often found liens on properties 
for lack of payment. Previous city intervention involved a whole lot of carrot in the way 
of funding for home improvement programs. The City asked, ‘what is the threshold for 
value returned?’ And burdensomely high improvement was determined to be needed in 
the Bristol Place area. 
 
One long-time affordable housing advocate in the area said of his perceptions of the City’s 
decision-making in the Bristol Place clearance and rebuild decision: “that decision was based on 
a number of things. It wasn’t just one thing. It was police calls, quality of life in the 
neighborhood, you know just different kinda problems in the neighborhood.” The Neighborhood 
Services Department Director explained that the departments of Planning & Neighborhood 
Services wanted the proposal to be acceptable to the City from a feasibility standpoint, and to the 
larger community. He said “technical experts” had looked at the economics of issue, the 
combination of 70% investor-owned properties, low property values and extreme safety issues, 
and mentioned that the City and the NSD also had to take into account that the City has other 
neighborhoods to serve as well. The City wants to invest in areas that will actually be successful 
expenditures, and the “experts” said that infill would be a “sunk cost,” and it was unlikely that 
the City could rely on code enforcement to get investors to rehab the houses. He continued, 
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saying “experience bears out that that approach could take 20 years to fully resolve current 
issues, which was an untenable solution, given that folks are living in bad conditions.” 
A City Council member put it in the following way: “In any other part of town if you 
gave away a vacant lot someone would build a modest home on it. Once the City touches it, it 
costs $50,000 - $70,000 to bring a house up to code that would then have a market value of 
$30,000. Home repair fund or grant program would be putting more money into shacks than they 
would be worth after completed it.” City Manager Dorothy David said that Metanoia’s efforts 
were an example of trying to build infill housing in Bristol Place in the absence of massive 
reconstruction. But that unfortunately, they built nice homes whose values could not be 
maintained because of the declining home values around them. In Bristol Place, people were 
actually losing value when they invested resources in their properties. While all of this is 
undeniably true, and confirmed by much of the investment property owner public participation 
comments gathered, this issue framing does not even allow for the consideration of alternative 
suggestions made to improve the neighborhood in public sessions, including creating community 
gardens and providing more and different kinds of assistance with fewer income restrictions for 
property upgrades. Nor does it allow for something in between a single lot-by-lot infill strategy 
and complete displacement and clearance, like developing groups of lots at once.  
In a March 11, 2010 NSAB meeting, Jim Rose, current local public housing authority 
board commissioner and long time local affordable housing advocate who has given technical 
financial advice to housing authorities across Illinois, worked at UIUC doing research on 
supportive housing issues for almost two decades and with local mental health and affordable 
housing groups like Homestead locally, suggested this as a possible alternative method to 
beautify the neighborhood and begin to bring property values up and improve traditional quality 
of life measures: “Jim [Rose] asked about the vacant lots in the area and if residents might use 
those for vegetable gardens and suggested a good use of the land. Ed [Hawkes] asked if that was 
something that could be started this summer. Mishauno [Woggin] wasn’t sure it could happen 
this summer, but for future years. Jim asked if the small park in the Bristol area is maintained by 
the Park District and if it could be expanded” (3/11/10 Neighborhood Services Advisory Board 
Meeting Minutes, from 2010-2014 Consolidated Plan). 
During the public comment part of the May 8, 2012 study session, Reverend Barnes of 
Metanoia elaborated on his efforts to work with the City in the 2000s on infill rehab investments:  
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We proposed to NSD at that time to build 6 houses at one time, then come back and build 
6 more, and then 6 more. [We] had a firm commitment from Danny Cameron who was 
CEO of National City Community Development Corporation, whose Vice President in 
Springfield personally came down to NSD to confirm the City’s commitment with 
Metanoia. What was finally decided was that Metanoia would build one home at a time 
and then have that house presold. Roger Morsch, the Executive Director of housing at 
IHDA [at the time] said the way to turn a neighborhood around is to build at least 3 
houses at one time. What we discovered is that it is impossible to turn around a 
neighborhood building one house at a time. We suffered a great loss of revenue, and we 
only ended up building 2 houses.  
 
The lesson here is thus not that infill investment failed in Bristol Place, the lesson is that 
tiny owner-occupied rehab assistance funds in a 70% renter-occupied neighborhood and single 
lot infill development failed in a neighborhood with more significant challenges than its 
surrounding areas. This leaves a vast array of grouped infill investment, rental assistance, 
incentive programs for investment property owners and code enforcement alternatives between 
what was actually tried by the City and the total displacement and clearance that was eventually 
decided upon. Especially when what was decided upon is costing the City $6.3 million. So much 
more could have been done in this neighborhood to preserve its value for longtime residents, 
even when this amount if cut in half, as part of the funding structure was for complete demolition 
and relocation. As longtime local activist Martel Miller put it in continued public comment in the 
May 8 study session:  
Last year there wasn’t even a plan because you took money from Urban Renewal funds 
earmarked for Bristol Place and gave it to a youth program. Why can’t we partner with 
homeowners? Ask the homeowners, do you want incentives from the City to help invest 
in the neighborhood. Talk about crime, you need jobs – that’s how you change the 
neighborhood, giving people jobs, opportunities, not by knocking down houses. I think 
you’re looking at it all wrong, and I think this is racial. 
 
And as Terry Townsend, a longtime local and community activist who worked in state 
government for 30 years, was a Housing Authority Commissioner for ten, and on the Champaign 
County Board in the 1980s echoed: 
You’re not going to solve the problems of poverty by destroying people’s neighborhoods. 
You will only spread the problem around. Slow down, before you create another problem 
in another part of the City. You use eminent domain, but you need to understand what 
you’re doing and it ought to be in the context of a very good plan for that area.  
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It is vitally important when evaluating the history of this redevelopment plan to recognize 
that the vast majority of City “carrot” assistance in the way of neighborhood programs were 
historically, and continue to be, primarily geared at homeowner assistance. A major theme that 
has been interwoven throughout the institutional approach to this neighborhood redevelopment 
plan is the persistent bias towards normative values of homeownership, in direct opposition to 
contemporary research on increased rental tenure because of the rise of housing cost-burden 
locally (as well as nationally) resulting from the 2008 housing market crash. As Michael Stone 
put it in the early 1990s:  
The attractions of homeownership are undeniable: most of us desire the security of tenure 
and control over our living space that only homeownership has seemed to provide in this 
society, along with the possibility of relatively stable housing costs, some equity 
accumulation, income tax benefits, and a sense of community membership and social 
status that homeownership has promised (Stone, 1993).  
 
Conventional homeownership has historically offered three primary economic advantages over 
renting: (1) homeowners have lower monthly payments than renters residing in an identically 
valued house because there is no payment for the landlord’s cash-flow profits and overhead 
costs; (2) homeowners receive income tax benefits through mortgage interest and property tax 
payment deductions from taxable income (if itemized); and (3) homeowners are able to build 
wealth through equity buildup via mortgage principle payments and rising property values 
(Stone, 1993). 
As long-time local rental housing advocate, former Urbana City Council woman, and 
founder and manager of the Champaign-Urbana Tenant’s Union Esther Patt explained in an 
example of one of the ways in which this ethos translates locally: 
The Urban League had this rent-to-own program where, basically, families got a $15,000 
gift, $15,000 per family, and as long as you were income-eligible, and the income 
requirements were higher, of course – so if you made $35,000 a year and you were going 
to buy a single-family home, you would get a $15,000 grant through the City of Urbana, 
and you had to live in it for five years for it to be a gift.  Five years. Well, okay, if I came 
and proposed giving a $3,000 rent subsidy each year for five years to a family who’s 
renting, would people be excited about that? Well, no, no, because they like home 
ownership. America’s love affair with home ownership has hurt renters more than 
anything, including pushing people into home ownership that they can’t afford.  
 
In the City of Champaign, of the approximately 16 neighborhood services programs 
offered geared towards housing stock improvements (which vary by year, somewhat based on 
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federal funding cycles, but mostly guided by City Council and staff priorities), eight are geared 
at homeowners, six are more general City-wide assistance for specific incentive programs, one is 
targeted at assistance to investment property owners, with only one geared towards assisting 
renters (see Table 2 in Appendix A). The single program geared towards rental assistance, the 
Tenant Based Rental Assistance Program, only began in 2009. Many of the eight programs 
geared at homeowners have been around for over a decade, and even then have eligibility 
limitations on them, which is sometimes due to federal HOME and CDBG source funding 
constraints. In 2010, 54.6% of public funding was directed towards assistance for homeowners, 
26.4% towards other community programs, 10.5% towards investment property owners’ 
assistance, and 8.5% towards assistance for renters (see Table 2 in Appendix A & Appendix 
D.8). In 2010, 57.3% of the housing units in Champaign were owner-occupied, but even if you 
take out of the equation the 26.4% of funding towards community programs (which are fantastic 
and geared at disabled and youth populations citywide – e.g. CommUnity Matters), and divide 
the remaining funding budgeted for only housing assistance (73.6%) equitably according to 
existing homeowner-renter population breakdowns in 2010 (excluding investment property 
owners and only focusing on program assistance for actual housing expenses), that leaves a 
12.4% overfunded discrepancy between what homeowner support programs should receive, and 
what they did in fact receive in 2010. Similarly, that leaves an 11.3% underfunded discrepancy 
for renter assistance. And this is a conservative proportionately equitable division, when in fact 
homeowners, as stated above and demonstrated by housing cost-burden data contained in Table 3 
and Appendices D.8 – D.10, almost always have higher incomes and assets than renters, are 
generally less cost-burdened and less in need of financial assistance. Esther Patt, a local 
community advocate for tenant’s rights locally, said in our interview:  
Homeowners are who matters, and everyone else – nobody ever says this, but when you 
look at how public policy is enacted, I don’t think decision makers think of tenants as 
people, and that’s part of what you see with code enforcement. They never would say, 
‘We don’t consider tenants people,’ but they sure don’t think of them as people who 
matter. Tenants are mostly lower-income people, and even middle-income tenants get 
squeezed out just by the prejudice against tenants.  
 
Part of this bias has to do with widespread misperceptions and social biases surrounding 
who pays property taxes and what proportion of total tax revenue to the City different citizens 
contribute in the community. Individual property owners pay property taxes on the properties 
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they own, but in 2004 the Illinois General Assembly passed a law to allow landlords to create the 
fiction that the tenant is the property taxpayer for the purpose of the landlord getting the 
“homeowner exemption” on property taxes in single family rental home investment properties 
they own. This means that all landlords have to do is have the tenant sign something, most often 
embedded in leasing terms, saying the tenant agrees to be responsible for all property tax for the 
unit, and that the tenant has satisfied this requirement through the payment of rent. Notably, there 
is no additional requirement that landlords are then required to pass any resulting savings along 
to their tenants. Landlords renting out single family homes thus now get more tax breaks 
(homestead exemptions are currently worth $6,000 each) than homeowners who can only afford 
one home – the one they live in.  
The General Homestead Exemption, more colloquially known as the owner-occupied or 
homeowner exemption, “also applies to certain leasehold interests in which the person occupying 
the residence is liable for the property taxes. In addition, it applies to each unit in a multi-unit 
building owned as a cooperative, including some assisted living facilities,” which has caused 
controversy as well (35 ILCS 200/15-175). According to County Assessor Stan Jenkins, in 2011 
in Champaign County there were 1,520 single-family rental homes where the property owner had 
filed for the homestead exemption. This brought the total 2011 assessment value down $9.1 
million, which translated to roughly $730,000 that did not go to county taxing bodies (News 
Gazette, September 18, 2011: Law allows landlords to claim multiple homestead exemptions). 
Thus, investment property owners are the ones paying the physical tax bills, but they certainly do 
not pay property tax out of their own pockets – they act as intermediaries, with money flowing 
directly from renters paying rent to local property tax collectors. The only difference is now in 
addition to the investment property income generated by rent, landlords get even more biased 
beneficial consideration legally in Illinois. Normative social valuations of the “value” of 
homeowners skew this community’s perceptions of who is contributing to and taking away from 
public tax coffers and contributes to the widespread prejudice against renter rights locally.  
Special interest tax loopholes aside, which abound at all levels of government in this 
country, and which this is nowhere near the most egregious example of, this brings up a vital part 
of the constrained fiscal policy space that have affected local municipalities’ spending allocation 
decisions since 2008. Declining federal, state and local revenues have spurred cities, and the City 
of Champaign in particular locally, towards more conservative direct assistance programs, and 
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more creative and complex public-private partnerships to fill the gap between public services 
provision and budgetary shortfalls. A public comment from the City Council study session for 
the AAP 2012-2013 dated April 10, 2012 sums up the results of the declining trajectory of 
federal funding in the last five years and the City of Champaign’s response. This resident, retired 
UIUC Urban Planning professor and local housing expert Len Heumann pointed out that the 
housing programs included in the 2012-2013 AAP make no attempt to address the local quantity 
of affordable housing, just the quality by only providing small funding for structural 
improvements. He went on to say that local nonprofit housing developers fight over existing 
resources, but the real problem is the decline in overall federal funding in the Central IL area.  
This has tragically happened simultaneously as need has risen to unprecedented levels 
and housing cost-burden has increased across the country, with Champaign being no exception. 
Evaluating housing cost burden in the City of Champaign calculated as spending more then 30% 
of income on housing from 2008-2013 shows decreases in cost burden for homeowners with 
annual incomes between $20,000 – $49,999, and slight increases in cost burden for homeowners 
with income less than $20,000, and between $50,000 - $74,999. For renter-occupied housing 
units however, all income categories below $50,000 show significant increases in housing cost 
burden, with income groups between $20,000 - $49,999 experiencing increases over 10% since 
2008. In 2008, 62% of households earning between $20,000 - $34,999 annually were spending 
more than 30% of their income on housing in Champaign, but in 2013 this number increased to 
73%. For those with annual incomes below $20,000, housing cost burden has remained at nearly 
100% of all households paying more than 30% of their incomes on housing (see Appendices D.9 
- D.11).  
The data collected in 2012 from Bristol Place residents supports these housing cost 
burden numbers as well. HUD considers 80% of area median to be low-income, 50% of area 
median to be considered very low-income, and 30% of area median to be extremely low-income. 
30% of area median income is approximately the poverty level. In 2012, the CU MSA’s area 
median income was $68,000, which locally means household incomes in 2012 below $54,400 
annually were considered low income, below $34,000 annually were considered very low 
income, and below $20,400 were considered extremely low income. As the Bristol Park Steering 
Committee’s survey of Bristol residents in March 10-12 of 2012 demonstrated, 93% of the 
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renting households in Bristol Place were classified as low-income, with 60% paying more than 
30% of their monthly income on housing (see Appendix D.12 for a full statistical breakdown).  
The average reported monthly household income was $1,977 per month ($23,726 per 
year). Owners on average had higher household incomes ($2,214 per month / $26,571 per 
year) when compared to renters ($1,905 per month / $22,861 per year). The average 
monthly housing cost (average rent/mortgage plus average utility costs) was $968 for 
renters and $1,069 for homeowners with a mortgage. Comparing the housing expenses to 
household incomes, an estimated 60% of renters and 7% of owners were housing cost 
burdened, based upon the federal standard of 30% of income spent towards housing (SS 
2012-024).  
 
By HUD designations then, renters in Bristol Place on average fall between the extremely 
low income and very low income categories (making an average of $22,860 annually), and if 
these residents only paid 30% of their income on housing costs, those housing expense 
amounts would range from $510 (for extremely low income) to $850 (for very low income). 
The average monthly rental housing cost in Bristol Place was reported in 2012 as $968, 
which is $11,616 annually. This means that those who fell into the very low income category 
were spending 34% of their total income on housing, and extremely low income renting 
residents were paying 57% of their total income on housing.  
This extreme need and financial squeeze between incomes and housing costs was echoed 
in my interview with Aaron Smith, the manager of Homestead Corporation, a local Community 
Housing Development Organization (CHDO) that has run into difficulty in recent years because 
of funding cuts and new restrictions on project-based subsidies. Homestead is a small local 
nonprofit developer that does individual homeownership development projects for low-income 
families, as well as some scattered site rental rehab for very low-income families. When asked 
about the local population Homestead targets and serves with the greatest need, Aaron 
responded:  
…We see the greatest needs right now are affordable rental for very low income is where 
the greatest need is. Unfortunately making a project like that work requires vouchers, 
requires some sort of ongoing operating subsidy. I mean there are sources of funding out 
here for development subsidy. That’s not an issue. If we kept the project small enough we 
could even probably do one without the tax credits but ongoing operating expense is for 
something like that if you’re going to serve very low income population you really have 
to have an operating subsidy like a project based subsidy that’s attached to the units. 
 
His experience echoes sentiments of Kevin Jackson and Esther Patt of the extreme housing-cost 
burden in the area, and the disproportionate burden felt by lower-income family and single non-
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student household renters, exacerbated locally in particular because the large student rental 
population so heavily skews the local rental market. As Aaron puts it, “I talk to people who 
spend an outrageous amount of their income on housing.” And as Esther elaborates: 
…If you’re the sole wage earner for the household, like a mother with children, and you 
get paid the current Illinois minimum wage, then in order to afford a two-bedroom 
apartment at a tax credit apartment complex – that would be Douglass Square, Oakwood 
Trace, Crystal View Townhomes, Town Center, Prairie Green, or Rainbow Apartments – 
you would have to work 80 hours a week just to not go over 30 percent of income for rent 
and utilities to afford an affordable two-bedroom. Someone who makes $30,000.00 a 
year can’t afford to own a home, around here at least, without financial assistance, but if 
you make $30,000.00 a year and you’re looking for a two-bedroom apartment, you don’t 
need to go to the tax credit places. 
 
According to Esther, other than public housing and Housing Choice Vouchers through the 
Housing Authority, there is virtually nothing else (no program) that helps households with 
incomes below 30% AMI locally.  
Even Habitat for Humanity, which is a wonderful program, does not help households 
with incomes that low. Do you think people that live in Habitat housing make $10,000 a 
year? No. How would they pay insurance, how would they pay property tax?  You have 
to be able to own a home. It makes homes cheaper, and I’m not sure what the figure is 
today, but in 2005, the last year I was a city council member, the lowest income 
homeowner that they were helping had a household income of $25,000 a year, which is 
pretty poor. 
 
In contrast to Habitat for Humanity, whose local branch is part of a large enough 
international organization and has access to enough capital that they can do their own lending, 
Homestead is restricted to a very small subset of the affordability spectrum – people who qualify 
for mortgage loans based on credit worthiness, but also qualify for development subsidies due to 
income levels. Aaron said the four biggest problems in getting piecemeal affordable homes built 
locally are (1) the combination of Congress cutting the overall HOME funding pool by 50%, (2) 
the lack of availability of credit for a lot of the demographic the organization works with, (3) the 
role that the Housing Authority has begun to play as a local developer, and (4) the fact that to 
serve the neediest demographic developments need operating subsidies, which the Housing 
Authority has sole control over and has reserved for their own ongoing projects. As Aaron puts 
it: 
I mean it was always kind of a narrow demographic for the home ownership part of it 
because you need to work with low income people but they have enough income where 
they can afford to own a home but then they also have to have credit that’s sufficient for 
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them to get a loan. So that was always kind of a narrow segment to work with but it’s 
gotten smaller. Trying to find someone in that income spectrum who’s also got the credit 
- it’s been difficult.   
 
The third issue according to Aaron is that the Housing Authority has turned into a 
housing developer, and they have the majority of Illinois Housing Development Authority 
(IHDA) funding tied up in their current large-scale projects underway. 
We go to IHDA to ask for funds and they look; [and then say] ‘Well you’ve got three 
IHDA funded projects going on in your geographic area already and two of them are still 
under construction and haven’t been rented up yet.’ In addition to that IHDA has really 
been focusing the last few years on preservation of existing housing and on doing 
developments with a high percentage of units for the supportive housing community so 
people who need supportive housing so very low income people, people with – who 
needs social services, things of that nature.  So if your project doesn’t have high enough 
percentage of units directed at supportive housing and it also isn’t preserving existing 
housing it’s harder to get the funding now than it was a few years ago. We’ve been trying 
to get something going on an open 5-acre site. And we’ve been trying to get that project 
funded for like three or four years now and we still can’t get it funded.  We’re looking at 
some various possibilities like getting some veteran’s assistance supportive housing 
vouchers to put a veteran’s housing component into the project.  We’re basically trying to 
make the project more appealing.  
 
He said recently the only way for Homestead to get operating rental subsidy vouchers is to 
…focus in on a particular group, a supportive needs group that maybe the housing 
authority doesn’t want to necessarily try to incorporate into what they’ve got going but 
maybe they’ve got the vouchers – they’ve got vouchers to the side that they can direct 
towards that.   
 
This sentiment, of trying to stitch together funding for a project from so many pools of 
funds with different restrictions on them that you end up integrating different design elements 
into the final proposal in order to access those funds, is evident in the funding structure for the 
BPNP housing strategy as well. Listing the sources included in the Preliminary Funding Model 
in 2012 took an entire paragraph and spans almost the entire range of creative financing currently 
available to municipalities:  
Funding identified in Section 11 (Preliminary Funding Model) for FY 2012/13 are currently 
included in the City’s proposed budget, including the Home Investment 16 Partnership 
Program (HOME) and Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) from the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Urban Renewal and Urban Development 
Action Grant funds (UDAG). Future funding may come from: HOME, CDBG, Federal 
Home Loan Bank of Chicago (AHP), State Affordable Housing Tax Credits, Federal Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits, Urban Renewal and UDAG in addition to a Hazard 
Mitigation FEMA grant and debt financing (SS 2012-024).  
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Some of the redevelopment design decisions (e.g. the decision to include a tornado shelter as part 
of a new fire station located on the site giving the City access to FEMA money; the integration of 
part of the City’s Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) funds targeted at hiring Minority 
and/or Women-owned Business Enterprises (MWBE) as demolition contractors, a fund which 
also provides Champaign’s matching for federal HOME program funding) likely stem from these 
kinds of funding constraints and considerations. 
As financing mechanisms for public investment become increasingly opaque to anyone 
without an advanced academic degree or financial experts, potential abuses abound, easily 
justified by the modernist myth long plaguing the planning profession of the impartial objective 
planning expert. It will likely only continue to become more difficult for ordinary citizens 
affected by their government’s financial decisions to grasp the myriad abstruse and often esoteric 
complexities of its services financing. This trend is also a vital part of understanding the City of 
Champaign’s explanations and motivations, the “plausible” fiscal policy space that constrains 
decisions ranging from service delivery to financing mechanisms. Dorothy David provided 
further explanation, saying that neighborhood wellness investments are sometimes not as 
complex as the BPNP.  
Sometimes policy recommendation is self-evident, or sometimes support for City Council 
deciding to do something is unanimous. She gave the example of the local MTD having received 
notification of $15 million TIGER grant close to the time of our interview in late 2014. It was a 
federal allocation with Durbin’s influence to do multi-model street improvement projects 
straddling CU that would be focused on the campus community. There was a local match 
involved, and required an intergovernmental agreement between Urbana and Champaign, and 
MTD and UIUC. That kind of wellness investment, she explained, is agreed upon and passes 
quickly precisely because it allows the City to achieve a community goal using outside 
resources. She explained, “it causes us to shift work priorities because often outside funding has 
its own timelines and we cannot be slow to obligate the money or we will lose it.”  
Esther Patt, echoing Aaron Smith’s earlier comments, also elaborated in our interview on 
the new role the Housing Authority has begun playing in a new fiscally creative, partnership-
based era:  
The Housing Authority is building 160 units of housing west of I-57 just south of 
Springfield in the Thornberry Ridge subdivision.  This is a new thing the Housing 
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Authority is doing – actually, they’re not building it.  They’re partnering with not-for-
profit housing developer Benoit Group for a tax credit apartment complex. These tax 
credit places are getting tax credits, which if they’re a non-profit, they sell them to for-
profit corporations for part of the money for operating. 
 
The tax credits she is referring to are those involved in HUD’s Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) program, which have been in operation since 1986 and are responsible for 90% of the 
affordable housing development in the U.S. since. These tax credits last for ten years and the 
project developments are required to meet low-income tenancy requirements for a 15-year initial 
compliance period and a subsequent 15-year extended use program. This program has primarily 
promoted public-private partnerships and leveraged primarily private corporate equity for 
affordable housing development that would have otherwise been priced out of the housing 
market due to low ROIs. They also count towards federal evaluation of banking institutions’ 
compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, which some argue is the primary 
reason financial institutions pursue tax-credit investments, rather than any significantly positive 
financial gain equations (Schwartz, 2015). 
In 2010, the cities of Urbana and Champaign, the Champaign County Regional Planning 
Commission (RPC), the Housing Authority of Champaign County (HACC) and the Village of 
Rantoul partnered to fund a consultant-prepared Regional Housing Study. The top three priorities 
discussed by the City of Champaign in a December 13, 2011 study session included the lack of 
emergency shelter, especially for families; lack of affordable rental housing units or subsidy for 
extremely low income households; and affordable homeownership and preservation (AAP, 
FY13-14). Right now, there are no programs or organizations in the area that serve the need of 
developing increased affordable rental units for extremely low income residents other than the 
local public housing authority.  
Dorothy David in our interview said that Champaign’s housing strategy is about setting 
priorities. In housing, she said, Champaign has problems with homelessness, rental affordability, 
and homeownership affordability. There is an entire policy spectrum of things the City could get 
involved in, but a limited amount of resources. She echoed Aaron’s financing sentiments earlier, 
explaining the evolution of the City’s relationship with Habitat for Humanity in recent years as a 
result of Habitat having access to more grants and being positioned to help achieve the City’s 
housing goals of affordability and infill development, which is why she argued the city spends so 
much time building partnerships and relationships to support other local organizations in 
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housing-related efforts. She continued this explanation as a reason for the City’s partnership with 
the HACC in the Bristol Place redevelopment.  
 
5.6.3. Housing Authority Housing Choice Voucher Allocation and Developer Controversy 
In a memo dated June 15, 2012, approximately a month after the May study session 
where the housing strategy recommendations were first presented to Council and the public, a 
memo was presented to City Council from then City Manager Steve Carter with a draft 
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) with the Housing Authority which listed a $1,092,000 
contribution either through Housing Choice Vouchers (HCVs) valued at $33,600 each, cash, or a 
combination at its discretion. This was based on an estimated 40 rental households to be 
displaced by the BPNP, but the IGA verbiage itself specifically stated: 
The Authority shall determine eligibility and may make available a voucher for each 
eligible Bristol Place household displaced as the result of the revitalization plan, but not 
to exceed 32 vouchers. The vouchers shall be targeted for seniors, persons with 
disabilities, persons with special needs, or extremely low-income renters, defined as 
households with incomes of less than 30% of the AMI (CB 2012-215). 
 
It further stated that HACC is required to make a decision regarding eligibility within 30 days of 
the initial referral, which would occur during Phase I relocation.  
There was widespread community disagreement with the City’s decision to partner with 
the HACC on the financing of the BPNP. FOIA-ed email correspondence reported a letter dated 
June 1, 2012 from Antwaun Neely, a local landlord who rents to many local Section 8 recipients, 
alerting the Chicago office of HUD in outrage that 
…the HACC would be relieving the city, in part of its responsibility to help the families 
that the CITY is displacing at an estimated cost of a million dollars!! It also strikes me 
that this resolution appears to suggest that the HACC currently has the vouchers for use, 
yet is holding them aside to be used as a bartering tool with the city (Urbana-Champaign 
Independent Media Center, September 17, 2012). 
 
On August 23, 2012 before a meeting of the HACC’s Board of Commissioners met, a 
community protest took place about the City and HACC’s combined plans to prioritize displaced 
Bristol Place tenants by setting aside the 32 vouchers. Because the local housing authority is 
allotted a limited number of vouchers, they are in very high demand in Champaign County, and 
giving special preference and priority to 32 displaced Bristol residents means the financial 
hardship of the displacement effects from the BPNP double. The existing 32 residents who had 
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been on the HACC’s waiting list for rental assistance would also be “displaced,” by being 
bumped further down the waiting list, while vouchers for Bristol renters are held “in reserve.” 
Esther Patt also voiced objections, saying “with more than 300 homeless children in the county 
and more than 400 families waiting on the Section 8 waiting list, it’s unconscionable for the 
housing authority to be sitting on close to 200 vouchers and not putting them into use right now” 
(News Gazette September 27, 2012: Voucher-plan opponents to voice concerns). As both Terry 
Townsend and Esther Patt alluded to in our interviews, often people wait years on a HCV. 
Edward Bland, executive director of the housing authority, has said it can take from one to five 
years for someone to go from the waiting list to receiving a voucher. The waiting list is cut off at 
about 400 households, so some have to wait just to get on the list (News Gazette September 27, 
2012: Voucher-plan opponents to voice concerns).  
Terry Townsend, a former HACC Commissioner for 10 years who led the protest, 
continued his prior protests against the eminent domain-based displacement and clearance 
housing strategy being used in Bristol Place. Arguing that it would “psychologically disturb” 
existing residents and deepen their financial challenges (News Gazette August 23, 2012: “Protest 
planned over Housing Authority plan”), his sentiments were similar to what Reverend Barnes in 
a Bristol Park Steering Committee meeting eight months earlier on January 26, 2012 shared, 
where meeting minutes stated that he said “studies of relocation show depression is a factor with 
relocation,” and distributed information about (CARE) Church Assisted Relocation Engagement 
geared towards social and emotional support in partnerships with area churches. In a public 
meeting on January 30, 2012, a “male audience member” asked of the City’s relocation and 
compensation plans, “what about emotions, etc. of disruption?,” to which Kerri Spear responded, 
“the ones we have kept in touch with are much happier in the new place,” and then talked about 
the Douglass Square development on the other side of the railroad tracks (AAP, 12-13). This 
blanket dismissal of even the potential for negative and disparate life impacts post-forced 
relocation is representative of the problematic approaches and lack of historical understanding 
evidenced by City officials as they moved forward with the BPNP.  
During the protest in August, Townsend argued that he wanted to see preferential 
treatment in the distribution of HCVs - but for the homeless, disabled and seniors first: “Rather 
than give preferences to Bristol Park, we want them to do these kind of preferences” (News 
Gazette August 23, 2012: “Protest planned over Housing Authority plan”). After the community 
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protests, in November 2012 the housing authority added to the list of people who would be 
considered for preferential treatment, including veterans, victims of domestic violence, homeless 
people, people with disabilities and people already living or working in Champaign County 
(News Gazette, November 8, 2012: Housing authority to hear Bristol Place presentation from 
Champaign).   
Another layer of controversy in the approval of the IGA between the HACC and 
Champaign occurred in September of 2012, as one of the Commissioners’ terms expired at the 
end of July 2012 (Al Anderson), and the City of Champaign is one of the local agencies with 
representatives on the housing board. The City of Champaign and the HACC operate as separate 
entities under state law, but the Cities of Champaign and Urbana each have two appointments to 
the HACC Board of Commissioners. A fifth position serves as a “floating” appointment that 
rotates between the two cities, a sixth commissioner is appointed by the Champaign County 
Board, and the seventh commissioner is a resident appointment. But it isn’t only the makeup of 
the board that links local municipalities with the housing authority. During the HACC’s annual 
planning process, the City of Champaign receives a copy of the draft plan for review. Once the 
review process is completed and the HACC has satisfactorily responded to any City concerns, 
the City will issue notice certifying that their Plan is consistent with the City’s adopted 
Consolidated Plan. As stated in the 2010-2011 Annual Action Plan, this review process includes 
“reviewing any upcoming demolition or disposition cases, proposed capital improvement 
projects, and overall policy changes.” The partnership between the HACC and Champaign is 
made clear in another statement: “the City of Champaign and the HACC have enjoyed a much 
more cooperative arrangement since the late 1990’s due to the success of joint redevelopment 
activities at Taylor Thomas Subdivision, Oakwood Trace Townhomes, and Douglass Square.”  
In September 2012, Champaign City Council unanimously approved then Mayor Don 
Gerard’s appointment of Reverend Larry Lewis, the pastor of Bethel AME, to the housing board. 
Gerard maintained that he selected Lewis for “no political reasons whatsoever,” and that “he 
quite simply is the best man for the job,” but Terry’s take was different: “I have no doubt that 
Rev. Lewis will do whatever the mayor asks of him.” Lewis’ take was to claim religious 
objectivity, saying “As a minister, I have no political ties. My only ties are to God and doing 
what is right” (News Gazette September 19, 2012: Mayor’s pick for housing authority board 
creates stir). In our interview, Terry elaborated, saying that City officials in Champaign recruited 
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HACC board members, and put people on the board as political puppets to get the votes needed 
to support designating Section 8 HCVs to support the city’s renewal efforts. After Lewis’s 
appointment, the HACC board voted to move ahead with the Bristol IGA.  
Another conflict of interest argument put forward by concerned community members 
Terry Townsend and Martell Miller, among others, concerned Housing Commissioner Bishop 
Lloyd E. Gwin of the Church of the Living God. He had an ownership interest in a parcel in 
Bristol Place at 1307 N. Clock St., although he was reported as saying he was “only holding 
ownership of the lot for a family that would have lost the home had he not gotten involved 
financially” (News Gazette September 12, 2012: Gerard pick for housing authority board could 
sway Bristol Park decision). From another interview I did however, I learned that in addition to 
that physical parcel inside the plan area, his church owns four large properties just east across the 
railroad tracks from Bristol Place, where he is building a new mega church on a 10-acre site. The 
church will double as a storm shelter from tornadoes with its poured-concrete walls, and the 
church plans to use its current building, right across Bradley Avenue to the south, as a 
community center “we want to make it a community facility, not only for our membership, we 
want to make sure we have a positive impact on the community” (News Gazette January 5, 2015 
“Pastor hopes new church transforms North End from ‘notorious’ to ‘glorious.’). Gwin also 
plans to transform the former Champaign Asphalt garage directly behind the new site into an 
activities or sports center, he says the young people need and deserve a place to have fun and 
play ball.  
In the summer of 2012 the City of Champaign paved an extension of Fourth Street north 
of Bradley, put in sidewalks, sod grass, and drainage, spending nearly half a million dollars in 
taxpayer money. On June 5, 2012, City Council voted 9-0 to approve the project. At the council 
meeting, Gwin said this project would benefit the “entire community,” but his church was the 
biggest winner with free infrastructure provided by the City of Champaign. The City gains little 
financially from the church, as it is a tax-exempt institution (Urbana-Champaign Independent 
Media Center, September 17, 2012: Emails reveal Champaign city staff working behind the 
scenes to level Bristol Place). But when taken in the context of public participation community 
input desiring a community center, the City identifying need for a storm shelter, and athletic 
facilities, it seems clear why the City approved those infrastructure expenditures. 
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In fact, in the February 2011 BPNP, one of the least involved “approaches” the City 
identifies for meeting the stated Human Development goals listed in the original plan as gathered 
from residents, “call[s] for establishing partnerships with other agencies to ensure access for the 
neighborhood’s children and families to existing programming.” The full excerpt discussing 
those needs is below: 
For example, one objective in the Human Development goal is to increase activities for 
children and families in the neighborhood. If the City were to choose an approach with a 
high level of involvement, staff could seek funding and pursue a strategy to establish a 
Family Resource Center in the neighborhood. In this example, it is possible that the City 
may consider donating a City owned lot for a new facility to build on and potentially 
pursue grant money to fund it. As operated in other communities, a Family Resource 
Center is typically run by a non-profit and has facilities to provide afterschool activities 
for children or other activities, such as computer education classes. Another approach 
where the City is less directly involved would call for establishing partnerships with other 
agencies to ensure access for the neighborhood’s children and families to existing 
programming. 
 
In September 2012, housing authority commissioners were documented as having said 
that city officials had not been completely transparent with the board about their plan to use the 
vouchers. “What we were hearing was, they didn’t know anything that was going on,” then-
Mayor Gerard said (News Gazette, September 12, 2012: Gerard pick for housing authority board 
could sway Bristol Park decision). In the midst of the previous month’s protests, the seven-
member housing board voted on whether to invite the city to formally present its plans to the 
board, the vote was split 3-3 with board members Margaret Neil, Grant Henry, and Eddie Adair 
voting “no,” and Rev. Bishop Gwin, Janice Mitchell, and Clyde Walker voting “yes.” Board 
chair Al Anderson abstained from the vote, as his term expired on July 31, 2012. Board 
commissioner Grant Henry said in the August 23, 2012 board meeting following the protest that 
the board has been “kept in the dark” about the negotiations of the director Ed Bland. Bland 
resigned from his previous position with the Gary Housing Authority amidst a scandal in which 
other top administrators were fired or reassigned. A federal report concluded that Bland had 
“grossly mismanaged” a $1.2 million rehabilitation project (IMC, August 24, 2012: Champaign 
Housing Authority considers demolishing a third black neighborhood).  
The City made a presentation on November 8, 2012 to the HACC board, and on 
November 15, 2012 the HACC Board of Commissioners approved the IGA. Terry Townsend 
said at the time that he did not believe commissioners knew at the beginning of the process what 
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they were being asked to approve, “the executive director had cut these deals with the city of 
Champaign, and the board was not aware of what was going on,” to which Ed Bland responded 
“I guess they just wanted to get a better understanding” (News Gazette, November 8, 2012: 
Housing authority to hear Bristol Place presentation from Champaign). When I asked Ed Bland 
if I could interview him, he declined, saying, “The City of Champaign is responsible for the 
redevelopment of Bristol Place. The contact for the City of Champaign is listed below,” and gave 
me Kevin Jackson’s contact information at the City. 
In even further controversy, on June 13, 2012, the use of the Atlanta-based developer The 
Benoit Group also simultaneously seemed already arranged by HACC and City staff. Kerri Spear 
wrote in an email, “I felt very strongly that Torian [Priestly, developer for the Benoit Group] was 
patiently sitting on his hands, waiting for us to ask him to join in the project. :).” To which Patti 
Smith, HACC’s Director of Capital Programs, responded positively, saying: 
…we spoke to our attorney, Eric Hanson, regarding our solicitation of The Benoit Group 
- specifically as it may apply to the HACC’s and The Benoit Group’s participation as our 
developer in the Bristol Place redevelopment. Eric told us he had no problem with it 
(Urbana-Champaign Independent Media Center, September 17, 2012). 
 
Further documentation of some involved individuals knowing they were hiding their plans was 
found in a June 28, 2012 email Kevin Jackson wrote to Kerri Spear, saying “Ed has previously 
requested discretion with communication on this issue. Thanks.” (Urbana-Champaign 
Independent Media Center, September 17, 2012: Emails reveal Champaign city staff working 
behind the scenes to level Bristol Place). 
In my interview with Esther, she shared similar sentiments about both the HACC-City 
collusion, as well as developer and development design decisions already made, saying:  
Now, the other thing that was the eye opener for me at that [Steering Committee] meeting 
in July 2012, because someone there asked, and I asked, too…‘Why don’t you tear down 
everything that’s substandard, and then leave the stuff that is in good shape, and then re-
build around it, and that will give you more of a neighborhood. Then, Kevin Jackson said 
‘A developer wouldn’t want that,’ like a developer wants all cleared land, and I didn’t 
realize at the time, and this is why the city officials may disagree with me, but if they say 
anything otherwise, hooey! They knew, I don’t know at what start, maybe from the start, 
they were looking at wanting to build another single-family home neighborhood, like 
Taylor Thomas Homes or something. But, when I attended my first steering committee 
meeting in January of that year [2012], for those six months I was there, there was all this 
talk about how we’re going to talk about what we want in there, and …they went through 
all the motions of trying to find out what people want. I mean they didn’t do a very good 
job of it. It was clear to me at that meeting because Kevin did clarify it. That’s when I 
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realized, ‘Oh, they already decided, before they embarked on this project, when they 
created the steering committee, that they’re demolishing the entire neighborhood, and 
they’re putting in a tax credit housing complex. That has been the decision, so I’m here as 
part window dressing, and now we’re just going to go through the motion that there was 
all this public engagement to come up with the solution. At one point, it became − well, 
the Housing Authority, I mean Ed Bland sort of let the cat out of the bag that, ‘Well, we 
already have the developer.’ It’s like, ‘We haven’t even decided what we’re going to do 
yet, and you’ve already got a developer? How does that work?’ so then Kevin, of course, 
pulled it back, ‘No, no, no. Ed has a developer he’s working with if we do that,’ but that 
was clearly what they were going to do. I thought, ‘Of all the foolish things.’ Being in 
planning, you know that the thing that’s frustrating is, you know, people have ideas like, 
‘If only you had six square blocks with nothing on it, then how would you plan it?’ and 
you never have that. What you have is things in pieces, real spaces. Here, you have it. 
This was an opportunity. What a wasted opportunity. This was the opportunity to develop 
an actual neighborhood. 
  
The IGA and resident relocation plans were both approved by City Council on December 
18, 2012, and the BPNP moved forward with its displacement and clearance decision for the 
Bristol Place neighborhood. 
 
5.6.4. Residential Relocation Plan: City claims is more humane than Old Urban Renewal 
The City has argued that they are going beyond the minimum federal requirements for 
residential relocation assistance as determined by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real 
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4601) (URA), by “also includ[ing] local 
enhancements, based on substantial public input over the last year, to protect the long-term 
housing stability for the most vulnerable” (CB 2012-214). In addition to the URA, the use of 
HOME, CDBG or UDAG funds in the BPNP project is subject to section 104(d) of the Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1974, which requires a one-for-one replacement of lower-
income housing (CB 2012-214).  
Existing federal requirements under both the URA and Section 104(d) require 
comprehensive relocation assistance advisory services (see §24.205 (c)(2)(ii)), and moving and 
related expenses (e.g. security deposits and credit checks for new housing) (49 CFR Part 24). 
Relocation advisory services include (1) relocation planning, involving determination of the 
relocation needs and preferences of each person to be displaced; (2) explanations of the 
relocation payments and other assistance for which the person may be eligible; (3) the related 
eligibility requirements; and (4) the procedures for obtaining such assistance, which includes a 
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personal interview with each residential displaced person. For moving expenses, displaced 
persons have the option to either receive payment for actual moving and related expenses 
(§24.301), or fixed moving cost payment determined according to the Fixed Residential Moving 
Cost Schedule (FRMCS) approved by the Federal Highway Administration and published in the 
Federal Register on a periodic basis.15 
Differences between the federal relocation requirements under the URA and Section 
104(d) may help explain why the City of Champaign pushed so hard to involve the Housing 
Authority of Champaign County in the financing model for Phase I of the BPNP. Existing 
federal requirements under the URA for displaced residential tenants require payments equal to 
42 times the monthly rental assistance payment. This is calculated as the difference between (A) 
the lesser of (1) old housing costs (rent & utilities), (2) 30% of gross monthly income, or (3) 
welfare rent (as paid); and (B) the lesser of (1) comparable housing costs (rent & utilities) or (2) 
the occupied decent, safe and sanitary (DSS) replacement dwelling (HUD Tenant Assistance, 
Relocation and Real Property Acquisition Handbook 1378). Under the URA, cash replacement 
housing payments are required if the displaced tenant is not currently receiving government 
housing assistance, although they do have the option to accept government housing assistance if 
desired and available. 
Interestingly, due to the funding package of the BPNP including HOME and CDBG 
funds, Section 104(d) requirements must also be satisfied, which has slightly different 
requirements for displaced residential tenants. Section 104(d) requires 60 times the monthly 
rental assistance payment, calculated as the difference between (A) the greater of (1) 30% of 
adjusted gross monthly income, (2) 10% of gross monthly income, (3) welfare rent (as paid), or 
minimum rent for the local public housing authority; and (B) the lesser of (1) comparable 
housing costs (rent & utilities) or (2) the occupied decent, safe and sanitary (DSS) replacement 
dwelling. Under 104(d), the displacing government agency may offer Housing Choice Vouchers 
(Section 8) in lieu of cash replacement housing payments, but low income tenants can request 
direct cash assistance calculated under the URA instead.  
The City’s partnership with the HACC translates directly into this project costing the City 
less money in CDBG Section 108 loan financing than it would have had without the option of 
using HCVs to help fund residential displacement costs, specifically due to the funding sources 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For further FRMCS info see http://www.fhwa.dot.gov//////realestate/fixsch96.htm 
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involved in Phase I. Phase I of the BPNP, which involves the acquisition of parcels, relocation of 
residents and demolition of all properties in Bristol Place, is budgeted to cost a total of 
$7,585,695: $1,200,000 in HOME funding, $1,780,000 from the Urban Renewal fund, and 
CDBG Section 108 debt financing in the amount of $3,524,000 (CB 2013-187). The HACC is 
providing the remaining $1,092,000 via HCVs.  
The residential relocation plan provided by the City for the BPNP included one main 
“local enhancement” and one main modification to existing federal requirements. The primary 
‘enhancement’ and additional resource the City will be providing is a real estate tax rebate 
program targeted chiefly towards elderly or disabled displaced homeowner residents, defined as 
“homeowners receiving a pension, social security or social security insurance” (CB 2012-214). 
This enhancement was created as a response to concerns that arose through public participation 
sessions about the long-term affordability for displaced existing homeowners in the 
neighborhood, as most were found to be elderly and/or on fixed incomes, and Bristol Place 
property values were the cheapest in the City. Essentially, this real estate tax rebate program 
involves the City committing to pay the difference between the elderly or disabled displaced 
person’s Principle, Interest, Taxes and Insurance (PITI) above 30% of their gross monthly 
income, reimbursed annually as a tax rebate for as long as they occupy the original replacement 
unit. All other homeowner households will “be considered for,” but not guaranteed, this rebate 
for a period of three years only. In addition, there is cap on the program of $25,000 a year, and 
the City stated in its relocation plan, “if the cost of the program should exceed this amount, the 
seniors and persons with disabilities will be prioritized. If any funding remains after the seniors 
and persons with disabilities receive their payment, then the remaining portion shall be equally 
divided amongst the remaining eligible homeowners” (City of Champaign Bristol Park 
Relocation and Replacement Plan).    
The main modification to existing federal requirements is a stipulation resulting from the 
resident protests held outside the HACC Board of Commissioners meeting in August 2012, 
which preferentially targets the HACC’s HCVs for seniors, persons with disabilities, special 
needs or extremely low-income renters (<30% AMI) that are paying less than $500 in rent in 
their leave unit (City of Champaign Bristol Park Relocation and Replacement Plan).  
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5.6.5. Use of Housing Choice Vouchers problematic 
These two ‘optional policies’ funded by the City are the only real financial evidence of 
any responsiveness to public input received throughout the planning process, and while I 
commend the real estate tax rebate program, the HCV prioritization still leaves unaddressed 
community protests and concerns about transferring displacement effects beyond just the 
residents of the Bristol Place neighborhood through the use of priority-access HCVs. In the only 
public comment Council received during the 30-day period before the Relocation Plan was 
approved in a November 20, 2012 City Council meeting, Martel Miller protested, again, the 
conflict of interest present by the two people appointed by the Mayor to serve on the Housing 
Authority of Champaign County Board of Commissioners, and re-stated that vouchers should not 
be used for people who are going to be displaced by the Bristol Park Plan because that 
compounds the area-wide disadvantage of the exact same struggling low income rental 
population this development is supposedly targeting. It is also significant that the only real 
addition to federally required relocation policies was for the most vulnerable elderly 
homeowners, and that the remaining and majority renting residents in the neighborhood will 
receive no assistance with rent increases (which are virtually guaranteed) beyond three years 
after their forced displacement. 
Esther Patt stated that she initially got involved in the Steering Committee for precisely 
this reason: 
The concern there wasn’t that these folks shouldn’t get relocation, our feeling was that 
the city should pay for the relocation costs for those people who live at Bristol Place and 
not take it out of the pool of vouchers that people are waiting for years. Why should they 
[Bristol Place residents displaced by government action] get bumped ahead of them 
[existing HCV waiting list members]?  
 
Hopefully, the use of HCVs in the relocation of displaced persons affected by this project 
may prove a beneficial thing in the future for expanding the City of Champaign’s human rights 
ordinance to no longer allow housing discrimination based on income, because City staff and 
officials will work with residents who need to relocate, and will thus become aware of local 
Section 8 discrimination. Local housing experts I interviewed corroborated the widespread 
Section 8 housing discrimination in Champaign. Aaron Smith with Homestead stated of his 
experience working with affordable housing provision locally, “if you get a voucher it’s still kind 
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of hard to find landlords who will accept them. But if you get a voucher definitely you’re in a 
better position than someone who’s on the wait list.” Esther said,  
Even in Urbana, there are landlords who will turn you down, and then you’ve got to go to 
the city and file a discrimination complaint. Most people do not file discrimination 
complaints because you’ve got 90 days to find a place, and then you lose your voucher. 
Most people who are victims of discrimination don’t file complaints anyway because 
they’re not looking for civil rights action, they’re looking for housing. If it will get them 
the housing immediately, they’ll do it. Otherwise, you know. 
 
And Jim Rose said, “landlords in Urbana cannot discriminate based on race or whether that 
person has a voucher and that’s not the case in Champaign. It’s just hard to get people into good 
quality housing when they have a voucher.”   
In addition to finding it difficult to get into a unit initially with a property owner who will 
accept Section 8 HCVs as a source of income, once residents do get into a unit, it is by no means 
guaranteed that the unit will translate to more housing stability for its residents. As Esther Patt 
elaborated, echoing earlier BPNP opposition sentiments shared by Martel Miller: 
With public housing, the Housing Authority wanted to tear down all the public housing, 
and it’s really because HUD wasn’t providing enough money to do maintenance on it, but 
they created this baloney fiction that it’s about density, that we have to have lower 
density, and also about mixed income, that if you have all poor people together, that – but 
somehow if poor people live around people with money that somehow that will inspire 
them to have more money or something. You want them to have more money? Give them 
jobs. For that matter, if you want to lessen the achievement gap in the schools, provide 
housing stability. At least 20% of third graders are attending their third school by third 
grade. That’s why a lot of kids aren’t doing well in school.  It’s not because people whose 
parents are crack heads or something, it’s kids who just they have to keep changing 
schools because the family has to keep moving. On Section 8, you will not get an honest 
answer from the Housing Authority, and I don't care if you publish this on the front page 
of the News-Gazette and put it on TV and radio. The Housing Authority is not honest 
about how much people have to move when they have Housing Choice Vouchers because 
either the landlord won’t do repairs, or the landlord raises the rent beyond the amount of 
the voucher, or the landlord just refuses to renew. People with Housing Choice Vouchers 
have to move a lot. I see, from the number of people on Section 8 who contact us [the 
Champaign-Urbana Tenant Union], who have to move because the landlord is not doing 
repairs, so they call the Housing Authority, they call the Section 8 person.  They send 
someone out, they do the inspection, they tell the landlord, ‘We’re not going to pay the 
voucher anymore,’ and then the tenant has got to move. A lot of times, the landlord sues 
the tenant anyway, so there’s that whole problem.   
 
Esther is referencing widely-documented scholarly evidence for the housing and school 
achievement linkages that has been around since the Civil Rights era. This linkage has been 
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documented as a key element in both the 1968 Kerner Commission Report (Report of the 
National Advisory Commission On Civil Disorders (1968)) and in the legislative history of the 
Fair Housing Act.16 The relation between school and housing segregation was also explored in a 
series of school desegregation cases beginning in the 1970s.17 Yet in spite of HUD’s duty to 
“affirmatively further fair housing (42 U.S.C. § 4208),” and the parallel “compelling government 
interest” in the reduction of school segregation,18 there have been few examples of effective 
coordination between housing and school policy in the intervening years, according to Philip 
Tegeler in a report prepared by the Poverty & Race Research Action Council in October 2011 
(Finding Common Ground: Coordinating Housing and Education Policy to Promote Integration). 
Despite these issues, when compared to the subsidized rental assistance provided by the 
City limited to three years post-displacement, despite the limitations of local landlords’ 
acceptance and management of tenants with HCVs, the longevity of the tenant housing 
assistance provided by HCVs is much better. This longevity, however, comes with additional 
requirements, often very difficult to meet in the current job climate.   
 
5.7 Shifts in public housing supply and decreased responsiveness to demand 
The HACC four years ago (in 2010), with 788 applicants on the HCV Program waiting 
list, became a Moving to Work agency. As Jim Rose explained, “That’s important to know 
because it’s a real change in the way housing authorities can do business and there’s less 
paperwork. There’s more flexibility about what the Housing Authority can do. They can be their 
own developer. They can buy property without prior approval from HUD.”  
One of the changes immediately implemented by the HACC as a MTW agency was the 
creation of a Mandatory Local Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) Program for all non-elderly 
households in both the Housing Choice Voucher and Public Housing Programs. This mandates 
that all residents aged 18 or over must be employed a minimum of 20 hours or more per week for 
at least one year, with incentives offered to families that succeed on an annual basis (HACC 
MTW Year 1 Report). As Jim Rose explained: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Florence Wagman Roisman, “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in Regional Housing Markets: The 
Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litigation,” 42 Wake Forest Law Review. 333 (2007) (citing 
Congressional hearings); Robert G. Schwemm. Housing Discrimination: Law & Litigation (2011); See also U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, Report on Racial Isolation in the Public Schools (1967). 
17 See for example Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
18 See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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We’re trying to break the cycle of families, one-family-after-another living in subsidized 
housing and with the Moving to Work idea the people cannot live in the housing 
permanently and they have an obligation to either work or go to school because in order 
to live in the housing you have to do one of those and the term is 7 years. After 7 years 
you can’t live in the housing anymore because, by that time, you’ve either got a better 
education or you’ve been working.  
 
And as the HACC’s annual plans explains: 
Created by Congress in 1996, Moving to Work (MTW) is a HUD demonstration program 
that allows housing authorities to design and test innovative, locally-designed strategies for 
providing low-income families with affordable housing and new paths to economic 
independence. MTW is currently the only mechanism through which public housing 
authorities can wholly transform housing delivery, programs and operations. The broad 
flexibility to waive statute and regulations allows HACC to better serve and house residents 
while streamlining internal operations. 
 
Terry Townsend in our interview shared that he does not see this shift quite as positively, despite 
HUD’s good intentions for more local flexibility in meeting locally specific needs. He blamed 
federal devolution and the regional office at HUD for relaxing its enforcement responsibilities 
too much, evolving “from a policeman to a partner,” by giving the local housing authority too 
much flexibility. He said there is a whole host of problems with that approach locally, because of 
the makeup of the HACC’s management.  
In its own Year 3 MTW Report, the HACC included a status report and evaluation of the 
MTW program prepared by researchers in the Department of Agricultural and Consumer 
Economics at UIUC that included excerpts from 15 tenant interviews, all of which were with 
female African American HACC residents with between one and five children. These women 
reported having worked or currently working in fast food jobs, earning $8.00 an hour with no 
benefits. When asked about the primary barriers to finding and maintaining employment, 
respondents mentioned the economy: “I get no response from applications,” “Right now with the 
economy it’s just not that easy. I would take any job right now to be honest”; and when asked 
about the barriers to continuing education, inadequate supplemental childcare and inability to 
balance work and childcare demands simultaneously were reported: “I actually did try going 
back to school, I wanted to get a business degree, but it’s like the bills didn’t stop coming, so I 
cut my hours back at work but it didn’t work out so I just said I’ll leave school alone until maybe 
the kids get a little older.” These struggles are reflective of the majority of the most vulnerable 
lower income Champaign residents, not just those currently receiving HACC housing assistance. 
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This MTW ideology includes no assistance for educational expenses, childcare or any 
other form of job training – it merely offers an “incentive payment” that residents have the 
option of receiving in the full amount as a credit against the upcoming year’s rent, or a 
commercial “gift” card equal to 50% of the annual incentive payment (Year 1 MTW Plan). As 
Esther Patt put it: 
“They had this idea that, ‘We’re going to increase people's employment opportunities,’ blah-
blah-blah, which of course you know rarely ever happens with people’s employment. If you 
want to increase people’s employment opportunity, you have to send them to a four-year 
college to get a degree, and that means you have to give them aid beyond tuition and fees. 
You have to give them free tuition and subsidy, because they have to give up work, you can’t 
go to school at night much, and you have to have a car if you want to go to Eastern and to 
drive an hour each way. You’ve got to give people a four-year college education. There’s a 
whole lot of people who have a high school degree, diploma, and even have some college, 
but they still can’t get better-paying jobs, and actually there are people with college degrees 
who are having trouble getting jobs, it depends on what your degree is in, but you know - you 
[also] see that most of these people are too old, and for that matter, if you’re 55 years old and 
you need a job and you have a master’s degree, it ain't so easy. People don’t want to hire you. 
  
While the HACC seemed to understand these realities three years after implementing this 
program, reporting in its 3-year MTW report that “initial data collected through the University of 
Illinois evaluation program indicated that significant educational and training was going to be 
required in preparation for gainful employment by residents,” they have neither discontinued the 
FSS program, provided supplemental support for child care or lost income from educational 
programs, nor changed its mandatory requirements. The requirements state that in order to 
continue receiving HACC assistance, one adult member of each household must be employed 20 
hours a week or enrolled in a certificate-granting educational program full time by the second 
year of housing assistance, and in order to receive any assistance after 5 years, all adult 
household members must be employed 20 hours per week (Year 3 HACC Report). 
As Aaron Smith with Homestead mentioned, and as Jim Rose confirmed, the HACC has 
also changed the way they allocate government housing subsidies. The HACC has turned into an 
affordable housing developer, and has set aside and assigned project-based vouchers to all of its 
new LIHTC mixed-income private partnership projects. As Jim explained of the project-based 
voucher program: 
That means the voucher is attached to the unit and it’s good for 20 years, so a person who 
moves into these newer developments that are coming online get subsidized. The unit 
itself will have the subsidy. The person’s still only gonna be able to live there X number 
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of years and have to move on but it’s good for the Housing Authority because the subsidy 
money is guaranteed for the units for a longer period of time – 20 years. 
 
Aaron elaborated further, recognizing the squeeze for low-income renters as a group area-wide: 
I know the housing authority has gotten a little bit of flack about the fact that they’ve held 
on to some of the vouchers for their development, to use in their developments. I don’t 
know. People can debate that but I mean certainly once somebody gets moved into a 
project based unit that has a subsidy attached to it that will be a great help for those 
people. But that also means there’s less vouchers out there.  
 
In 2013, the HACC had a total of 1,798 authorized HCVs, 281 of which were held for 
project based vouchers (PBVs). The HCV waiting list was opened for a limited time period in 
November 2011, and out of a total of 2,200 applications received, 400 were selected via random 
lottery to be placed on the waiting list. Of these 400, 389 (97%) were considered extremely low 
income, with household incomes below 30% of the AMI. In 2014, there were 606 households on 
the HCV waitlist, 45 on the PBV waitlist, and 139 on the public housing unit waitlist, for a total 
of 790 on the waitlist for public housing assistance in Champaign County (2014 MTW Annual 
Report). While this only underscores the high level of need already documented for affordable 
low income rental housing units across Champaign County, HACC turning into an affordable 
housing developer led to a 312-unit increase in new housing made available for households at or 
below 80% AMI, and an average waitlist applicant time decrease from 36 months (3 years) to 
13.6 months. Overall, the HACC states that at least 75% of the families assisted by HACC are 
very low-income families (indicated as <50% AMI) (Year 4 MTW Report). Unfortunately, those 
who most need it, as demonstrated by multiple interviews with local housing experts, 
government officials, and data on local housing cost burden, are precisely those below 30% of 
the AMI. And as documented above, the HACC is the only local option for financial assistance 
for those households, which explains why 97% of the households on the HCV waitlist in 2013 
fell into this income category.  
Similar to complex financing partnership trends discussed above in relation to the BPNP, 
with the PBV Program the HACC has also shifted some of its maintenance responsibilities onto 
the private sector, with the “establishment of project based waiting lists and transference of all 
administrative functions for the operation of the vouchers and processing of all project based 
activities at the property to the respective property management company.” In 2014 this led to a 
$19,882 annual cost savings and 888 hour staff time savings for the HACC. The three new large 
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development complexes HACC has partnered with LIHTC developers on since turning into a 
MTW agency have leveraged $6.92 in private funding for every $1.00 of HACC funds spent 
(Year 4 MTW Annual Report).  
Despite these seemingly positive indicators, in 2010, the HACC owned 434 total units of 
public housing (109 Family, 84 Elderly/Disabled mixed, and 250 Elderly only units) (MTW 
Year 1 Report). But by 2014, that number had dropped to 354 (16 Family, 106 Elderly/Disabled, 
and 232 Elderly only units), including a staggering 85% decrease in total family units available, 
compared to a 7% decrease in elderly only units and a 21% increase in elderly/disabled units. In 
addition to traditional public housing stock owned and operated by the HACC, it also claims 
Oakwood Trace and Douglass Square in Champaign and Hamilton on the Park in Urbana, all 
LIHTC properties owned by “HACC affiliates,” which adds 74 additional total PBV units to the 
HACC’s unit inventory. While in overall numbers this is positive, these 74 units with PBVs only 
made up 35% of the total units constructed in these developments, meaning that as public 
housing units have been demolished, they are not being replaced at the same rate, and market 
rate units make up the difference. Providence at Thornberry, by far the largest development 
HACC has undertaken as a MTW agency and developer thus far, has a more advantageous 
affordable-to-market-rate unit split at 227 PBV units (47%) compared to 252 market rate units.  
In 2005, Burch Village, at the time a 70-unit family public housing development was 
demolished, and replaced with only 50 units built under HUD’s mixed-income HOPE VI 
guidelines, which do not require a one for one unit replacement. Burch Village was the first 
public housing development in Champaign and opened in 1952 for white families only. HUD’s 
mixed income approach to public housing (which began in 1992 with HOPE VI) breaks down 
most developments into 1/3 market rate units, 1/3 moderate income, and 1/3 of total units set 
aside for low-income residents. The new Burch Village, called Douglass Square, thus only set 
aside 16 units for the lowest income eligible renters, and only 36 of the original 70 residents 
were able to return – the remaining 34 families who were originally tenants of Burch Village 
were permanently displaced. Additionally, former public housing residents were not guaranteed 
the ability to come back, but instead had to go through a screening process before being declared 
eligible (Ferrari, 2013).  
Essentially, similar to nationwide public housing supply trends, Champaign is losing 
public housing units. As Jim Rose put it: 
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When we tear down public housing, we usually lose units and now we’re replacing them 
with different kinds of housing. But we’re not entire owners of the things we redevelop in 
town anyway so a private developer comes in and does in all the work and does that and 
we give ‘em a land lease at 99 years usually, and we’re a limited partner so it’s not public 
housing. So we’re losing public housing in that regard but we’re gaining affordable 
housing. Public housing used to serve only the lowest of the low-income so when we 
replaced the housing we tried to set aside a lot for very extremely low-income families. 
  
This is directly reflective of national policy shifts that began in the early 1990s as HUD 
responded to other widespread neoliberal governance changes and began an ideological shift 
from supply to demand-oriented approaches to low-income housing provision nationwide. Public 
housing according to HUD “was established to provide decent and safe rental housing for 
eligible low-income families, the elderly, and persons with disabilities.”19 Historically, HUD has 
administered federal aid to local housing agencies (HAs) that manage the housing for low-
income residents at rents they can afford. This stance on housing provision positions Has 
providing both a rival and excludable private good to fill the gap between the realities of market 
provision and consumer budget lines of that same good. Public housing has historically provided 
homes for low-income households who cannot afford equilibrium market rents, and in effect has 
acted as a subsidy that enables these households to devote more of their limited incomes to other 
basic needs (e.g. food and clothing).  
The use of HCVs is a paradigm shift and a direct change from historical supply-oriented 
solutions to meeting the affordable housing needs of low-income residents to more demand-
oriented theory and policy. In supply-side approaches to public housing, the government builds 
or subsidizes new housing, which is generally more expensive, gives recipients fewer options 
and increases housing consumption. In demand-side approaches, existing housing stock is 
occupied by families who need it and receive government assistance in the form of income 
supplements (coupons or vouchers), which give recipients more options, but increases both 
prices and demand for housing overall as the available supply is in higher demand, which in turn 
increases prices.20 This increase in pricing becomes especially problematic when public voucher 
programs are not sufficient to meet the needs of all of the low-income households who are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 HUD’s Public Housing Program, Downloaded on December 2, 2013 from 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/rental_assistance/phprog 
20 Phillips, Rhonda. Pittman, Robert H (Eds.) (2009) An Introduction to Community Development. London, 
Routledge, pg. 256. 
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eligible for assistance, as is clearly the case currently in Champaign County.21  
In part, this new HA role was made possible by the 1998 Quality Housing and Work 
Responsibility Act (QHWRA) that allowed PHAs to work directly with the private sector to 
develop mixed-finance projects (among a series of other provisions). Overall, the QHWRA 
legislation privileges a demand side approach over a supply side approach to meet the housing 
needs of low-income households, and has essentially entailed shifting a large part of the cost of 
maintaining and producing housing for low-income people to the private sector (a combination 
of both for-profit and not-for profit developers).22 Turning to the private sector may provide 
additional sources of funding to rebuild and renovate buildings, but it also adds stakeholders 
previously absent into the public housing provision equation. Namely, the investors and 
developers in the private sector who are generally more risk averse in building low-income 
housing as they are required by law to measure all of their actions against the amount of profit 
those actions generate for their shareholders. Developers now often have lead responsibility for 
securing financing, overseeing design and construction, marketing to subsidized and 
unsubsidized residents, and contracting for property management and social service provision.23 
This is exactly the kind of “streamlining of operations” the HACC has sought with its new 
mixed-income LIHTC housing development complexes, as they put it, successfully transferring 
“all administrative functions for the operation of the vouchers to the property management 
company.”  
Public housing, dissimilar to general housing or other private goods, constitutes both an 
economic and a social asset, and one that cannot be successfully created or sustained solely by 
the private market to meet all the needs of those who cannot afford market rents. While portable, 
vouchers also put greater responsibility on the user to find and secure housing in the private 
sector and then manage finances and unfamiliar institutional mechanisms to keep it. Very 
specific assumptions about the market need to be fulfilled in order for vouchers to actually 
expand choice. These include the availability of units at a fair market rent (i.e. a rent level set by 
HUD that generally reflects the 40th percentile for a geographic area) in good neighborhoods 
(i.e. one that is an improvement over the current public housing environment), and, if units are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 O’Sullivan, Arthur (2012) Urban Economics, 8th ed. Boston, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, pg. 398.  
22 Ibid, pg. 225-26. 
23 Joseph, M. L. (2010). Creating mixed-income developments in Chicago: Developer and service provider 
perspectives. Housing Policy Debate, 20(1), 91–118. 
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available, the ability for voucher holders to actually use their vouchers (i.e. the landlord is 
willing to participate and the unit meets housing quality standards set by HUD). 
 
5.8 Elderly housing assistance privileged over family housing assistance: Reflection of 
community-wide NIMBY biases 
 Another theme that has come up in interviews and in low-income housing provision in the 
HACC’s stock is the Champaign-Urbana community’s bias towards privileging elderly residents’ 
needs over those of local families. In addition to the 85% decrease in the HACC’s supply of 
family units compared to the overall 14% increase in elderly and disabled units since 2010, of 
the 1,879 MTW households served by the HACC in 2013, 78% of were African-American, 83% 
were female-headed households, and 79% were family households with 3 children or less (MTW 
Year 3 Report). In my interview with Jim Rose, he explained his thoughts on why there is more 
community support for elderly supportive housing than housing for families: 
Well it’s easy to build senior affordable housing because it’s not controversial. You can 
put affordable senior housing anywhere in the community and people will say, ‘yeah, 
that’s great because we have to help our seniors citizens of elderly people.’ But if you try 
and start placing affordable family housing in areas, it becomes very controversial and 
we’re finding that out because we’re building something in West Champaign – 
Providence at Thornberry – when it first came to light the neighbors were just outraged… 
a lot of people see public housing as being occupied by only one group of people - that is 
African Americans - and that’s gonna have to change, too, and we’re gonna try and do 
some marketing outreach for our Thornberry development because it’s a bad perception, 
you know? I mean this town is full low-income people and they’re not African-American. 
There’s Asian and there’s Hispanic people who work in restaurants who make minimum 
wage. There’s a lot of different groups of people, across the whole board but the 
perception was it’s gonna be all one group of people living in their housing. 
 
The malicious NIMBY vitriol Jim referred to is easily seen in web board responses to a 
single local news article’s coverage of the HACC’s Thornberry LIHTC development in April 
2013: 
…I moved out of Turnberry a few years ago as my family size grew.  Praise Jesus I did.  This is 
not a good situation, but it sounds as if it is moving FORWARD! I took a hit on my home value 
when I sold it due to the timing; I can only imagine the hit homeowers in the area will be facing. 
I promise a few things:  1) Super Pantry will be increasing their single serve alcohol and tobacco 
sales post-development of Providence at Thornberry.  2) Emergency response time to 911 calls 
will have to be deeply considered by homeowners in the area who currently do not own a 
firearm.  3) Champaign Police Department will be forced to quadruple thier route presence in 
that sector of town.  4) There will be a substantial increase of homes for sale (both by owner and 
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by agent) in that area in the next 60 days. In conclusion, my message to the neighbors of 
'Providence at Thornberry' is GET OUT, GET OUT, AND GET OUT!!!!  
 
…Those living in subsidized housing care very little or nothing for thier environment because 
they have no skin in the game.  They dont have to care.  Its those around them who suffer.  This 
is not a good thing for SW Champaign. 
 
…What it means is more section 8 people from the Mattis to Neal down Bradley crowd is going 
to keep getting thrust upon on better areas of town and then continue with the trend of putting the 
problems of crime, drugs, gunfire and shootings out in what used to be good neighborhoods. 
With the city’s blessing an outside, out of state developer will come in and make all the money 
and then not have to deal with the lowering of property values and the increase in crime and 
drugs in areas where they werent that prevelant before that comes with this element of the 
population. They want to erect these mixed housing multi family plans and locate them near 
good decent single family housing subdivisions and then you get the increase in crime in those 
areas (News Gazette, April 3, 2013). 
 
There were a few more reasonable responses to these comments posted in the same thread, “but 
this is mixed income, not section eight,” and “some serious white flight going on here”; but 
overall, these perceptions reflect a much larger social divide in the local community. 
However, by the HACCs own recent PBV program and primarily elderly and disabled public 
housing supply design, as the physical supply of family units have disappeared, as one might 
expect, the statistics on those waiting on HCVs have reflected more families. Of the 400 total 
HCV waitlist applicants in 2013, 390 (98%) were African American, and 97% were extremely 
low income (below 30% AMI). On the public housing unit waitlist, 128 applicants (82%) were 
African American, 100% are below 30% AMI, and 72% are families (MTW Year 3 Report).  
The fact that 98% of the HACC’s waitlist are African-American combined with the intensely 
segregated neighborhoods in the Cities of Champaign and Urbana makes these community 
comments decidedly racist as well as classist (in addition to just being ignorant). This 
widespread racist community rhetoric can be found widely documented in other sources. It is in 
fact, such an issue in the local community that it is listed in the City’s Analysis of Impediments 
to Fair Housing Report submitted to HUD as “Perceptions of affordable rental housing – 
NIMBYism/Perceptions of “Section 8” Voucher holders.” This report states: 
The low/moderate income areas of Champaign are fairly compact geographically. In 
keeping with federal direction to reduce concentrations of poverty, efforts have been 
made to achieve this with new developments in Champaign including affordable rental 
housing. However, these efforts have often been met with public opposition. Some 
property owners believe that the construction of multi-family housing will bring down 
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property values in adjacent neighborhoods. Other arguments that have been expressed 
include the fear that renters make less desirable neighbors and that multi-family units 
overly burden the infrastructure and create traffic problems in residential neighborhoods. 
This attitude has been present as recently as April 2013 – the announcement of pending 
construction of subsidized housing in southwest Champaign was met with significant 
public resistance to the effort, much of which was based in traditional misconceptions. 
The practice of defining a population (Section 8 people) and then judging them as a 
whole is a classic example of prejudicial behavior, and remains present in Champaign. 
These misconceptions persist despite a body of work disproving it. 
 
And in its following recommendations for addressing this barrier, the report states: 
Local officials might consider approving additional incentives or requirements for the 
inclusion of some affordable units in new neighborhoods to try and break the pattern of 
development that has occurred over the years. Another important factor in ensuring that 
rental units do not detract from neighborhood property values is a continued emphasis on 
code enforcement. 
 
Under another name, this is called inclusionary zoning, which can be set up to require 
developers to provide some percentage of housing that is affordable to low and moderate income 
renters or buyers, or pay into an affordable housing trust fund in lieu of providing affordable 
units in his/her development. However, the report then concludes, despite identification of the 
severity of the problem and what I assume to be NSD staff recommendations proposing two 
incredibly positive and potentially very effective solutions: 
At this time, the City has decided to focus more on providing incentives to developers to 
encourage this type of affordable new construction, similar to what was done for the 
Atkins Group in the development of Ashland Park on the north end of town. If incentives 
continue to be sufficient to encourage voluntary construction of affordable units, no 
changes need be considered. 
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CHAPTER 6 
URBAN RENEWAL IN CHAMPAIGN: COMMUNITY RATIONALES 
In contrast to the primary reasons for the clearance and rebuild decision stated by City 
officials related to the physical and market conditions of existing housing stock, other 
community stakeholders, when asked what they believed the main rationale behind the City’s 
plan was, reported crime, poor property management combined with no code enforcement 
(unregulated slumlords), the lack of effective city reinvestment programs and the City’s 
northward development expansion plans as their perceptions of the City’s primary motivations.  
 
6.1 “Crime” 
Jim Rose, as mentioned above a long time local resident and housing and social services 
professional recently elected to the Housing Authority Board of Commissioners said: 
The crime issue was a big one in that area. There were shootings and there were lots of 
things going on. A lot of it’s related to drug trafficking as far as I can tell. They’ve been 
thinking about it because that neighborhood has really been a kind of a drain on the 
resources of the city. There’s been a lot of police activity on the area.  
 
In recounting the history of the neighborhood, specifically related to addressing or 
mitigating criminal activity in the area, there were always two City actions that all interviewees 
mentioned: the demolition of the infamous “Green Apartments” in 1998, and the City changing 
all of the streets in the Bristol Place neighborhood to one-ways in a neighborhood-wide crime 
reduction effort recommended by the police and also enforced by the City in 1998. According to 
City Council member Tom Bruno, the Green Apartments were a “hangout for a bad element” 
and “adversely affected the neighborhood” to the point that Marty Smith, a former City Council 
member, negotiated a deal with Jerry Schweighart, former Mayor of Champaign, to sell the 
property to the City and demolish it. One of the buildings stood where the current city park 
somewhat confusingly labeled ‘Bristol Park’ is on the westernmost edge of the Bristol Place 
neighborhood, and the other across the street in neighboring Garwood. As Kerri Spear said, “the 
Green Apartments had high drug trafficking issues, tearing those down was a short fix for the 
neighborhood while the City expended its limited resources in building Douglass Square and the 
Taylor Thomas subdivision.” A News Gazette article dated June 17, 2012 stated that in 1998, 
police estimated a drug transaction went down in the Bristol Place neighborhood every two or 
three minutes.   
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The other crime mitigation decision, also in 1998, to turn all neighborhood streets into 
one-way streets, occurred when police determined that would be a better way to manage the drug 
activity in the neighborhood, according to former community development specialist Greg 
Skaggs. In a News Gazette article documenting the 2010 change back to two-ways, Skaggs 
alluded to earlier efforts of residents and Metanoia detailed above, saying “the one-ways have 
been up there ever since, and there’s been different times the neighborhood has approached the 
city to get them removed.” Metanoia’s Reverend Barnes was quoted as saying, “once we got 
those old apartments out, that presence tried to remain here. After a while, people who have 
other intentions, they decided to move on or move some place else.” And since then, it has been 
like “night and day,” Barnes said. “There was a time when, just at the corner where we’re 
located, you could find anywhere from 15 to 20 individuals just standing in the street, and today 
we don’t have any of that. The community itself, it rallied around a lot of issues.” He was further 
quoted in the article as saying that he believed the change back to two way streets was a City 
change in the right direction for the health of the neighborhood and its residents, “the 
neighborhood needed to be turned back to normalcy” (News Gazette, March 6, 2010). Barnes 
said two years later that the area was much improved since the Green Apartment days, and the 
residents who remain deserved “better…these people are part of the city. They’re part of the 
citizenry. They deserve the same kind of attention as the people down in Devonshire” (News 
Gazette, June 17, 2012: Is it time to Wipe the Slate Clean in Bristol Place?). Terry Townsend 
agreed, saying in our interview that the crime issues had decreased significantly in Bristol Place 
in recent years, but that City Hall did not take that into account when creating their 
redevelopment plan. He asked rhetorically, “where are the statistics to justify what you are 
doing?”   
The Champaign Police have re-structured their service delivery twice since 1992 – once 
in 1994 when the City was broken into three districts with specific officer teams assigned to each 
district in efforts to incorporate a ‘community oriented policing’ ethos into services, and once 
again in 2006 when those three districts were divided into four because of the expansion of the 
City’s southwestern subdivisions. This shift from rotating beat officers to fixed assignments so 
officers and residents become familiar and hopefully more comfortable working with one 
another is an immensely positive shift, if done in the right way. The Garden Hills neighborhood 
group, one of the oldest registered neighborhood groups in the City, has been vital in leading 
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these efforts along with Champaign police, as is evidenced from selected 2008-2009 Annual 
Report excerpts listed below.  
The re-districting that occurred in 2006 cut the West District, which as is evident from 
the map contained in Appendix E.1 covered the largest geographic area in 2001, in half using 
University Avenue as the dividing line. Interestingly, Beat A in the North District, which from 
1994-2006 contained the current BPNP redevelopment area, the Old Urban Renewal area, as 
well as the locations of the most recent two City neighborhood improvement projects (Douglass 
Square and Taylor Thomas Subdivisions), was the smallest geographic sub-area designated for 
assigned regular patrol policing services. And despite the geographic area of the West District 
being approximately 7 times the size of Beat A in the North District, the same number of officers 
were assigned to the entire West District as to the smallest Beat in the North District until 1997. 
Between 1998 and 2000 the West District had marginal patrol officer assignment increases, but 
still definitively not proportionate to either the residential numbers in either area or to the 
physical size of the two geographic areas: 2 more patrol officers were assigned to the West than 
North in 1998, 4 more in both 1999 and 2000, only 3 more in 2001, then 2 more in 2002, 1 more 
in 2003, and 3 more in 2004 (see Tables 4 and 5). Additionally, the only Lieutenants assigned to 
any Districts are assigned to the North and Norwest Districts.   
What used to be Beat A in 2006 turned into Beat 11, still part of the North District, but at 
the same time as the District boundaries were re-drawn, the Beat boundaries were re-drawn and 
now encompass, instead of avoiding, the largest regional shopping center in the area (and a 
source of significant sales tax revenue for the City of Champaign), Marketplace Mall (see 
Appendices E.4 – E.6). While an exhaustive review of the concentrations of Part I Index Crimes 
by Beat in this area is still underway and whose publication is forthcoming, Larceny-Theft 
incidents (which includes shoplifting and forgery, according to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program) are concentrated in this retail center, 
due simply to its size and sales volume relative to the rest of the retail shopping opportunities in 
the Champaign-Urbana area. This means that without a breakdown of specific Index Crimes by 
offense type listed, the aggregate “criminal activity” attributed to this area in criminal data 
reports have the potential be inflated by these re-drawn boundaries in the same way that 
gerrymandering in political redistricting can skew election results. The UCR Program, used by 
the City of Champaign in collecting and tracking local criminal activity according to Champaign 
	   144 
Police Intelligence Analyst and 2013 Employee of the Year Renae Yandell, collects data 
about Part I offenses in order to measure the level and scope of crime occurring throughout the 
country. The UCR Program’s founders chose these offenses because they are serious crimes, 
they occur with regularity in all areas of the country, and they are likely to be reported to police 
(Crime in the United States Uniform Crime Reports, printed annually, FBI).  
  When reviewing Annual Police Reports dating back to 1992, there is a clear pattern of 
disproportionate policing efforts concentrating in Champaign’s North End and there have been 
many local critiques of disproportionate policing of African-American residents (e.g. via traffic 
stops), trends dovetailing the results of over two decades of criminal justice research nationally 
(see The New Jim Crow by Michelle Alexander for a comprehensive national overview of 
national racial disparities in policing practices).  
The distribution of Champaign police patrols and calls for service by beat (see Table 5 
and Appendix E.2) demonstrate the breakdown of policing services’ concentration in the North 
District, and the misconduct allegations data collected from 1989-2000 demonstrate a serious 
spike in 1998, corresponding to the time period in the late 1990s when the Green Apartments 
were demolished (see Appendix E.3). The most revealing quote indicating the Champaign Police 
Department’s ethos about concentrating more policing in the North End, the high Disparity 
Indices related to traffic stops and other accusations of racial profiling was: 
The 2005 [IDOT Traffic Stop Study] report revealed that there continues to be a 15% 
difference in the citation versus warning tickets issued to Caucasian and African 
American motorists, with African-American motorists receiving a higher percentage of 
citations. We believe there is likely an underlying economic correlation contributing to 
this issue. We readily acknowledge that we routinely assign more resources to beats and 
districts that have large minority populations, but this stems from crime volume, more 
violent crime, and the rate at which police resources are utilized in various areas (2005 
Annual Report).  
 
This makes little sense from a number of perspectives: first, economic status has no 
correlation to a residents’ likelihood of a police officer issuing a citation or a warning (or it 
should not), and at best this demonstrates a vilification of lower income citizens. Second, the 
claims of ‘crime volume’ are exactly the sorts of generalizing stereotypes by area that I refer to 
above when discussing potential abuses of re-districting, and that does not even take into account 
inflated arrest rates and therefore incident rates in precisely the neighborhoods they reference. 
Some argue that this is a chicken and egg problem, but if there are more officers patrolling a 
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neighborhood, and the differences in arrest disparity index by race is as pronounced as it is, that 
is a false analogy. Increased police presence in an area by definition means more stops, more 
citations, and more arrests than in an area with fewer physical patrols. Assigning more resources 
to areas with more violent crime, specifically, is exactly what police should do, as the need for 
those kinds of responses are the primary reason taxpayers are willing to fund municipal police 
departments, but broad claims about “the rate at which police resources are utilized” rings false 
in light of widespread community documentation over the same time period in news articles and 
court records of the often tragic results of police misconduct over the last two decades. 
Evaluating the calls for service by beat (see Table 5 in Appendix A and Appendix E.2) 
demonstrates that in fact, the South District, which contains the highest student population in 
Champaign, except for a two year period between 2007 and 2009, had the highest number of 
service calls by area in the City. As Brian Dolinar put it in our interview: 
There’s this argument about police calls: ‘Well, we know there’s high crime because 
there’s a high number of police calls. We need to wipe out the community because 
there’s a high number of police calls.’ The police racially profile black people because 
there’s more phone calls in a black neighborhood, when actually the largest number of 
phone calls in this town come from Green Street and Campus Town. 
 
Interestingly, in an early Neighborhood Services Advisory Board meeting discussing the 
BPNP in 2009, this very ‘data conclusion ambiguity’ issue was discussed. The overall number of 
police calls in Bristol Place had gone down while in Garwood they had gone up at the time, and 
community development specialist Greg Skaggs said that in talking with police officers in that 
area, they believed that the number of calls going up was actually a positive, as it indicated more 
trust in the police - more citizens calling when issues arise. If trust in the police is lower, the 
number of calls also decreases. Robert Boyer, a City of Champaign Planning Department intern 
at the time and the co-author of the existing conditions report cited by the 2011 BPNP also stated 
in this meeting that it was hard to determine whether the numbers reported indicated an increase 
in service calls, more patrolling, or a surge in crime (1/22/2009 NSAB Meeting Minutes). Thus 
despite early and more accurate considerations of the limited conclusions that can be drawn from 
calls for service data, the ultimate perception in the community overall has remained that as 
police call numbers increase, overall crime must also be increasing, when in fact this is not 
definitively the case. 
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One caveat about the historical calls for service data contained in Table 5 in Appendix A 
and in Appendix E.2 is that it is both incomplete because not every District Lieutenant reported 
exact numbers, some often gave rounded off thousands, so where I could I filled in gaps based 
on simple math from the aggregate number of annual police calls, but whenever there were more 
entries missing, I left cells blank. Even with this approach, the numbers do not quite add up 
correctly, but they give some sense of distribution nonetheless, and in more recent years, for 
2007 - 2013 they are more accurate.	  	  
A brief timeline of Annual Champaign Police Report excerpts is included below to highlight 
approaches and service delivery ethos over time, as well as a few notable incidents on the history of 
police misconduct in the North End of Champaign: 
 
In 1992: The Tactical Team has considerable flexibility for tactics in addressing street crime, 
surveillances, and order maintenance problems throughout the City. However, most of their 
enforcement efforts were in public housing areas in northeast Champaign during 1992. In 
addition to the usual two patrol officers assigned to northeast Champaign, a Tactical Team of 
three officers and one sergeant has devoted most of its time toward drug enforcement in 
northeast Champaign. This group of officers, known as Team 11, contributed significantly to an 
81% increase in drug arrests in the City during 1992 (1992 Annual Champaign Police Report). 
In 1994: The Champaign Police Department began implementation of what could arguably be 
the most fundamental change in service philosophy in its history. This change moves the 
department away from a traditional, narrow focus to service delivery toward a broad focus 
characterized by problem solving and citizen involvement. All Police Department employees 
received training during the year in the Community Oriented Policing philosophy and problem 
solving. Patrol officers, assigned to permanent beats, have developed beat profiles and 
established park and walk locations in their patrol areas city-wide. Patrol officers and supervisors 
regularly attend neighborhood meetings on their beats (1994 Annual Champaign Police Report). 
In 1996: Foot patrol efforts in the City continue to play a vital role in the policing arsenal of the 
Champaign Police Department. Efforts in northeast Champaign as well as the Maple Vine area 
have been especially praised by neighborhood residents. These officers through innovation and 
hard work keep the criminal element off balance and provide considerable reassurance of safety 
to law-abiding citizens in the neighborhoods. This along with their positive approach to youth in 
the neighborhood win them high marks with citizens. The Gang/Tactical Team Unit was most 
proud of a comprehensive problem oriented policing project in the North Market Street area. The 
project involved cooperation with property owners and resulted in numerous drug arrests (1996 
Annual Champaign Police Report). 
In 1998: 1998 has been a year to test the metal of the men and women of the Champaign Police 
department. Considerable attention was focused on the citizen complaint process during the year. 
During these discussions there were many comments made that were inaccurate and 
unsubstantiated. Positive police-citizen relations are essential to the community oriented policing 
philosophy of the Champaign Police Department. The Human Relations Commission examined 
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5 years of complaint data along with information relating to traffic stops and calls for police 
service. As the chair of the Commission has stated on several occasions, no discriminatory 
policies or prejudicial patterns of conduct were found during an exhaustive examination of the 
data. There remains however, a certain lack of trust among some citizens. This is especially true 
among African Americans and efforts are underway to address their concerns. Over 100 drug 
related search warrants were served during the year. This along with the destruction of the 
infamous “Green Apartments” represent considerable pressure on drug traffickers throughout the 
City (1998 Annual Champaign Police Report). 
The Champaign Police SWAT team brutalized a black 81-year-old grandmother. Renee Holt said 
she was grabbed by the throat and pushed to the floor while the police searched for her nephew 
who, it turned out, was not in the apartment. She had to receive medical treatment at a local 
hospital (News-Gazette, Dec. 11, 1998). 
In 1999: There were growing concerns of racial profiling and alleged discriminatory practices by 
Champaign police officers. There were also high expectations of furthering the concepts of 
community policing (1999 Annual Champaign Police Report). 
In 2000: Gregory Brown died in the custody of Champaign police. Brown, a developmentally 
disabled man, was beaten in an alleyway late at night by over a dozen Champaign police officers. 
Witnesses heard Brown crying out for help and telling police he could not breathe. He died of a 
heart attack. The Brown family received a $185,000 settlement from the incident. Officer Daniel 
Norbits, who in 2009 shot and killed Kiwane Carrington, was one of the officers involved 
(History of Police Misconduct in Champaign County, Champaign-Urbana Citizens for Peace and 
Justice (CUCPJ), local community advocacy group started in 2004 to combat misconduct and 
racial profiling in local policing activities: http://cucpj.org/page/history-police-misconduct-
champaign-county). 
In 2002: An understanding and awareness of concerns of the community related to equal 
treatment continues to be addressed by the installation of mobile video recorders in every patrol 
car. It may be too early to make a judgment on exactly how this affected operations but our 
citizen complaints resulting from traffic stops decreased from ten in 2001 to one in 2002. 
Regular meetings between Police Department command staff and members of the minority 
community to discuss relations between the Police Department and the community continue. 
Citizen complaints decreased twenty percent to the lowest level since statistics have been kept 
(2002 Annual Champaign Police Report). 
In 2004: Black activists Patrick Thompson and Martel Miller were charged with felony 
eavesdropping by the Champaign Police Department for videotaping local police. The Citizens 
Watch video contrasted the heavy policing of the African American community, with the hands-
off attitude of police toward students on campus. Both Police Chief R.T. Finney and City 
Manager Steve Carter denied involvement in the plot to charge the two activists, but an affidavit 
from Assistant State’s Attorney Elizabeth Dobson implicated Champaign police. The City of 
Champaign agreed to a civil settlement with the two activists (History of Police Misconduct in 
Champaign County, Champaign-Urbana Citizens for Peace and Justice, local community 
advocacy group started in 2004 to combat misconduct and racial profiling in local policing 
activities: http://cucpj.org/page/history-police-misconduct-champaign-county). 
In 2005: The 2005 report revealed that there continues to be a 15% difference in the citation 
versus warning tickets issued to Caucasian and African American motorists, with African-
American motorists receiving a higher percentage of citations. We believe there is likely an 
underlying economic correlation contributing to this issue. We readily acknowledge that we 
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routinely assign more resources to beats and districts that have large minority populations, but 
this stems from crime volume, more violent crime, and the rate at which police resources are 
utilized in various areas (2005 Annual Champaign Police Report). 
In 2006: Champaign Police called out its SWAT team to deal with a suicidal black man in 
Garden Hills. Carl “Dennis” Stewart was the head janitor at Booker T. Washington Elementary 
School. He was going through marital problems, had separated with his wife, and was suicidal. 
Police received a call that he was in his car with a gun. Calling out its SWAT team in an 
Armored Personnel Carrier, an expensive high-tech tank designed to suppress mobs and riots, 
police blocked Stewart’s SUV in a driveway while a hostage negotiator used a phone and a 
bullhorn to talk to him. Police brought Stewart’s mother to the scene, but would not allow her to 
talk to him. They also restrained his brother, also on the scene. After he drive his truck across the 
lawn and down a side street, Champaign police chased him in a car through Garden Hills, a 
neighborhood directly west of the BPNP plan area, also with a large population of African 
Americans. After police cornered him with the SWAT truck, Stewart took his own life (NG 
5/12/2006: Standoff Ends in Tragedy; The Public I June 2006: Police Stage Attacks on Garden 
Hills).  
In 2007: Champaign police send 17-year-old black youth Brian Chesley to the hospital as a 
result of pepper spray, wait five weeks until his 18th birthday to file a misdemeanor charge of 
resisting a police officer, which he was then convicted of and sentenced to 100 hours of 
community service and required to pay court fines. Chesley had been playing basketball at the 
Douglass Center gymnasium which was open until 11 p.m. At approximately 8:30, he was 
walking an 8-year-old home through Douglass Park (3 blocks away from the area of the BPNP), 
but according to Champaign police the park had closed at sundown. When Chesley took the case 
to court, Champaign police admitted on the stand that they had been instructed to stop 
individuals in the North End, check them for warrants, and enter them into a police database. 
Champaign police officer Andre Davis said he stopped Chesley because, “I wanted to know why 
he was in the park.” When Chelsey refused to stop and kept walking, he was grabbed by backup 
police who slammed him face down on the pavement and pepper sprayed him, so that afterwards 
he had to be sent to the hospital. After a judge disallowed several arguments by the defense, an 
all-white jury found Chesley guilty of resisting and obstructing a peace officer (NG 3/29/2008: 
Racial bias alleged in outcome of trial; February 2008, The Public I State’s Attorney Implicated 
in Cover-up of Police Brutality).  
In 2008-2009: We believe and expect that our officers continue to use an objective process when 
deciding who to stop. It is has been continually reinforced through training, supervisory review 
and anti-biased training; that race in and of itself is neither a valid nor acceptable reason for 
initiating enforcement action. Over the past year, CPD has deployed a new digital in-car video 
system. The police department has made a commitment to apply the Problem Oriented Policing 
(POP) process through out the city. Problem Oriented Policing has proven so successful in 
Garden Hills that the same tactics and initiatives will be focused in other neighborhoods in the 
City (2008-2009 Annual Champaign Police Report). 
2009-2010: Kiwane Carrington, 15-year-old unarmed black male, shot and killed in what was 
ruled an accidental shooting (December 8, 2009 Report of the State’s Attorney).  
The Northwest District has undergone a positive transition over the last few years. This 
improvement is directly related to the Garden Hills Neighborhood Group and its intimate 
involvement with City personnel and most importantly the police department. In 2009 officers 
and citizens continued their focus with neighborhood involvement and problem policing. This 
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steadfast approach has made a noticeable reduction of crime and nuisance violation (2009-2010 
Annual Champaign Police Report). 
 
In 2004 the Illinois General Assembly enacted legislation requiring every Illinois law 
enforcement agency to collect data on traffic stops and send it to the Illinois Department of 
Transportation (IDOT) as a result of concerns about traffic stop practices. Traffic stop reports 
from Champaign between 2006-2010 demonstrate that African-American residents were stopped 
at twice the rate of their proportionate population represented in Champaign (see Table 6 in 
Appendix A), although the results of the stops (warning vs. citation) demonstrate no strong racial 
bias. The 2008-2009 Champaign Annual Police Report concludes: 
The only definitive conclusion from the distribution of these numbers is: this is who the 
CPD police officers deal with and it is this interaction that creates the basis for the 
individual and collective knowledge our officers possess as they serve our community. 
 
In 2010, data on “consent searches” (when officers ask motorists they stop for permission to 
search a vehicle) showed that 1/3 of Caucasian searches resulted in contraband found, while only 
7.7% of minority drivers searched resulted in contraband found. The Champaign Police 
Department’s summary of this data was, “officers were moderately more successful searching 
Caucasian motorists than minority motorists.” And yet, the concentrations of drug-related 
policing efforts remain concentrated in minority neighborhoods in the North End.  
Brian Dolinar, local activist scholar and University of Illinois lecturer, did a study in 
2007 on SWAT raids in Champaign County and both Urbana and Champaign. There were 63 
separate SWAT raids, and though data is slightly flawed because many names were redacted, 
and some cases were still pending at the time of analysis, he found that in 49 incidents where 
race was indicated, 44 were against black households, and the concentration of raids occurred in 
the neighborhoods north of University Avenue and on Lierman Street in southeast Urbana. He 
also reported that the majority of the SWAT raids were for drugs: “in 52 SWAT raids where the 
cause of the warrant could be determined, 45 were for drug searches. This indicates that 87% of 
SWAT raids were for drugs.” He concludes, echoing the sentiments of Reverend Barnes quoted 
above about unequal treatment of Champaign’s citizens by neighborhood (and in Champaign 
neighborhood designations are often used as a rhetorical proxy for race and income-based citizen 
valuations, as demonstrated by NIMBY comments above):  
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Authorities often say there is more crime in black neighborhoods. They say this is where 
all the service calls come from. Yet in the case of drug raids, police are selectively 
pursuing individuals. Studies have shown that blacks and whites use and sell drugs at 
equal rates. Still, it is commonly believed that only blacks are drug dealers. The targeting 
of blacks by SWAT teams is unequal enforcement of the law, plain and simple. What 
would happen if a SWAT team targeted a fraternity house on campus or a suburban home 
in Cherry Hills? 
 
In Illinois in 2007, 66% of those who were in prison for drugs were black, and the state’s rates of 
blacks incarcerated for drug possession was the highest in the country (IMC, 10/19/2007: Home 
Invasion: Racial Disparities in SWAT raids).  
In 2011, 658 (88%) of the 744 persons arrested for jaywalking were black, which is even 
more discriminatory and racially repressive when taken in conjunction with the fact that: (1) a 
large number of these tickets are given for walking in the street in the same direction as traffic; 
(2) a disproportionate number of people are ticketed in an area that does not have sidewalks; and 
(3) jaywalking tickets carry a $120 fine (Cha-Jua, 2014).  
The history of hiring practices in the Champaign Police Department (CPD) also 
contributes to its alienation from the local North End community: only 6 (less than 5%) CPD 
officers in 2010 were black, and 75% of all officers live outside the corporate limits. Until 1970, 
CPD officers were required to reside inside the city’s corporate boundaries. This is no longer the 
case. This is highly problematic in the case of Champaign County, as many if not most of the 
surrounding suburban communities according to historical sociologist James Loewen, are 
sundown towns (Loewen, 2005). Sundown towns are communities where either by law or 
custom and history the communities prevent or minimize African American residence and 
enforce sunset curfews for blacks. Most CPD officers live in one of the historically sundown 
towns that surround Champaign-Urbana, in virtually all white communities like Mahomet and St. 
Joseph (where the largest proportion of officers reside), Effingham, Areola, Homer and 
Monticello (see Appendix E.7). This racist local history is further documented in the 1994 CPD 
Annual Report, which documented CPD officers responding to “4 call outs and 1 Ku Klux Klan 
rally in Decatur, Illinois,” where they “recovered and rendered safe: 3 conventional pipe bombs; 
3 small improvised devices; and 1 anti-tank bazooka round.” 
 Hate crimes in Illinois decreased from 379 in 1999 to 155 in 2009 (Crime in Illinois 
Annual Uniform Crime Reports, 1999-2013), and in Champaign County from 49 in 1999 to 0 in 
2009, according to the 2010 Champaign County Statistical Abstract published by the Champaign 
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County Regional Planning Commission. However, the perpetrators and targets of hate crimes in 
Illinois since 1999 support a distinct black-white divide (see Appendices E.8 – E.12). 
In 2013, newly appointed African American Chief of Police Anthony Cobb said the 
biggest need for improvement in the Champaign Police Department was community relations: “it 
was overwhelming from the majority of staff. Community relations were abysmal when I got 
here. We recognized that there was a lot we could do in that area to improve.” In October, 
volunteers went door-to-door in the troubled Bristol Park neighborhood as part of a “Walk As 
One” event to distribute information about crime prevention and to work with residents to 
address neighborhood concerns. Champaign resident and member of the Bristol Park Steering 
Committee Seon Williams has been deeply involved in a lot of those efforts for more than three 
years, since the October 2009 fatal police shooting of Kiwane Carrington. Many community 
members felt the shooting could have been prevented had the police and black teens been more 
comfortable with each other. Williams said that he has seen change for the better since then, “I 
see us being more involved, more engaged, our communities coming together and being able to 
heal from Kiwane” (News Gazette March 12, 2013: Cobb: Tested, challenged, 'a lot more left to 
do'). 
More recent data on the Champaign County Jail population confirms that the 
disproportionate policing of the local black community remains a local problem: tracking the 
local jail population, demographics and charge types from January through September of 2014 
demonstrated that over half (53%) of the individuals arrested and detained during this time 
period were African-American (in 2013 the Champaign County African-American population 
represented 12.8% of the total County population, and 16% of the population of the City of 
Champaign) (see Appendix E.13). When using a Disparity Index (DI) method to evaluate the 
level of disproportionality, a ratio of 1 indicates a racial group’s likelihood of being arrested is 
equal to their presence in the general population. This 2013-2014 DI for blacks arrested 
countywide is 4, while for whites is 0.6. This means that in Champaign County, blacks were four 
times more likely to be arrested, and whites were almost half as likely to be arrested as their 
relative proportionate population numbers countywide. Even when comparing to the relative 
total population percentages in the City of Champaign, which has a higher percentage of black 
residents than the entire county, the disproportionate DIs remain undeniably clear: for African-
Americans, the DI is 3.3; for Whites, the DI is 0.63. 
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Delores Jones-Brown, professor of criminal justice at John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice in New York, said the data in Champaign and Urbana are consistent with national trends. 
The criminality of black people has been accepted, she said, with people of all races comes to see 
black and Latino people as the crime problem. “The kinds of things you see happening to black 
people in Champaign and Urbana are happening to black people across the country,” she 
said. Rod Brunson, professor at the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University, said 
that change can be a lengthy process, and is one that requires leadership from the top that is 
carried out at the street level. “Culture is slow to change,” Brunson said. “It has to be enforced in 
the most basic and routine interactions that people have with citizens.” “People like to break it 
down like it’s two different situations,” said the Rev. Zernial Bogan, assistant pastor at 
Champaign’s Salem Baptist Church and president of the Black Chamber of Commerce for 
Champaign County. “It’s really one situation. It’s Chambana” (CU-CitizenAccess.org October 
18, 2012 Police move to improve relations with black communities in Champaign, Urbana). 
6.2 “Poor property management combined with no City code enforcement” 
In further contrast to the primary reasons for the clearance and rebuild decision stated by 
City officials related to the physical and market conditions of existing housing stock, the second 
primary interview theme that came out when I questioned other community stakeholders about 
what they believed the main rationale behind the City’s plan, was poor property management 
combined with no code enforcement by the City. Many of the themes echoed issues raised during 
Old Urban Renewal about understaffing and lack of public support for enforcement being the 
primary reason for poor code enforcement in Champaign.  
Poor property management happens everywhere, sometimes a result of poor planning and 
lack of investment property management inexperience, and most often as a result of purely 
individualistic profit motives. Without having conversations assessing each property manager’s 
history, it is difficult to tell why owners do not manage upkeep on homes in an adequate manner 
for their tenants’ habitation, but this is precisely the reason municipal property maintenance 
codes were created, as I explained in detail in Champaign’s Old Urban Renewal chapter. 
Additionally, as I explained in the same chapter and section, often the problem lies not in the 
official rules, but with enforcement, and correspondingly (and often overlooked), with 
widespread community support for enforcement, including additional public funding allocations 
for inspector salaries.  
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In all of my interviews with institutional, community stakeholder, and Bristol residents, it 
became abundantly clear that not only does the City of Champaign perform no regular 
inspections except in common areas of multi-family buildings, but it has a very poor track record 
with code enforcement citywide, thrown into particularly stark relief when compared to the 
enforcement policies of sister city Urbana. From the more vocal and virulent opposition to the 
more conservative or politically correct responses I received when asked about the differences in 
code enforcement and inspection processes between Urbana and Champaign, in addition to 
conversations in both cities with code compliance experts, the City of Champaign’s historical 
negligence towards tenant inspection requests and its clear bias and support of investment 
property owners poor property management practices for individual profitable ends is clear. 
Aaron Smith’s perception: 
Urbana is…generally much more on the side of policies that protect the tenants to the 
point where like landlords and things like that will get very annoyed with some of their 
policies. I think it’s kind of a little bit more the opposite way in Champaign. So I think 
the policies in Champaign tend to be a little bit more on the side of the landlords and 
Urbana tends to have a lot more deference towards the rights of the tenants in sort of their 
policies. But I’d say probably the biggest difference is the landlord tenant ordinance in 
Urbana prevents landlords from denying housing to people with criminal records, things 
like that.  
 
Esther Patt’s perception: 
But the key, to conclude the highlights on Bristol, the neighborhood wouldn’t have been 
run down if the city would have proactive code enforcement to stop deterioration of 
housing, and not just in Bristol but everywhere.  I don’t know if they’re still doing this 
because it’s only come up now and then [in my experience with the CU Tenant’s 
Association], where the City of Champaign has really hurt the tenants because they don’t 
condemn the property…even when something should be condemned, when they agree 
that it should be condemned, they don’t actually bother condemning it. It’s not that they 
don’t bother, it’s really they’re cutting a break to the landlord. They won’t declare it 
condemned if he’ll agree − if he’ll just tell them he’s not going to re-rent it again…I 
don’t think they do it deliberately to enable the landlord, or to try to enable the landlord 
to continue to collect rent when they shouldn’t after a condemnation by not condemning 
it, but I don’t know why they do it…You know when they finally cared? At one property 
on Church Street, after the tenant rented the condemned place, then she thought she had a 
carbon monoxide leak…she went to the City, and there was a carbon monoxide leak.  
That’s why I say that I really think that, to a large extent, government officials have the 
attitude the only good tenant is a dead tenant. If it’s something that will actually kill you, 
if it will mean a loss of human life, boy do they care. They even sentence to prison or jail 
for six months for it, but if you’re not going to die, eh, they don’t care so much, or at all.”   
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Brian Dolinar’s perception: 
This is a college town, and, you know, my sense is they should be very on point about 
maintaining properties, because you know you can have landlords come in here, buy up 
the property, rent it out, and just see the money stream in.  You hire a manager to take care 
of it, and if you’ve got the capital to put upfront, you know, it’s a moneymaker. And so 
who are the inspectors and who are the authorities that are going to make sure that people 
living there are in safe conditions? The City is supposed to fill that function, and they send 
out inspectors, but the City needs to be prosecuting them in court. Why does Bristol go to 
shit, you know? It’s partly because those properties are rented out and the landlords are 
absent and the properties deteriorate, the city never prosecutes any of the violations. You 
know, you go out there and – when I was doing stories, and I think I had a photo of one of 
the houses where there was just a big pile – somebody had moved out and there was just a 
pile of junk out on the curb that sat there for days, weeks. And, you know, the City is 
supposed to follow up with things like that, make sure that stuff gets cleaned up. So it 
sounds to me that basically what’s happening is they’re using police – they’re basically 
vilifying the neighborhood and, you know, classifying it as blight due to crime, due to lack 
of property ordinance issues, not taking responsibility or, you know, acknowledging some 
responsibility in this enforcement of ordinance violations. 
 
Jim Rose’s perception: 
Garden Hills is another trouble spot in the city and people talk about it all the time and we’re 
concerned about it as a Housing Authority because one of our developments is at the corner 
Bradley and McKinley and our executive director is always asking the city, you know, 
what’s gonna happen to the housing stock in those areas as well, you know? Code 
enforcement is the only way you can keep the properties up, code enforcement, and the city 
is pretty good. The city uses things like just the specific loans to individuals to rehab their 
properties and bring ‘em up-to-code and things of that nature and they were working in 
Garwood.  
 
6.2.1 Urbana’s code enforcement is proactively responsible, Champaign’s is criminally negligent 
The City of Urbana’s code enforcement policies, and the regulation of rental housing, 
according to an Urbana City Planner, is vastly different in Urbana than Champaign. Urbana has a 
comprehensive rental registration policy and for 50 years, Urbana has had systematic inspections 
of apartments inside and outside every unit for apartments defined as 3 units or up. This program 
expanded in 1997 to include every rental property, including single family homes and 1- and 2-
bedroom structures, not just 3+ bedroom structures. In 1997, Urbana also created a rental 
registration program, and hired a second inspector. Urbana city ordinance now requires each year 
that everyone who rents residential property must register that property with the City and provide 
info on who manager is, with local contact info, and affidavits that occupancy is to code. Annual 
registration costs $55 per SF home per year. Urbana has 9,600 units total, and the annual fee 
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pays the City costs for their second inspector. She admitted that Urbana is aiming towards a 
better, shorter regular inspection cycle – the goal is regular inspections every 3-5 years – but the 
inspection cycle had expanded to over 10 years because one inspector could not be spread that 
far, so they increased the registration fee recently to be able to hire a 3rd inspector because the 
regular inspection cycle length had gone up again. Urbana currently has two housing inspectors 
and one code enforcement coordinator. In the registration system, each property is graded on an 
annual basis: no violations gets an A, but most regular property gets a B or C usually. If you 
have many violations you get an F and lose your right to rent property. Urbana levies fines if 
owners do not fix violations. Thus, Urbana does systematic inspections, but also has to respond 
to tenant complaints, which have tighter timelines for being repaired. Up to 40-50 tenant 
complaint-based inspections are requested per year in Urbana, often referrals from the Tenant 
Union. 
She continued, explaining that if a city just relies on tenant complaints, they will not get 
“the worst of the worst” property management violators. The local Tenant Union plays a vital 
role in facilitating complaints, but often it is the neighbors who complain. It has become 
common opinion locally that the Champaign City Council never supported a rental registration 
program because there have historically been too many owner interests on council. A tragic 
incident occurred in 2004 when a Champaign City Council member (J.W. Pirtle) who was a 
slumlord, did not fix a furnace and a tenant died of carbon monoxide poisoning. He was indicted 
in 2004 on an involuntary manslaughter charge and five counts of criminal housing management 
(a misdemeanor that alleges he allowed the condition of the home to endanger to lives of its 
occupants), and after agreeing to let his case be decided by a judge and not a jury in 2006, the 
involuntary manslaughter charge was dropped (NG 7/12/2006: Involuntary manslaughter charge 
dropped). He was then sentenced to six months in jail and two years of conditional discharge 
(NG, 12/21/2006: Champaign landlord gets six months in jail). According to a current City of 
Urbana staff member, the partisan nature of Urbana’s politics, in addition to the tenant bias and 
influence of political heavyweight Esther Patt helped produce the rental registration program in 
Urbana.  
In addition to these policies, Urbana has been doing 5 rehabs per year for 25-30 years in 
east Urbana and other target areas. The City has partnered with local CHDOs Habitat, 
Homestead and EcoLab on 25 rebuilds. Urbana has also had a longtime goal of preserving older 
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neighborhoods with supportive programs like Old House Rehab, Emergency Grants Access 
grants (for things like broken heaters, accessibility ramps, senior preference targets). These 
investments and programs stabilized Urbana’s “blighted” neighborhoods, and crime went down. 
Urbana’s ethos with property management and code enforcement has historically been more of a 
“preservation of existing housing stock” than in Champaign, and less about building new 
buildings. Champaign has more money, resources, and business activity, and it is easier to be 
landlord in Champaign, but according to an Urbana planner, “the neighbors are fussier.” Many 
tenants locally also value Urbana’s human rights ordinance over Champaign’s, which prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of prior arrest or conviction record or source of income, and move to 
Urbana. The City of Champaign currently allows discrimination in housing based on source of 
income – if you have a Section 8 voucher, a landlord in Champaign in 2015 can refuse to rent to 
you.  
Champaign’s history with the particular element of their Human Rights Ordinance 
dealing with discrimination based on source of income in housing is odd, to say the least. 
Champaign was actually the first city in 1977 to prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of 
source of income, and from 1977 through 2001, refusal to rent to someone based solely on the 
basis that they would use a Section 8 voucher to pay part of their rent was enforced as a violation 
of the city ordinance. In 2001, Royse & Brinkmeyer Apartments refused to rent to 70-year old 
Bettina Chapman, one of the Tenant Union’s clients, who had rented her whole life, because she 
had a Section 8 voucher. In a hearing before the Human Relations Commission (HRC), Royce & 
Brinkmeyer’s attorney made a pre-hearing motion to dismiss, arguing that federal law 
established Section 8 as a voluntary program and that the federal law should pre-empt the city’s 
ordinance. Essentially, that Section 8 is not a source of income. To the surprise of many, the 
hearing officer ruled in favor of the apartment owner, finding the “source of income” clause in 
the city ordinance did not cover Section 8 (Public I, November 2007, Champaign Landlords Now 
Permitted to Discriminate Against Section 8 Voucher Holders). The HRC then accepted the 
hearing officer’s ruling, according to Esther Patt, because they did not realize they had the 
authority to ignore or the overrule what the officer said. The complainant appealed the decision 
to the Circuit Court, which ruled that the HRC had acted within its authority by interpreting the 
“source of income” as not including Section 8. Thus, “discrimination against people with 
vouchers was not protected by law anymore in the City of Champaign because one hearing 
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officer said so, and the Human Relations Commission didn’t know to say otherwise,” according 
to Esther. 
In 2004 the Illinois Appellate Court (1st District, Godinez v. Sullivan Lackey), upheld the 
City of Chicago’s practice of interpreting the “source of income” clause in their human rights 
ordinance to include Section 8, so in 2006, Esther Patt brought the issue back before the HRC, 
and after public hearings by the Champaign HRC and a study session by the City Council, in 
March 2006 the council voted 6-3 to follow the recommendation of the HRC and specifically 
prohibited discrimination against Section 8 voucher holders again. However, a year later in the 
spring of 2007 there was a City Council election in Champaign and two of the council members 
who had supported Section 8 protections were replaced by two who opposed them.  
Likely unsurprisingly to those who know local area politics, the new City Council 
member who requested a bill to be placed on the City Council agenda deleting the language from 
the ordinance was the Council representative from District 5 in Southwest Champaign (see 
Council map in Appendix D.2), Ken Pirok, who then lead the Council in October 2007 to reverse 
the 2006 decision. Also unsurprisingly, the most outspoken Council opponent was then-District 1 
city council member Gina Jackson, who starkly pointed out, “we talk about a city of diversity, as 
long as that diverse person is not living next to you - that’s unacceptable” (Daily Illini, 10/10/07: 
Champaign to remove language about federal housing vouchers).  
Given the demographics of Section 8 voucher holders discussed above, this income-
source-based discrimination has a disparate impact on the disabled, families with children and 
people of color. And there continue to be vitriolic, uninformed, and discriminatory NIMBY 
sentiments echoed across the City of Champaign as it relates to conflating Section 8 recipients 
with crime, degradation and destruction of property, and more. Demonstrating yet another 
investment property owner-friendly policy created and upheld by the Champaign City Council, 
one of the primary theoretical burdens investigated that was used to support this decision was the 
fact that HUD can prematurely terminate a contract with a landlord when special circumstance 
arise (e.g. if a tenant has a child and needs an extra bedroom or if a tenant marries), and landlords 
do not have the capacity to sue to recover lost rental income as they would with other lessees. It 
is difficult to obtain data on how often this occurs, but the rate of overall premature terminations 
is less than 5%, because Section 8 vouchers are so valuable to those who receive them that they 
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will do everything they can to avoid losing them (Public I, November 2007: Champaign 
landlords now permitted to discriminate against Section 8 voucher holders).  
 And the most heinous and obviously racially targeted exception to the City of 
Champaign’s Human Rights Ordinance, particularly in the context of local policing practices and 
jail population breakdowns in Champaign County:  
Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit discrimination in the leasing of residential property 
based upon a person’s record of convictions for a forcible felony or a felony drug conviction 
or the conviction of the sale, manufacture or distribution of illegal drugs or convictions 
which are based upon factors which would constitute one of the categories of convictions 
listed above under Illinois law; provided, that the conviction shall not be allowed to be the 
basis of discrimination if the person convicted has resided outside of prison at least the last 
five (5) consecutive years without being convicted of an offense involving the use of force or 
violence or the illegal use, possession, distribution, sale or manufacture of drugs. This 
exception is not a restriction on the use of conviction information for other necessary 
business reasons (C.B. No. 94-167, § 1, 7-5-94).  
 
And as the Steering Committee’s survey results reported in 2012, two residents of Bristol Place 
had experienced this housing discrimination in the past (March 8, 2012 NSAB Meeting 
Minutes).  
But even when tenants do get into leasing agreements, if they are unlucky enough in the 
City of Champaign to sign a lease with a slumlord, there is very little of the proactive 
enforcement of preservation of older housing stock evidenced by the Urbana policies detailed 
above. Champaign does not have a rental registration program, does not do regular inspections of 
interiors of buildings other than the common areas of apartment buildings with three or more 
units, and relies solely on tenant inspection requests for its interior structural code enforcement. 
The sole exception is private certified University housing – Champaign inspects sororities, 
fraternities, and other private housing approved by UIUC. It does do systematic exterior code 
violation inspections, but primarily code inspections occur by complaint. The multi-family 
common area inspection program is supposed to be on a 3-year cycle, but similar to Urbana’s 
staff issues, current Champaign Code Compliance Manager David Oliver explains “this is a huge 
undertaking without additional staff in addition to tenant-generated inspection request 
responses.” David also explained, partly because Champaign does not have a rental registration 
program or regular interior inspections, that when Champaign inspectors go into properties with 
tenant complaints there is a good chance an inspector has never been inside the property before, 
so unless the property owner has done their homework in advance and is well-versed in property 
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management and codes, the owner may or may not have known a violation exists. This can mean 
significant expense to property owners if many violations are cited upon initial inspection. 
According to David, this is the main reason the City of Champaign tries to work with property 
owners and give them extensions and many chances to correct violations. 
The code enforcement process in Champaign according to David, begins after a 
complaint is filed with inspectors trying to get initial inspection response schedule within three 
days of a complaint being made, but they shorten that timeframe if the condition is considered 
‘critical,’ like backed up sewage in a one bathroom dwelling unit, lack of sufficient heat or no 
heat at all, or if utilities supplied by property owner are shut off. Once an inspection is done, the 
inspector generates a housing violation notice, with a list of observed deficiencies. This notice is 
sent to the owner of record identified by the property assessor’s office unless a management 
company involved, and a copy is also always sent to the tenant. Unless a life safety issue is 
reported, the City sends a 30-day violation notice (meaning the property owner has 30 days to fix 
the violations cited). The City will sometimes send 24-hour notices when the case is an 
emergency, but by and large the first grace period is 30 days.  
The City inspector then returns after 30 days to update the case and document compliance 
for those violations that have been corrected. Ideally it is all of them. More likely than not 
according to David, not all of them are done, and the City then sends an amended re-inspection 
notice listing those remaining. The property owner then gets another 14 days to bring the 
property into compliance, although the City also provides an opportunity for an extension 
agreement in that second notice.  
Extension agreements are either time or money related – e.g. when a property owner says 
they couldn’t schedule a contractor or don’t have capital ready for immediate repairs. The City 
then asks the property owner to give a date of expected completion – as long as the date is 
reasonable, Oliver says, the City will agree (e.g. asking for two months to replace a carbon 
monoxide detector battery the city will not agree to, but fixing a plumbing leak or doing a major 
capital-intensive program like a roof replacement will likely lead to an extension being granted). 
City inspectors work with property owners to come up with a compliance plan, get repairs 
completed, and then the City closes the case. If an owner gets into an extension agreement and 
that agreement expires before the violation(s) are corrected, the City sends a legal warning letter 
explaining that without completion, they will refer the case to the legal department for litigation. 
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David says at this stage the City also provides property owners another opportunity to review or 
create a new extension agreement. 
The City emphasizes mediating and negotiating with owner to get violations resolved. As 
David puts it, “cooperation is better than competition – [we go for] win-win or no deal,” where 
the property owners cited win, the tenants win because their complaints are resolved, and the 
City wins because they don’t have to go the expense and hassle of taking an owner to court (the 
no deal scenario). He said the end goal of the City is all property owners’ compliance to code, 
and he would rather see property owners invest their money in fixing up their properties rather 
than paying court fines. He explains that sometimes this results in tenant eviction, and the City 
does not provide tenants legal advice, it sends them to Land of Lincoln or the Tenant Union 
instead.  
If an inspector knows they are dealing with a historically uncooperative property owner, 
the inspector will still send a 14 days notice with offer for extension agreement, but will then go 
straight to a legal warning letter which gives owners 10 days to comply. It is a lengthy process to 
file in court. If there is only one violation, property owners are cited for a municipal ordinance 
violation. If multiple violations are associated with one case, the City will file a raze or repair 
order with all violations included. There are only 1-2 legal cases a year filed by the City of 
Champaign, because they work with property owners for such extended periods of time to 
resolve violations.  
A direct result of this process-oriented leniency towards property owners in violation of 
City property management codes is a truly abysmal length of time to resolve complaints. An 
evaluation of code compliance data going back to FY2006-FY2007 shows that on average over 
the 8 year period evaluated it took almost a year (355 days) to resolve tenant inspection request-
based code compliance complaints; there were an average of 98 requests per year, although the 
largest spike was in FY2009-FY2010 at 117; and 123 requests, or 15.7% of all tenant requests 
are still open and have yet to be resolved as of the beginning of FY2014-FY2015 (see Appendix 
E.14 and E.15). David Oliver arrived in Champaign in 2010, and as is evident from Appendix 
E.16, days to resolution have dropped every year he has been in code enforcement management. 
When I first met with and interviewed him, he had also recently returned from an International 
Association for Public Participation (IAP2) full week of training on planning for public 
engagement and communication strategies.  
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David agrees with many other interviewees quoted, that property decline in the Bristol 
Place neighborhood is an example of not having an aggressive code enforcement approach, with 
property values declining to the point of redevelopment being the only option. When I asked him 
why Champaign does not have a rental registration program, which seems like the most effective 
way to prevent conditions like those in Bristol Place from occurring, he said he believes the City 
would meet resistance if they tried to charge a rental registration fee, most likely from the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Central Illinois Rental Property Professionals. He alluded to the 
fact that while rental property owners should ensure their properties are up to code, many fear 
city inspectors would find violations requiring modifications, which cost money to correct. As 
many interviewees have explained or alluded to, and as is borne out by mid-century UIUC 
community housing history in the Old Urban Renewal chapter above, owning rental properties is 
a booming business in the Champaign-Urbana area – and there is also a very vulnerable 
population of family and working renters because of the numbers of students here – it is “almost 
like shooting fish in a barrel,” according to an Urbana planner, who shared her experience, 
saying that for a long time, property owners could rent almost anything to students because of 
lack of education about tenant rights.  
A current Champaign City Council member who owns and manages property in Urbana I 
interviewed explained from his perspective why he does not support a regular rental inspection 
program in Champaign: 
Council has been tempted from time to time to impose inspection programs, sometimes 
initiatives come from NSD – they want to inspect rental properties – but it will cost 
money so they want to impose a fee. Urbana has a rental registration fee and government 
inspectors that come into rental units whether people ask for them to come or not. 
Proponents would say that mandatory regular inspections improve the quality of housing 
stock. Opponents would argue that it just adds to the cost of housing. Owners will add 
fees to leases to pass on the additional expense. And inevitably, inspectors want to justify 
their existence so they aggressively come up with lists of violations. Whatever people 
inspect, it is always tempting to say, ‘I better justify my position and this program.’ Then 
more charges come and grow and never go away. Mandatory inspections add to the cost 
of housing – the more aggressively you inspect housing, no doubt the safer housing stock 
becomes, but the more expensive it is as well. We need to come up with a good balance 
between regulation and market effects. Urbana has pretty expensive housing because 
every idea sounds good to them. In a property I own [in Urbana], an Urbana city 
inspector cited a torn off piece of paint – I had to touch it up with same color paint. What 
is the government’s role in that? That’s what you get when there is an inspector who 
wants to find every violation in the book, because that is his job. Next year when I set the 
prices for four apartment leases it may be built into the equation. It’s burdensome. 
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Housing gets a little bit more expensive. In Urbana, property owners have to do an 
inspection with a government individual once a year. That’s invasive. It’s your home, it’s 
sacred. 
 
It is worth re-iterating here that under Illinois law, an annual $6,000 homestead 
exemption deduction far outweighs even a $55 annual fee, but his points about government 
employees needing to justify their salary expenses, especially in the current conservative fiscal 
climate, is entirely valid, and in fact goes beyond just code inspectors to police and other 
government service providers as well.  
This kind of Council membership ethos in Champaign has developed over decades, and 
investment property owners and other property management interest groups have created strong 
constituency and advocacy organizations to support their property-based profit interests, and as 
has also been evidenced by comments and news reports already referenced, Champaign’s City 
Council has been dominated by those very investment property owners for a long time. These 
legacies will not fade easily, or quickly, but challenges need to be issued nonetheless, 
particularly when those protections directly, disproportionately, and deleteriously affect life 
opportunities and outcomes for historically marginalized low-income people of color. Private 
citizen interest groups have more leeway, but similar to recent financial regulation legislation 
conflict of interest issues in Congress, particularly when serving on a public body that is 
supposed to represent the interests of the larger community in a representative democracy, 
Champaign City Council members must be cognizant and ever-vigilant not to vote with their 
own profit interests, but in the interests of those they represent, citywide. 
The code compliance approach currently taking shape in Garden Hills and led by David 
and the NSD, is a first run test attempt by the City of Champaign to improve their code 
enforcement practices, and may operate as an experiment before determining whether the City 
believes it needs to try and implement a more comprehensive citywide registration process. Right 
now, as part of the Garden Hills code strategies, Champaign is considering a neighborhood-
based rental property registration program as a targeted rental management scheme whereby if a 
neighborhood met certain criteria, rental property professionals would be required to have a 
certificate of inspection prior to leasing the unit. This would be at no cost to the property owner 
other than whatever repairs they would have to make if code-based deficiencies were identified. 
In the most recent Garden Hills Action Planning City Council study session in December 2014 
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(SS 2014-058), the next steps on this are researching other Big Ten, Central Illinois and 
comparably sized cities’ rental registration programs and them evaluating the feasibility for the 
Garden Hills neighborhood before expanding such a proposal citywide. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION  
7.1 Discussion 
My analysis engages with three questions regarding the evolution of “new” fiscal policy 
driven urban renewal in Champaign:  
 
1. How does the City of Champaign’s Bristol Place Neighborhood Plan reflect historical 
urban renewal trajectories and outcomes?  
2. To what extent do new municipal fiscal priorities influence the plan’s rationale for the 
use of eminent domain?  
3. To what degree are new fiscal priorities underscoring disparate impacts of 
redevelopment on minority communities? 
 
This chapter engages these questions directly in light of the results described in chapters 4-6. 
 
7.1.1. BPNP ßàOUR parallels 
This case study has produced evidence that historical urban renewal trajectories and 
outcomes are being reproduced in the City of Champaign’s Bristol Place neighborhood 
redevelopment plan, 50 years after Old Urban Renewal. Specifically: (1) the valuation of 
residents’ opinions in directing neighborhood intervention and public policy is according to what 
they can pay into City coffers; (2) there exists an institutional bias against renters as documented 
by lax and ineffective code enforcement combined with financial assistance geared 
overwhelmingly towards homeowners and no regulation against predatory housing practices; (3) 
political decision makers are out of touch with lower income community desires and needs, even 
after going through public participation process motions; (4) there exists widespread devaluation 
of residents of the North End community wide; and (5) evidence for shadow state planning and 
growth machine influenced governance exists in Champaign.  
(1) The valuation of residents’ opinions in directing neighborhood intervention and public policy 
is according to what they can pay into City coffers 
In a news article dated November 19, 1966 the director and chief advocate of the old 
urban renewal program in Champaign said:  
…it is actually a program of selective destruction and redevelopment. Owners of property 
who are absentee owners have allowed their property to deteriorate. The area is not only an 
eyesore but a more or less wasted area as far as revenue is concerned. People in that area 
have been paying very little money into the city, properties comprising a scant 1.78% of the 
total assessed valuations in Champaign…It may be worth $16,000 to the owner, but it's put 
down as $600, because that's all the value he's able to pay taxes on. Urban renewal would put 
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some of these properties into the hands of people who could afford to pay the taxes on them. 
This, in turn, would bring increased city revenues and a host of possible community 
improvements (DI, November 19, 1966 “Low assessed values contribute little value to City 
tax receipts”). 	  
These increased city revenues and “host of possible community improvements” are 
echoed in more recent BPNP planning documents as City rationales for the redevelopment 
moving forward using eminent domain.  
Currently, of the 118 total parcels in the Bristol Place sub area of the BPNP, 20 are 
owner-occupied, 64 are investor-owned, 27 are City-owned, and 7 parcels are tax-exempt. Of the 
investor-owned property, 30 parcels’ owners live in Champaign and contribute $3,679.93 (23.4% 
of the tax value in the area) to the City in property taxes, 18 are owned by Urbana investors and 
contribute 13.8% of the area’s tax value, and 16 are owned by remote investors as far away as 
California, contributing 13.8% of the area’s tax value (see Table 7). In total, investor-owned 
property in the area contributes 51% of the total tax value, owner-occupied properties contribute 
24.3%, and the single parcel in the entire site area that is exempt from the BPNP demolitions is 
the Family Dollar store on the southwest corner of Market & Bradley, whose assessed value is 
almost as high as all 20 owner-occupied properties combined, and contributes 20% of the entire 
area’s property tax value to the City. The planning decisions identifying who benefits according 
to this redevelopment plan are not random. In reality, it is actually directly proportionate to the 
value of the land in total assessed property taxation.  
The total revenue of the entire Bristol Place sub-area, including the Family Dollar (which 
is excluded from the redevelopment – the only structure that will be left untouched by the City’s 
use of eminent domain) is $15,729.73 (based on the 2014 portion of the property tax that goes to 
the City of Champaign of 1.3152%). The largest property tax contributor is exempt from the 
development, the second largest group of contributors are given financial remuneration with as 
little hassle as possible, and owner-occupants are provided additional protections beyond 
federally-mandated displacement requirements. Renters are forcibly displaced, given preference 
to HCVs above all other qualified Champaign County residents in need, and provided no more 
than 3 years rental assistance after displacement. According to a planning staff member I 
interviewed, the City has also decided, upon a TIF study recently completed by Kane McKenna, 
to move forward with creating a TIF in the Bristol Place and Garwood areas (excluding Shadow 
Wood) in 2015/2016. At this time the City will own all 23 acres, so its assessed value will be $0, 
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once totally cleared. After implementing a TIF, it then has the potential to create large value, 
likely to repay part (if not all) of the CDBG Section 108 loan financing the City will take out to 
help finance Phase I of the redevelopment. 	  
 
(2) Bias against renters as documented by lax and ineffective code enforcement combined with 
financial assistance geared towards homeowners and no regulation against predatory housing 
practices 
As becomes indelibly clear when evaluating a historiography of the residential 
segregation in Champaign, affordable housing demand and local supply, and complaint-based 
code enforcement, rental discrimination policies and predatory slumlord rental practices have 
been around since Old Urban Renewal and remain active today (see sections 4.3, 4.6, 4.7 and 6.2 
for more detailed discussion). 
 
(3) Political decision makers are out of touch with lower income community desires and needs, 
even after going through public participation process motions 
‘This is a matter of takeover’ said Lincoln Wesley, 506 E. Beardsley: Champaign. ‘The 
people in this area don’t get any direct information from the city officials whatsoever. 
They’ll come out here and say a few things, then you meet them again it’s something 
different. Thev go behind closed doors and do the things they wish to do and the people 
who are directly involved are excluded.’ ‘I would like for people to get their houses all 
fixed up,’ said a housewife. “We need a lot of that. Some houses — I don't know if they 
need to be torn down or what — they in a bad way. But some ain’t so bad. Why tear 
down all the houses? Why should we suffer for the ones that the houses in such bad 
dispositions? And they live in their homes,’ she said. ‘So why shouldn’t we live in ours? 
They wouldn’t want their homes torn down because there was a few bad homes on the 
block where they lived. They’d get a petition to get them bad homes out. Help them if 
they wasn’t able to fix them up.’ … Mrs. Shirlee Zervoulias [Administrative assistant for 
the local Community Action Program agency - part of the county Economic Opportunity 
Council, the local arm of the federal War on Poverty] said the [City] council’s greatest 
problem lies in ‘closing the breech’ between people on the council, professionals, and 
people who serve as voices of the poor. To a large extent this becomes a matter of 
interracial relations” (Of Community Motives, Poor are ‘Suspicious’; Local Negroes 
discover: No Way to Escape ‘Ghetto’; Daily Illini December 19, 1966). 
 
This Old Urban Renewal newspaper excerpt actually provides evidence for three 
common themes: disconnect between decision makers and impoverished constituents, the 
devaluation of North End residents’ equal consideration as citizens, and political decision-
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making being made in non transparent and undemocratic ways. In my interviews it became clear 
that there were iterative sentiments and preferences voiced by residents and neighboring 
community members during the evolution of the BPNP that were not heard or incorporated by 
City Council and staff, regarding specifically the desire for more financial assistance for 
structural repair work being made available to renters who live in poor housing conditions, 
homeowners questioning why if their home was one of the nicer ones, it was also slated for 
demolition, and sidewalk and lighting improvements neighborhood-wide. One particular 
interview excerpt echoed such disconnects: 
Even Jim Rose, who ran Homestead for so many years, looked me right in the eye and said, 
‘Esther, everybody has a car now.’ I thought, ‘Are you tripping on acid, or are you just in 
total denial of reality? How can you think something so foolish?’ … And when the YMCA 
moved out to Staley Road and Windsor, the director of the Y said to me ‘Oh, no one rides the 
bus anymore. Their parents all drive them.” I said, “What income level people are you 
talking about? If you’re talking about the people you serve, on Hill Street, you serve a large 
number of people who are lower income.’ I just said, ‘You’re right here. Just walk down to 
University Avenue around 2:45 when Central gets out, and see how many kids are waiting 
for the bus.’ This is one of my dreams. One of my fantasies is that public policymakers who 
deal with anything having to do with location of stuff, would all, if not ride the bus, at least 
sit down with the MTD bus schedule route. The primary focus of the MTD is to keep cars off 
the U of I campus. They still have no night and weekend service, and I don’t know if they 
ever will. I really do wish MTD would provide service on weekends and on Sunday night 
and on holidays. I mean people are absolutely stranded unless they have people [to drive 
them around]. I found the HUD data on people with the HUD Housing Choice Vouchers 
nationwide. Sixty percent do not have cars. 
 
(4) Residents of the North End unequal and devalued members of “the public” 
 Another parallel between OUR in Champaign and the BPNP is its indifferent dismissal 
and devaluation of black citizens’ voices as equal members of “the public.” A 1967 news article 
stated: 
Why all the fuss about urban renewal? Much of the static has come from the ghetto, from 
people who simply don’t want to lose their homes. It may or may not be valid opposition. 
From a larger perspective, however, they don’t really matter. What matters, in the end, is 
the good of the public. Most observers not directly involved agree the city is justified in 
clearing ghetto land as long as it’s done for the overall good (Daily Illini, September 22, 
1967).  
 
Similar sentiments were more recently and explicitly stated in a Plan Commission Meeting 
Minutes document from June 2014 discussing the BP redevelopment Master Plan concept 
diagrams prepared for the City by an independent consultant, where one member stated: 
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I believe the Commissions role is to speak to Planning but not social planning. We hear 
these comments about how individuals or neighborhoods might be affected on a personal 
level. It is not really our purview but I believe it is going to be the kind of issue that 
would be important to the City Council. I personally look at the history of gentrification 
as simply displacing people and moving them out to a perimeter that is just as 
unattractive as the place they are leaving but as they leave it behind someone else takes 
advantage of it. That is not necessarily wrong but there is a little social discomfort having 
to watch that sort of thing happen. I like the way it is being articulated here. I believe we 
are going to be giving a developer an opportunity to earn some money and at the same 
time we are going to be improving an area to the great benefit of the City. We are 
somewhat mitigating the consequences to the people who have to pay something of a 
price by leaving and many will leave and not come back (City of Champaign Plan 
Commission Meeting Minutes, June 4, 2014). 
 
These sentiments are compelling insight into the position of some in the contemporary 
local government structure in Champaign. Despite its protests saying they did everything they 
could to elicit public participation, the City assuming that it could get good public meeting 
participation in this neighborhood by traditional channels is at best incongruous (and at worst 
acrimoniously belittling) due to the deep distrust on the part of longtime homeowners from 
decades of City disinvestment in the area and disregard when collective neighbors’ opinions 
were voiced, combined with high rates of rental residential turnover with no extant organized 
tenants’ association. Real community preferences being voiced requires a collective effort, or 
mobilization by a group of concerned residents who feel that if they spend their time organizing 
and debating, the recommendations they come up with will then have some effect on their 
circumstances, particularly when those circumstances are promulgated by the elected governing 
body.  
The history, however, from this particular neighborhood of effective community 
mobilization voicing preferences to the City that then successfully instigated community-desired 
change, is abysmal. The primary example discussed above related to restoring the traffic from 
one-way to two-way streets, which had at least a seven-year lag between when residents 
organized to voice desires opposite to the current policy of the City and when the City responded 
positively to those preferences. But other examples abound: Reverend Barnes’ comments about 
his failed efforts to elicit enough City financial support for neighborhood revitalization infill 
projects in partnership with Metanoia and First National to make a significant change in the 
neighborhood; even for something as small as providing a dumpster for a neighborhood clean-up 
project, which the City refused to do because the area didn’t have an officially City-registered 
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“neighborhood group;” the many comments about crime and policing “services” being 
disproportionately directed towards this area; the lack of monitoring of the physical deterioration 
of housing stock via proactive City code enforcement policy, etc.  
Much in the same way that public housing authorities in the 1980s used a process of de 
facto demolition through neglecting maintenance and upkeep until they could petition HUD for 
demolition funding (referenced in Old Urban Renewal chapter), the City of Champaign allowed 
investment property owners to create the “blighted” conditions of the existing declining 
properties by not just neglecting code enforcement for minimum habitable standards, but 
sometimes even refusing to spend public funds for modernization and improvement due to 
policy-led caps on grants available or the targeting of grant programs effectively excluding 70% 
of neighborhood residents due to communitywide tenure bias (see Chapter 5). Called by another 
name, these policies and limitations on funding access and design of supportive programs 
combine to produce an overall collective historical City policy towards this neighborhood of 
benign neglect. In public housing projects in the 1980s and into the 1990s, once conditions had 
deteriorated enough, local HAs would petition HUD for demolition funding as a necessary action 
due to public housing properties’ poor conditions – the parallels here are clear.  
 
(5) Decision-Making Process in Champaign: Shadow State Politicking 
Contemporary democratic governance in the U.S. has been empirically documented to 
favor dominant economic interests at the expense of less powerful groups (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Fox-
Rogers et al., 2011; McGuirk, 1995). Often attributed to the structural constraints that shape 
power relations (Abu-Orf, 2005; Harris, 2002; McGuirk, 2001; Neuman, 2000; Tewdwr-Jones & 
Allmendinger, 1998; Tewdwr-Jones & Thomas, 1998; Watson, 1998), the ability of stakeholders 
to participate in and shape collaborative process is largely found to be determined by the 
availability of resources available to them (e.g. economic power), resulting in “the continued 
dominance of the already powerful” (Fainstein, 2000). This conception of power is deeply rooted 
in Marxist theory, which emphasizes the exploitative class relations in linkages between 
economic and political power based on the historical origins of the state, making “power over” 
process vitally more important than individual subjective “power to” effect change in individual 
circumstances (Fox-Rogers, 2014). Marxian perceptions of political economy in planning 
systems argue against the conception of planners as modernist, impartial “referees,” instead 
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questioning the ability of the state to act as a politically neutral institution given its historical 
origins in race and class conflict seen most clearly through the regulation of property ownership 
(Healey, 2003).  
McGuirk (1995) demonstrated the informal participation channels in the policymaking 
stages of planning processes between “central government representatives and development 
interests,” and Fox-Rogers (2014) argues further that there exist two planning systems:  
One is the ‘official system’ that (theoretically at least) everyone can access and engage 
with and the second is the shadow (informal) planning system only accessible to vested 
interests and utilized primarily by the key holders of power, such as developers, 
politicians and senior management (i.e. the elite in class terms). 
 
And that planners hold a central stakeholder position given their liaisons with all other 
stakeholders (developers, community groups, management, politicians), and their position in 
constructing proposals’ pieces (Fox-Rogers, 2014). The dynamic interplay between these four 
primary group categories determines neighborhood outcomes. In Fox-Rogers’ (2014) study of 
informal planning process navigation in Ireland, and in Bent Flyvberg’s (1998) landmark study 
of power and planning in Aalborg, which demonstrated the ability of powerful groups to exercise 
power over the planning process by adopting a strategy of rationalization (presented as 
rationality) to serve their own interests at the expense of others, these concepts come through 
clearly. In my interviews with City of Champaign officials, neighborhood and local housing 
stakeholders, it was also the case that the planning strategies employed in the creation of this 
neighborhood plan operated according to pre-existing relationships between individual interests 
and senior officials. While this could be attributed to a benign natural result of the scale of 
interactions over the lengthy period of time an intensive redevelopment plan like the BPNP takes 
to come to fruition, and may also have to do with the complexity and scale of various proposals 
and pieces involved, it is absolutely vital to question and recognize the political culture and 
history of such interactions and evaluate the extent to which the informal actions that take place 
in the construction of such plans ultimately shape neighborhood outcomes. This is where 
evaluating this local neighborhood planning process through the lens of what makes up the 
constrained fiscal policy space of the City of Champaign becomes vitally important to 
uncovering some of the truths behind its constraints. 
 In the case of Ireland, “the central driver in the emergence of informal interactions stems 
from the power imbalances that exist between powerful economic interests and the executive 
	   171 
arm of the local authority given the latter’s reliance on private investment to generate 
independent income streams” (Fox-Rogers, 2014). This has direct relevance to evaluating the 
BPNP through the lens of fiscal policy space, and shifting intergovernmental funding streams, 
property value capture mechanisms, and local government decision-making in the face of 
increasing fiscal austerity. The recent and inherent reliance of local government on privately 
generated income streams for development adds a new “Economic Development” dimension to 
the traditional roles of the public sector, seen historically as: 
1. Regulator (e.g. when individual property owners cannot regulate and public goods or 
externalities issues arise) 
2. Service Provider (e.g. roads, sewer/water/electric, schools, fire, police, public amenities) 
3. Growth Manager (e.g. zoning) 
 
In the decision-making processes in the City of Champaign between Council members and 
staff in the creation of the BPNP, two City Council interviewees said the following: 
From time to time when an idea like BPNP comes up, will meet systematically two at a 
time. Here’s what we are thinking, what do you think? Ask questions, give feedback – do 
that systematically with all 9 council members. Preliminary discussions usually include 
staff members. Systematically a handful of staff members will talk to a couple of city 
council members at a time to brief us on what they are thinking and ask us for our input. 
May need to change plan slightly to win support from X & Y council members. Study 
sessions are all open to public – plans are presented after adjustments are made based on 
private discussions. Take straw poll – maybe passes 7-2 BPNP, maybe another study 
session where those remaining issues are addressed. Then get formal council bill that 
passes 9-0. Staff knows they need to come to Council with ideas that likely to win broad 
support. Public often misperceives this – ‘you are just rubber stamps for staff – every 
time idea brought vote 9-0. Should tell staff to go shove it more often.’ 
 
Another Council member said:  
Agenda item & reports are received every week by Council members with agenda item 
report updates – transmitted via explanatory memos to help Council members make an 
intelligent decision on whether to support or not. Then Council members go to private 
entity or someone we know to help with decision-making. 
 
These descriptions referencing very small numbers of individuals discussing different options, 
running those options by “private entities” to help with decision-making, straw polling to count 
consensus votes before a proposal even comes to a public study session, is directly tied to what 
both Fox-Rogers and Flyvberg discuss in their case studies, and to Marxian conceptions of the 
way that institutionalized power filters through official but not publicly transparent decision-
making channels to produce observed outcomes. Echoes of growth machine coalition politics are 
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evident here as well, with commodity relationships being established as a result of geographic 
immobility and locally dependent embedded social and professional relationships, whose power 
is only enhanced by the tenure structure of City Council described above and the relatively small 
size of the City of Champaign (e.g. smaller towns have more direct overlap, retain more “usual 
suspects” for longer periods of time who then build more local influence over politics and culture 
than in larger urban areas). 
 As one long-time City Council member put it: “Being active in city government is a 
hobby, a small group of people who are willing to spend their free time [doing this work].” Other 
community members I interviewed see it as decidedly less benign: one local resident I 
interviewed said he believes that City staff embarks on plans like the BPNP because of political 
pressure – “they know it’s wrong, but they try to justify doing it – or they go and do it anyway 
and hope they don’t get caught. If you are working there, you have to keep your mouth shut.” He 
continued, explaining that political parties are always guiding and close to these kinds of 
processes – you often don’t see or hear them but they are there. Often instructions to staff are for 
closed session debates, phone conversations, and “don’t ever write me anything.” This comment 
dovetails with the email comments referenced earlier between Kerri Spear and Kevin Jackson 
during the shadow politicking stage of the BPNP in early 2012 as well.  
As another community member I interviewed said: 
The plan to displace people and move people to gentrify the neighborhood, no, I’m 
against it, you know? That’s fundamentally what that is, and that’s what the city has 
wanted all along. You know, I have my own ideas about – and there’s talk about, you 
know, the city expansion and now the new high school discussion and the direction that it 
is taking up north, you know, gives major incentive to the city to further beautify these 
neighborhoods en route to the new high school. So, you know, we believe these plans 
have been in the works, some on a few cadre of people for many years, and they’re just 
carrying them out slowly and tediously so that they don’t get any political blowback.  
 
When I asked who the “cadre” consisted of, responses essentially reflected growth machine 
theories of urban power and development:  
It’s the city officials and the white ruling class of Champaign-Urbana, in a nutshell. The 
people who own property; own the land around Champaign-Urbana; the Peter Foxs; the 
people who run the restaurants; the developer behind M1 and M2; you know, people who 
own the banks; and the lawyers in town. And they have their functionaries at the city 
building, and that’s who – you know, they all – there’s colluding between a small set of 
people, is my perception. 
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7.1.2. New municipal fiscal priorities influence plan components and justifications for use of 
eminent domain  
In answering my second research question, new municipal fiscal priorities, constrained 
and shaped by Champaign’s contemporary fiscal policy space, have influenced the plan’s 
rationale for the use of eminent domain on a widespread area instead of using a neighborhood 
preservation infill approach. Specifically, a new environmental responsibility ethos, declining 
federal funds for neighborhood investment, and increasing post-2008 crash financial problem-
solving through local partnerships to diversify service provision expenses, combined with a new 
focus on racial sensitivity in business contracting, have all influenced components of the plan, in 
ways that are distinct from Old Urban Renewal.  
 
New environmental responsibility: LEED-ND & Safety Town ‘showcase’ neighborhood 
Kevin Jackson in our interview shared that former City Manager Steve Carter is the one 
who initially pushed the LEED-ND idea for the redevelopment – he sent Kevin a packet of 
information prior to the plan being developed, stating he wanted to emphasize sustainability, and 
wanted a state of the art proposal in accordance with the new City Council’s Goal #5 “Our City 
is a Model for Environmental Sustainability.” Kevin admitted that the LEED-ND point system 
will be an additional expense in the final redevelopment plan. In an article published by the 
News Gazette about the LEED-ND design decision, there is no room for discussion about why it 
makes sense for the lowest-income residents of the neighborhood to pay more for housing to 
make it energy efficient, beyond vague allusions to keeping energy costs down for residents. 
Likely much more relevant, and part of the constrained fiscal policy space Champaign operates 
within, is the fact shared by Lorrie Pearson (the land development manager for the Champaign 
planning department), who said that the use of LEED guidelines could help qualify the city for 
$10 million to $30 million of grants from HUD. This along with the usual adage that property 
values will increase – always in the context of the BPNP posited as a normative good without 
any nuanced investigation or analysis of potential “squeezing out” gentrification effects behind it 
– clearly demonstrates where City priorities lie (NG 3/28/2013: Energy efficiency, environment 
to be considered for neighborhood redevelopment).  
Much more widespread in other news coverage are comments about this blank slate 
redevelopment site being an opportunity for Champaign to advertise itself in a textbook-example 
	   174 
neoliberal place-making marketing strategy. In late 2013, neighborhood coordinator John Ruffin 
said “this is probably one of the only times we’ll get to do a substantial neighborhood 
redevelopment, so we want this to be a showcase neighborhood.” (NG 11/20/2013: Meeting 
planned for input on Bristol Park). On November 21, 2013, a “Community Envisioning 
Workshop” was held by Farr Associates – a design firm from Chicago hired by the City Council 
to create a ‘Master Plan’ vision for the redevelopment – that was supposed to gather residents 
from the Bristol Place neighborhood and from Champaign to provide redevelopment design 
input by viewing and discussing design preferences. During this meeting, Doug Farr mentioned 
that the city’s goal was to help create a “model neighborhood” with design features and elements 
that other areas of the country could emulate. The goal as stated in this meeting was to help 
“create a vision for the model community,” and echoing Esther’s earlier statements, it was 
explained that this was a “once in a lifetime opportunity.”  
Roughly thirty people attended the meeting, including roughly ten city officials, and only 
two Bristol place residents. Given the low number of resident participants, and the fact that the 
city officials were also voting during the “image preference survey,” it is clear that the 
redevelopment “Master plans” (see Appendix F.1) (a) show what the city wants to see, and (b) 
further support sentiments alluded to but often not stated explicitly by city staff and officials that 
existing residents will likely not be returning. By de facto lack of explicit policy in place to 
provide and encourage return, in most cases residents will not even be encouraged to return. 
Ostensibly the long-time owner occupants will be given demolition timing preferences on a 
“last-out, first-in” basis, but this has not been codified in official documentation beyond a vague 
statement in the Relocation Policy saying that “efforts will be made to keep all homeowners 
desiring to return as homeowners in the new development in their current home as long as 
possible” (CB 2012-214). Otherwise, those who wish to return need to work individually with 
the City on income and background eligibility and strategy in order to do so. 
So the “new” Bristol Place will be a “showcase,” “model” neighborhood that uses 
environmentally efficient state-of-the-art construction and design principles, will cost more as a 
result, provide much better City services to new residents, and solves a number of other city 
issues at the same time – providing a site for a new fire station, a community storm shelter, and a 
“safety town” to draw visitors to the community. As Kevin Jackson put it, “A safety town is an 
attraction to the entire community and beyond – Champaign is talking about how the 
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transformation of that space will transform the entire area.” It will include some affordable 
housing as part of the redevelopment design but not its primary focus, and what will be included 
will likely be designed and therefore limited by LIHTC development mixed-income unit 
distribution policies, which effectively means that there will not be anything close to a one-for-
one affordable housing unit replacement.  
These visions – from LEED-ND walkability and sustainable energy design, to including a 
model “Safety Town,” and comments from Council members about beautifying North Market 
Street – “[The BPNP] is huge, specifically because it’s one of the entrances and exits to our city” 
(Will Kyles’ comment, NG 9/28/2010) – have a lot to do with what would benefit the City 
overall to have in this particular north central corridor urban location, and do not address 
community concerns about widespread joblessness and underemployment, local income-based 
rental discrimination, local race-based housing finance discrimination, or the fact that the City’s 
plan will compound the displacement and dispossession effects beyond the project area itself 
onto all low-income area renters by the use of the area’s fixed and limited high-demand HCVs in 
its relocation plan, exacerbating widely recognized affordable housing issues community-wide.  
These are just a few among a whole host of other issues raised by residents concerned 
over the plan’s effects, including the fact that resident perceptions in the last 2-3 years are that 
neighborhood crime has been decreasing and what they want most is financial help in the upkeep 
of properties or small project incentives for neighborhood beautification efforts. These, along 
with early steering committee meeting discussions and other resident comments about 
neighborhood preferences, reflect the widespread Bristol Place community desire to build 
stronger “collective efficacy,” defined by criminal sociologists Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) 
as “cohesion among residents combined with shared expectations for the social control of public 
space.” Essentially, that the ability of members of a community who trust one another and are 
willing to cooperate to prevent crime, allows community residents to create a safe environment 
through things like monitoring children playing in public areas, acting to prevent truancy and 
street corner “hanging” by teenagers, and confronting individuals who exploit or disturb public 
spaces. This theory ties directly into Jane Jacobs’ understanding of the urban spatial and social 
fabric, and what creates “community,” and is in fact also the new service philosophy of the CPD 
in their “community oriented policing” efforts to date. 
In a document recently released named, “Bristol Place Talking Points,” other than 
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statistics on declining property values and this neighborhood containing the lowest valued 
property in the City, it states as justification for the demolition, displacement and new 
development: “landlords are unable/unwilling to invest further due to the return on investment.” 
This statement remains quite beyond the pale when understood in the context of the City’s 
history of racist community policing, neighborhood disinvestment since the 1990s and not-so-
benign neglect in its code enforcement before David Oliver was hired, Dorothy David became 
City Manager, and the NSD was given more support by Council in its community initiatives. It is 
the role of government to police property for minimum living standards for its residents in the 
same way that they police people for crimes against each other or against property – I wonder 
what the Bristol Place neighborhood would look like physically, and what kinds of success infill 
investments would have, if this had actually occurred in this neighborhood?  
Those who should have been and who should still, in all fairness and reasonable 
accountability, be held accountable for this devastation of neighborhood decline are the 
slumlord-type managerial investment property owners. And this is precisely the group benefiting 
most from this redevelopment plan. While those who have the largest stake in the neighborhood 
and who for the most part have persisted in keeping their properties clean, up to code and often 
even beautified – the older longtime owner-occupants – are those who are being hurt worst by 
this plan. They are also the only group for which extra displacement care has been taken in the 
form of the tax rebate program, but the success of that limited and capped fund in mitigating the 
very real financial challenges resulting from the displacement of the elderly has yet to be 
demonstrated.  
Additionally, nothing is being done to compensate or account for displacement effects on 
Bristol Place local businesses run out of personal homes, the two local churches and their 
affected congregations, or any property improvement investments made recently by any 
homeowners. Not to mention the emotional distress, amplified for long-time homeowners, of 
being forcibly displaced from a home full of memories and rich with individual emotional 
significance. Or the neighborhood social networks, documented in literature as being stronger 
among people at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum due to their experiences of shared 
deprivation and disadvantage. In this particular area for example, two resident themes that came 
out in those interviews involved the future difficulty posed post-displacement by not having 
neighbors available to babysit in case of emergencies, to borrow a car from, and for older 
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residents not having trusted relationships with younger neighbors around to mow lawns or help 
with trash pickup, house management, etc. Re-building community-based social support 
networks takes time, and energy, compounding relocation hardships discussed in detail above. 
 
New Racial Sensitivity: Minority- and Women-owned Business Enterprise (MWBE) Demolition 
Contracting in the BPNP 
Another of the more recent City Council goals involves increasing public contracting 
opportunities for female- and minority-owned businesses. Under the City Council goal “our City 
promotes economic opportunity” is the subheading “increase minority and women-owned 
business opportunities.” In working towards this goal specifically related to the BPNP 
demolition policy, City staff worked with the Small Business Development Center, Chairman of 
the Committee on Construction at Illinois Black Chamber of Commerce, Illinois Procurement 
Technical Assistance Center, local contractors, and community leaders to identify barriers to 
minority contractor participation in City demolitions. The key barriers they identified included 
lack of bonding, not enough insurance and financial capacity for large demolition projects, and a 
lack of experience with demolitions overall. Input from the outreach also indicated that smaller 
contractors have difficulty generally competing with larger established contractors regardless of 
the size of the project.  
The BPNP Demolition Policy works around these issues in its demolition contracts for 
the BPNP neighborhood by breaking down demolition contracts into no more than five parcels 
per package, and creating a prequalified contractor pool to assist in meeting this goal (CB 2014-
001). The prequalified contractor pool will address issues of capacity, capability and inclusion of 
minority- and women-owned business as prerequisites to bidding. Competition for demolition 
jobs will relate only to responsible bidding and pricing, and minority and women contractors 
lacking demolition experience will have an opportunity to obtain experience through 
partnerships with experienced contractors. Contractors wanting to participate in the prequalified 
contractor pool during the estimated three-year period will receive, upon request, an application 
from the NSD. In addition to standard demolition requirements, contractors will need to 
demonstrate the following minimum requirements: (1) designation as a small business, 
MBE/WBE or a Section 3 contractor; (2) 20% minority and/or women participation with a goal 
of at least 10% for minorities through (a) current employee makeup of their company, (b) 
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subcontracting, or (c) joint venture; (3) a bonding capacity of $50,000; and (4) demonstration of 
positive demolition experience equivalent to job requirements (CB 2014-148). 
As one City Council member I interviewed put it: 
Kevin Jackson and the NSD have worked really hard to unbundle projects all around the 
City to allow more space for minority public contracting. Our reports have been including 
minority participation where it is relevant – e.g. on small enough projects that it’s 
feasible. Kevin Jackson suggested unbundling demolition so minority contractors (only 
2-3 in town currently) have more opportunities. NSD has been putting on training classes 
to write RFPs, get bonding advice, etc. NSD, as much as they can, try to keep jobs and 
contracts within the community. 
 
According to all of my research, this is undeniably true, and insofar as I have specifically 
critiqued the actions of Kevin Jackson and Kerri Spear in other decision-making conduct related 
to this plan, it is very clear that in addition to their necessary collusion and orchestration behind 
the scenes to make the BPNP redevelopment successful (generously, likely due to job-related 
political and growth machine pressures), the NSD worked very hard throughout this process to 
include what few concessions they felt they could into the design of the relocation and 
demolition policies. I do not doubt that without the Neighborhood Services Department staff 
pushing for neighborhood resident and youth involvement and attempting in some way to 
incorporate responsiveness to concerns voiced in resident participation sessions, the demolitions 
would not be unbundled, there would be no prequalified contractor pool, no real estate tax rebate 
program for elderly homeowners would exist at all, and HCVs would have no associated 
preferences attached to their distribution. These additions go above and beyond what federal 
laws absolutely require. Dissidents might argue that these policies were the bare minimum the 
City could have done to get away with as little community outcry over the use of eminent 
domain as constitutive of this plan as they have, but eventual displacement outcomes for the 
residents affected by these small concessions will be better because of these policy changes.  
One of the City Council members I interviewed shared that public works has been the 
City department most responsive to the minority business initiative, but that the Urbana-
Champaign Big Broadband (UC2B) initiative started the change in City contracting to expand a 
focus on including MWBEs. However, there has been controversy around how the work was 
completed, which individuals in the community brought to Council attention by critiquing the 
work partially completed. This Council member was unwilling to share more details, and when I 
tried tracking down explanations for the change in contracting between phases 2 and 3 of that 
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project, the most explicit statement contained in city documents was “the City did not want to 
extend the contract with Power Up and desired to undertake the incomplete work with a different 
contractor” (CB 2014-053). An earlier document stated of this contracting decision shift:  
Staff did not utilize the components of the approved alternative procurement plan relative 
to Minority and Female Business Enterprise (MAFBE) participation or the minority 
participation in the workforce as determinative factors in this evaluation or 
recommendation. As was noted at the time the alternative procurement process was 
considered, race-conscious determinative outcomes, without a more thorough analysis 
and endpoint, may raise legal issues currently being considered by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Though not utilized as a determinative factor in the evaluation of these proposals, 
Western has indicated that it will achieve the MAFBE participation goal through its 
subcontract with Prairie Restorations, Inc. This company is located in Tolono, Illinois, 
and is certified as a female owned/controlled business enterprise by the Illinois 
Department of Central Management Services (CB 2013-111).  
 
It is ironic that “race-conscious determinative outcomes” are only feared when the “alternative 
procurement process” proposed is meant to reverse traditional racial and gender power 
arrangements to provide room for more historically marginalized women and minority inclusion 
in public contracting.  
This alternative process, similar to what ended up being used in the BPNP demolition 
policy, was proposed by staff but eventually not followed by Council. It provided preference 
points for proposers who pledge a diverse workforce composition, proposed unbundling the 
project into multiple smaller component parts, collecting prime contractor and subcontractor 
registration information to verify MWBE status, and implementing an annual contractor pre-
qualification system, along with incentive payments to contractors successful in achieving the 
workforce diversity pledges made in their proposals (CB 2012-020; CB 2013-081).  
It seems certain staff members have tried to push more progressive contracting and 
housing provision city policies forward only to have them rejected by Council. To some 
Councilmembers, apparently “good faith efforts” are enough on the part of the City for 
remedying decades of historical disadvantage and dispossession precisely by these sorts of 
decisions made by those who occupy positions of power able to define that decision-making 
space. When contracting for professional financial consulting services, the longest-standing City 
Council member Michael LaDue said, “we have to work with the demographics that the market 
presents us with. We do our best to get minority and female-owned firms ... I think this reflects 
our best good-faith effort. It’s still a field that is not dominated by women.” Robert W. Baird & 
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Co. and Comer Capital Group were recommended as co-financial advisers, and Kane, McKenna 
Capital was recommended for planning services. Comer Capital Group is a minority-owned firm, 
and Robert W. Baird & Co. is neither a minority-owned firm nor a female-owned firm. 
(Champaign City Council hires two new minority, women focused financial advisors 
Wednesday, November 20, 2013 Daily Illini article).  
In the Council Bill approving these two financial and advising services contracts, staff 
recognized that taking the easy, well-trodden path of least resistance would not meet new 
MWBE contracting City Council goals. Staff listed easy, known-quantity contracting in its 
recommendation to hire Kane McKenna for planning advising services, stating: 
Retaining Kane, McKenna Capital as the City’s financial advisor would provide 
continuity with a firm that has provided excellent service, and does not require the staff 
workload to explain the City’s financial policies and procedures, and for staff to become 
familiar with a new financial advisor’s procedures and expectations. 
 
At the same time staff clearly recognized and stated that this recommendation had a disadvantage 
of undermining the MWBE Council goal: “Depending on the specific direction given to staff, 
this alternative might not advance the City Council goal of doing more business with minority 
and/or female-owned enterprises” (CB 2013-224).  
The City of Champaign has definitively moved forward from the old urban renewal era in 
its encouragement via public policy for increased MWBE involvement in the demolitions of 
Phase I BPNP, especially when compared to the local history of the Creative Buildings proposal 
from the first round of urban renewal in Champaign. But City staff and elected officials 
universally continue to claim limited power over influencing “market dynamics,” and somehow 
relate these market dynamics’ constraints to not just all of its MWBE contracting, but to 
restrictions on what can be constructed, and re-constructed, in Bristol Place as well. “The 
market” didn’t allow for successful infill development, and when deciding what the replacement 
will look like, the City has been exceedingly careful to not commit to anything beyond vague 
statements about the redevelopment “still being a plan for affordable housing construction,” as it 
moves forward soliciting developer proposals in 2015.   
 
7.1.3. New fiscal priorities underscore disparate impacts of redevelopment on minority 
communities 
New fiscal priorities involving value capture through property value increases directly 
resulting from market-interventionist neoliberal government action, inaction, and investment 
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have been turned into tools for financing urban development as a result of declining federal 
funding for neighborhood and affordable housing initiatives in Champaign. These fiscal 
priorities and arrangements, embedded in longitudinal narratives about the City of Champaign’s 
social and political history, provide the lens necessary to evaluate the plausible fiscal policy 
space of the City of Champaign in the BPNP redevelopment. Specifically, new partnerships have 
emerged as a result of contemporary local municipal fiscal pressures, and their historical 
embeddedness in traditional neoliberal market philosophy underscores the conclusion that 
growth machine coalitions continue to drive development in Champaign, disproportionately 
impacting the lowest income, and in Champaign that also means minority, citizens. The degree 
to which this is a result of compounded historical disenfranchisement in land use policy and local 
government simply not taking proactive corrective action and continuing with the path of least 
resistance ‘business as usual,’ or a more deliberate racially motivated modern 
disenfranchisement requires further study.  
This emphasis maintained by City officials and representatives on market-driven 
constraints in the provision and regulation of affordable housing supply rings hollow, 
particularly in the face of market constraints’ potential to address affordable housing issues 
locally. As early as March 2012 City officials were claiming market-based limitations on 
replacement housing in Bristol Place. In a NSAB meeting on March 8, 2012 Jim Rose said, “It 
was my understanding that the goal was to have new development match the same percentages 
as existing neighborhoods,” to which Greg Skaggs replied, “Due to current economic state the 
current 50/50 split will likely not be possible.” Combined with the comment in July 2012 about 
“developer preferences” let slip by Kevin Jackson about a developer wanting all cleared land, 
shared by Esther Patt, the universal “economic forces” monolith is all that is usually required to 
remove oneself from culpability and declare oneself a neutral professional evaluator, or guided 
by one. Kevin Jackson and other City staff have maintained that the primary goal in the whole 
BPNP endeavor is to provide and expand affordable housing options for the local community. 
But directly after this statement in the March 2012 Council study session, he said: 
The market will dictate what we put back. We do know it will be a mixed income 
affordable housing development. It would have a funding arrangement that would include 
housing across affordability scale: 80% AMI being highest level of affordability of units 
going back into the area, market rate units would be in the minority. 
 
This sounds exactly like another City and HACC plus a private developer and manager mixed-
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income LIHTC housing development partnership project along the lines of Douglass Square, the 
replaced Burch Village complex just across the railroad tracks from the BPNP project area.  
It is clear that some individuals on the City of Champaign’s staff have the expertise and 
backgrounds necessary to recognize inequity locally and propose good solutions to counteract it, 
but those solutions often seemed to be undermined or not agreed to by City Council in my 
research. The starkest example of this is in the Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing Choice 
(AIFHC) submitted in July 2014 (a requirement of HUD’s as a component of Champaign’s 
Consolidated Plan every 7 years), where the City explicitly states, “the continued presence of 
[fair housing] impediments suggests that established efforts to address fair housing are 
insufficient.” It goes on to list nine local fair housing impediments in data-backed, documented 
detail. One of which remains, from the eras of Old Urban Renewal and New Urban Renewal, 
mortgage lending disparities for minority borrowers across all income categories seeking all loan 
categories analyzed: home purchase, home improvement, and refinancing. The local supporting 
data for mortgage lending disparities by race goes back to 2001, and the more recent data 
collected in 2011 demonstrates that the disparities in lending have actually gotten worse: in 2005 
the average disparity was a difference of 13 percentage points, but that number increased to 17 
points in 2011. The Community Reinvestment Group, a group of local mortgage lenders, 
apparently explained this as potentially resulting from private mortgage insurance guidelines 
including qualifying ratios, debt-to-income ratios and loan-to-value ratios, but then stated that 
overall credit was the biggest determining factor in loan application outcomes.  
Another fair housing barrier listed is “inadequate supply of affordable rental units/barriers for 
low-income population.” The Champaign County Regional Housing study, completed by 
professional consultant Vogt Santer Insights in 2010, found that in the City of Champaign there 
is a gap of 1,858 units of affordable housing for households with an annual income below 
$20,000 (SS 2015-011). City staff in the AIFHC recommended “continued analysis of housing 
need and availability” in order to implement proportionate “policies regarding new developments 
[that] could require 20% of the units to be affordable (or more, in order to address Champaign’s 
current deficit in affordable housing).” Staff preparing this fair housing barriers report also 
recognized some of the structural barriers to low-income housing seekers, including up-front 
costs of renting application fees, policies that ask for extended periods of financial stability or 
deny people with particular criminal backgrounds, in addition to the virulent NIMBYism 
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referenced earlier. Despite this clear recognition of significant “inadequate supply” and 
“structural barriers,” bafflingly, the end of this report states: 
At this time, the City has decided to focus more on providing incentives to developers to 
encourage this type of affordable new construction, similar to what was done for the 
Atkins Group in the development of Ashland Park on the north end of town. If incentives 
continue to be sufficient to encourage voluntary construction of affordable units, no 
changes need be considered (SS 2015-011).  
 
The City’s 2013/2014 Consolidated Annual Performance Evaluation Report (CAPER) stated 
that in the Ashland Park development, it  
…consented to waive some of the normal development costs, including building permit 
fees, to encourage the private developer to build affordable, visitable single-family 
homes. To further reduce the cost of the homes, the City also agreed to give all buyers 
with incomes at or below 100% MFI a partial rebate of City property taxes for the first 
five years after purchase (CAPER, FY13-14).  
 
As of the 2013-2014 CAPER, 141 buyers were participating in the tax rebate program with an 
average home cost (of those participating) of $141,595 and an average median family income of 
68% (this falls between the 50% AMI very low income and 80% AMI low income HUD 
designations). The City then concluded: 
This project has been an excellent example of affordable housing built entirely by the 
private sector, with no investment of federal funding whatsoever… The range of new 
home prices is from $119,000 to $200,000+, making many affordable to lower income 
buyers. This incentive was approved by the City Council to encourage homeownership, 
particularly for low- and moderate-income buyers (CAPER, FY13-14).  
 
When evaluating this particular decision-making through a fiscal policy space lens, what 
becomes clear, in addition to the continued homeownership bias, is the preference in financial 
decision-making on the part of the City Council of the budget impact via property tax revenue 
capture to the City from the Ashland Park subdivision proposal by the Atkins’ Group. As early 
as 2004 when zoning and plat infrastructure for this proposed development was being discussed:  
…the development has approximately 540 homes proposed. If each home is valued at 
approximately $150,000, the development with generate $27,000,000 worth of equalized 
assessed value. Annual property tax revenues would be estimated at $351,000 (CB 2004-
232).  
 
Two years later, this number had dropped to 225 homes, providing only $118,080 in property tax 
revenue, but still requiring the City to build new infrastructure “including new roads and 
	   184 
sidewalks…In addition, the new housing will extend the City’s fire, police, snow removal and 
road maintenance services” (CB 2006-200). By 2014, the Ashland Park subdivision had 
constructed and sold 418 homes out of the 540 anticipated lots.  
This provides yet another piece of evidence that despite staff evaluations of barriers to 
affordable housing and recommendations related to addressing local affordable housing need 
concentrated in the very low-income (<30% AMI) and predominantly African-American 
communities of Champaign (see maps in Appendix F.2), Champaign’s City Council remains 
focused on providing financial incentives geared primarily towards those both able to afford and 
desirous of pursuing homeownership. The Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing concluded, 
“housing units exist, but not of the type or number currently needed in the area,” and then 
additionally: 
…while there is a deficit at the higher income levels as well, of more concern is the 
deficit at the lower levels – while people in higher income brackets have options for 
housing (notably home ownership and renting “lesser” units that are available), those 
with lower incomes do not have these options. 
 
City staff clearly recognizes the extant problems, and has both reported problems and proposed 
potential solutions to City Council, but overall it seems Council has chosen to disavow 
responsibility, citing monolithic opaque “market forces.” Champaign has clearly not been willing 
to exercise its “stick”-oriented regulatory power over any but its most vulnerable and least 
organized citizens, to their detriment and simultaneously to the benefit of developers, property 
managers and owners area-wide who all benefit financially from the City’s “carrot”-based 
incentive attitude towards new construction and development.  
This “hands-off” regulatory attitude unfortunately jives with my interview with Dorothy 
David, who shared that over the course of her 20-year tenure working for the City of Champaign, 
even though the City Council is more progressive than it was 20 years ago, they still do not want 
to insert the City into things they believe are managed well by the private sector, like affordable 
housing development. Beyond standard policy guidelines like zoning ordinances, lot sizing, infill 
development versus greenfield protection – the kinds of policies that assure development meets 
community standards, she said that the City will not develop housing outside of achieving other 
missions like eliminating blight or promoting affordability, and that it wants to focus public 
resources where they are most needed and does not want to duplicate other efforts.  
	   185 
The problem is, there are no other efforts locally to provide lower than market rate rental 
housing, and specifically all types of housing for those at or below 50% of AMI besides the 
HACC and its larger recent LIHTC complexes. This denial of culpability in market influence 
was again echoed at the Farr Associates “visioning” Master Plan community meeting when 
towards the end of the meeting as city officials were explaining that their hands were essentially 
tied, saying “a lot of what we have to do is reactionary. We react with what developers tell us 
they want to do.” This sentiment not only completely belies the ultimate goals of democratic 
government and planning more generally, but even more egregiously of public participation 
requirements in public planning processes specifically. Instead of a reactionary, hands-off market 
politics which is really just a politics directed by property elites that provides financial incentives 
to Capital, the City should focus on identifying a vision for the neighborhood and development 
directed by residents and community members who actually live in that community, and then 
hire a developer who will work to deliver that local community’s vision. 
 
7.2. Fiscal Policy-Driven Urban Renewal: increasing fiscal partnership complexity and 
humanistic rhetoric 
The focus in Fiscal Policy-Driven Urban Renewal, different from the two earlier eras 
discussed, has become a more humanistic and “politically correct” rhetorical façade, combined 
with increasingly complex financial market integration and evolving local U.S. municipal 
government place-making pressures in the face of increased global competition. 
These claims to only minimally intervene in the local housing market run parallel to 
traditional neoliberal government policy on intervening on markets that focuses on the 
neoclassical model of “economic man,” competition, and free markets. Similar to Flyvberg’s 
study in Aalborg, in this case study I have found that members of the local business community 
put pressure on political actors to create special privileges and spaces to capture individual value 
for themselves, whether by city branding, land use incentives and regulations or selective City 
decision-making to preserve higher taxable property value. The in-between planning spaces in 
the City of Champaign’s operations are not directed by the correct ethics of representative 
democracy, redistributive equity and responsibility towards all citizens, equally.  
Further, the opacity of these decision-making spaces disallows reflexive state-market 
critique and leads to exactly the kind of Fiscal Policy-Driven Urban Renewal detailed here, 
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complete with unequal outcomes borne by those who can least afford it and whose demographic 
group for decades has been locally undervalued, denied access to the same wealth-building 
opportunities as others, unjustly targeted for criminal justice fines and fees, and unjustly forced 
to bear the undeniable financial and emotional costs of state-initiated forced residential 
displacement. Representative democracies are only as representative as those who participate, 
and come together to form groups to collectively advocate for their combined interests. As Terry 
Townsend put it, “in black power coalition politics [in Champaign], you don’t have the luxury of 
staying in one area and delving deep – you go where the storm is – because there is never a large 
enough group [locally] to support the Black Coalition (often between 5-25 people).”   
Much urban research focuses on the resulting manifestations of racial inequality in urban 
areas, but often this research fails to explicate the causes of race inequality in them. The 
dehumanization of black bodies has been a fundamental part of capital value capture by whites 
through the structuring of urban land markets, and the dispossession and serial displacement of 
African-American people for decades. One of the challenging issues concerning cities and the 
changing nature of multiscalar governance in the wake of federal devolution and austerity 
measures for neighborhood investment funding in particular, is determining who governs what at 
the local level: who gets to participate and in what ways, how power is allocated and mediated, 
and what kinds of governance systems or structures will best serve a multitude of ecological and 
social goals. Who decides meaningfully impacts what gets decided. As Harvey and Molotch 
(2007) put it, “the politics of place is about whose interests government will serve.” 
Land use regulations in the U.S. and in Champaign-Urbana were initially designed to 
construct an American version of apartheid, separating people by phenotype via the use of 
racially restrictive covenants and racial zoning ordinances. The idea that minorities, especially 
African-Americans but also Latinos and Asians, threaten property values was not just 
conventional wisdom but federal and state policy until the 1960s. But discovering the links 
between land use controls and racial exclusion since then requires more indirect and difficult 
tracing than the mapped-out apartheid of racial zoning (de Souza Briggs, 2005). For those 
seeking to make the connection between land use and housing regulations and racial equity, one 
must first determine whether a particular regulation or a combination of regulations raises 
housing costs or limits the availability of rental housing, then determining how higher housing 
costs or limited rental housing availability affect African-Americans. Part of the appeal of 
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market-oriented planning stems from its apparent ability to negotiate through rhetorically value-
neutral mechanisms in the same way that modernist planning sought to suppress through 
technical expertise. Economic change, real estate cycles, and transformations of urban 
governance all produce cycles of “creative destruction” which limit low-income households’ 
control over place-making in their own neighborhoods.  
In this case study, there have been clear and undeniable data produced from a number of 
sources about rental income barriers, the dearth of affordable rental or homeownership housing 
units, racism in home financing, and the relative successes of “carrot” and “stick” public policy 
approaches in effecting changes in housing market supply locally. The City of Champaign holds 
the legislative power, as a home-rule municipality, to create and enforce the development 
requirements proposed in the Impediments to Fair Housing report to specifically target and 
expand the supply of rental units available to its lowest-income and most vulnerable residents. 
Instead, it has chosen not to take an active role in representing its vulnerable populations’ 
interests in the heinously skewed (primarily by student-geared luxury rental development 
pressures) local housing and property markets, instead choosing via public policy to facilitate, 
represent and protect the interests and the individual profit motives via accumulation by 
dispossession of the investment interests of the white local elite. This case considers the 
circumstances surrounding the application of market logics in Champaign’s urban planning and 
examines the racist implications of this approach, given historic land use practices, wealth 
accumulation, and policing trajectories.  
The main effect of the neoliberal political turn that began in the 1970s has been a 
redistribution of assets and wealth from the mass of the population toward the upper class, 
documented as “accumulation by dispossession” by David Harvey in The New Imperialism 
(2003). This accumulation, Harvey explained as the proliferation of Marxian ‘primitive’ 
accretion practices during the rise of capitalism, including (1) the commodification and 
privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; (2) conversion of various 
forms of property (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusively private property rights; (3) 
suppression of rights to the commons; (4) commodification of labor power and the suppression 
of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; (5) colonial, neocolonial, and 
imperial processes of appropriation of assets; (6) monetization of exchange and taxation, 
particularly of land; (7) the slave trade (which continues, particularly in the sex industry); and (8) 
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usury, the national debt and most devastating to working classes’ obliviousness to its own 
decline since and from the early 1990s, the use of the credit system as a means of primitive 
accumulation (Harvey, 2007). 
The state, with its monopoly of violence and constructing definitions of legality, backs, 
promotes and constructs all of these accretion practices, and the gap between its rhetoric (for the 
benefit of all) and realization (for the benefit of a small ruling class) has increased in Fiscal 
Policy-Driven Urban Renewal. The idea that markets are about fair competition has been widely 
negated by the monopoly and internationalization of corporate and financial powers, and the role 
that government has historically played in constructing and regulating spaces of exchange. As 
Harvey and Molotch (2007) put it, “life chances of all sorts, including the ability to make money 
from property, are significantly determined by what goes on at the local level.” This oft-repeated 
fallacy that the City’s decision-making space is constrained by “market forces” may be in some 
senses true (although really only related to FPS #1 in the form of explicit federal cuts to 
programs like the CDBG), but what is equally clear in this case study example is the fact that this 
justification was used as a smokescreen to disguise and devalue other options available for 
neighborhood revitalization and investment, using rhetoric referencing the incomprehensible 
expertise of those who understand property markets and real estate cycles being the only 
individuals capable of determining how urban space can be structured. This rhetoric is presented 
as precluding critique, obviating any substantive alternative analysis or interpretation by either 
the broader public or members of the affected community. 
Markets however, like everything else humanly created, work through, are organized by 
and entirely bound up with human interests in wealth, power and emotional valuation, as 
opposed to being inherently individualistic and thus necessarily hyper efficient in the aggregate 
(e.g. neoclassical ‘invisible hand,’ Tiebout sorting, economic efficiency arguments). Molotch’s 
“growth machine” argument is that “the pursuit of exchange values so permeates the life of 
localities that cities become organized as enterprises devoted to the increase of aggregate rent 
levels through the intensification of land use.” This “creates a stratification of places according 
to the ease with which they can attract capital – a stratification that then alters the life chances of 
local individuals and groups.” They argue that neighborhood stability is entirely dependent on an 
area’s strategic utility to the growth machine apparatus:  
People dreaming, planning and organizing themselves to make money from property are 
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the agents through which accumulation does its work at the level of the urban place. 
Social groups that push against these manipulations embody human strivings for 
affection, community, and sheer physical survival…Neighborhoods whose obliteration 
would better serve growth goals are subject to the strongest pressure; unless their 
residents and organizations are high enough in the hierarchies of power to resist, 
neighborhoods are sacrificed to the growth goal. The mode of interpersonal supports, the 
presence or absence of an indigenous business class, and race and racism shape specific 
outcomes (Harvey & Molotch, 2007).  
 
In Champaign-Urbana, we continue to see the long-time indigenous white business class 
consisting of property owners and their allies on City Council securing individual profit value 
created in black community spaces in the North End. 
Part of the problem is that often government decision makers who deal with 
neighborhoods are stuck in a CDBG-defined world, but those funds are increasingly limited, so 
cities are increasingly becoming more “entrepreneurial,” interpreting the primary problem as a 
lack of investment capital, which leads to seeing neighborhoods as economic units (TIF districts, 
Business Improvement Districts, etc.). In this way, neoclassical economic assumptions try to 
convert “places” into definable units to be bought and sold as conventional commodities. But 
neighborhoods organize life chances in the same sense as class does, and “one’s home provides 
access to school, friends, work place, and shops. Changing homes disrupts connections to these 
other places and their related values as well” (Harvey & Molotch, 2007). Neoliberal market 
logics do not map well onto human conceptions of place, of home, and the complex social 
networks that arise over long tenures in a single location. 
In Illinois, home rule municipalities have much more discretion than non-home rule 
municipalities over property taxes, sales taxes, debt, and other financial areas including contracts 
and impact fees. Home rule municipalities can levy more types of taxes than non-home rule 
municipalities and are not subject to property tax limitations. The economic base determines the 
wealth of the revenue bases from which local governments draw revenues to finance spending, 
and spending needs and demands determine how much they must spend to ensure that services 
are adequate and citizens satisfied. Research shows that local governments have adapted to these 
changes by becoming more reliant on elastic and volatile revenue sources over which they have 
control rather than reducing spending (Mullins & Wallin, 2004; Brunori et al., 2008). Research 
in Illinois has shown that governments are not completely bound or constrained by their external 
environment in solving financial problems. Rather, governments have resources and options for 
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managing fiscal stress and volatility within their internal environment, and these features can act 
as filters or buffers on external events. According to an article detailing the interactions between 
Illinois municipalities’ fiscal policy space elements (1) the state or intergovernmental context 
and (3) municipally and locally imposed fiscal controls and policies, Hendrick & Crawford 
(2014) conclude that a government’s fiscal structure represents a set of moving parts that are 
likely to be used to solve multiple problems at the same time. The application of the FPS 
evaluation lens helps identify the complexity and the evolution of the multiple plan components 
and financing decisions behind the BPNP redevelopment that further support this claim.  
The City’s focus in the BPNP has clearly been on outsourcing the financing as much as 
possible through partnerships, as Kerri and Kevin repeated in many City meetings after its initial 
controversial May 8, 2012 study session, “the City’s goal is not to be the sole source of funding 
but to leverage other dollars.” The City’s take is that partnerships are the only way to create the 
collaborative, creative financing mechanisms required to do projects on the scale of the BPNP. 
As Dorothy David explained in our interview, there is an entire policy spectrum of things the 
City can get involved with in addressing housing issues locally, but it often does not have the 
funding to get involved directly (as for example, a developer), which is why they work so hard to 
build partnerships with organizations like the HACC and Habitat for Humanity to address local 
housing supply issues. But this approach runs the risk of exactly what occurred in this case study, 
the focus of the planning intervention shifting to manage and encompass so many other 
constituent goals that it became no longer solely geared towards targeted neighborhood 
revitalization and service improvements to existing residents, and was instead used to promote 
growth machine development interests and a more marketable “model neighborhood” place-
making. As Mihaly (2007) put it: 
Public-private development is notoriously difficult to describe. Conference panels 
regarding urban economic revitalization often involve disconnected presentations of 
project after project, devoid of connecting themes, reflecting the reality that large urban 
public-private redevelopment engages multiple actors in such complex realities so as to 
defy generalization.  
 
The complexity and scale of these revitalization efforts will remain opaque to the public without 
specific legislation enforcing transparency and accountability measures, even as public funding 
is funneled into them, because of the nature of private contract law in the U.S.  
Places are in fact created by the machinations and institutional maneuvers surrounding 
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them, and people construct land use regulations as parts of organizational webs that include 
political, economic and cultural values unique to individual localities. Land use is above all, 
constituent of collective local decisions. Even boundary demarcation is political and fraught with 
local social judgments and meaning, as I discussed in the creation of the ‘North End’ designation 
in Chapter 3. As Harvey and Molotch (2007) say, “The boundaries and meanings of place are 
repeatedly named and defined in anticipation of specific consequences.” This was even evident 
in the BPNP, as participants in a Youth Participatory Action Research project geared towards 
getting more youth participation in community planning efforts stated that study respondents: 
still had some difficulty identifying the Bristol Park neighborhood following explanation 
of the area and distribution of outlined maps of the area. When described by street names 
and nicknames for different areas of the neighborhood used by youth, participants then 
seemed to recognize the area referenced (Echetebu, 2014). 
 
This lack of understanding of what the City’s neighborhood designation of “Bristol Park” even 
meant, another UIUC researcher said “was a key factor in why youth had declined to participate 
in events and forums related to the redevelopment of the area, because it was not clear to them 
that it was referring to their own neighborhood” (Echetebu, 2014). 
As is evident from interview themes with Champaign city officials and politicians, there 
is a very common, ongoing, widespread and myopic acceptance of the self-equilibrating real 
estate market. The acts of exchange, buying and selling real estate needs no justification, and 
developers interests dictating market redevelopment options is simply taken and presented as a 
given, but regulating those exchanges for the benefit of residents requires special political and 
ideological mobilization and action. Unfortunately, this is a mentality stuck in the neoliberal 
economic traditions of the 1970s, as the issue of whether or not to intervene in property markets 
has been disproved as a premise entirely since then, and it is now widely understood as a 
fictitious creation of neoclassical economics. The only real issue, currently, is the form that 
property market intervention takes and whose goals it serves. As Kirk Harris (2015) put it, “the 
nagging questions are which public, whose interests, and how do we define the public good in 
the context of economic-development-driven eminent domain practices?” 
By giving public-private development entities that operate outside of traditional 
governmental structures public authority (such as HACC’s outsourcing of PBV management in 
its new mixed income LIHTC developments), municipalities limit the transparency of pubic 
decision-making, making accountability difficult, if not impossible (Harris, 2015).  
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There is consistent deployment of corporate-centered public–private development 
strategies, even in the absence of a plausible cost-benefit advantage to the municipalities 
and their working-class and low-income residents. These strategies promote a symbolic 
sense of progress that is compelling, politically expedient, and congruent with the 
entrenched neoliberal philosophy that has dominated local economic development 
activities, while foreclosing the possibilities of more redistributive development strategies 
(Ledebur & Woodward, 2003).  
 
In recent years, the role of municipal governments has shifted from guidance of social, 
spatial and economic order, to be subsumed by the drive for economic growth, which is 
presumed to expand the municipal revenue base and in the ethos of trickle down economics, 
benefit all residents. As Jennings & Jordan-Zachery (2010) argue, this private-public partnership 
paradigm insulates government from taking responsibility for the destruction of neighborhoods 
and displacement of populations.	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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION  
Elegant Racism in its contemporary form: Housing  
Structural violence theorists define violence as the unavoidable disparity between the 
potential ability to fulfill basic needs and their actual fulfillment, locating the unequal share of 
power to decide over the distribution of resources as the pivotal causal factor of these avoidable 
structural inequalities. Galtung defines violence as the: 
…avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs…human life, which lowers the 
actual degree to which someone is able to meet their needs below that which would 
otherwise be possible (Galtung, 1993 quoted from Ho, 2007).  
 
In order to understand the crucial distinction between types of violence, Galtung constructed a 
typology of violence composed of three categories: personal, structural and cultural (Galtung, 
1990). He asserts that structural violence, as opposed to personal or direct violence, is indirect in 
that “there may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The 
violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal 
life chances” (Galtung, 1969). Therefore, racial inequality in America, often coupled with 
poverty, is an institutionalized social structure that lowers the level of actual fulfillment of one’s 
fundamental needs below the potential, defined by the availability and access that other 
American citizens enjoy. Racial inequality is an example of structural violence in that the 
inequalities that exist in terms of disproportionate life chances because of disease or poverty are 
directly caused by an unequal distribution of resources. The underlying problem in structural 
violence is that ‘the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed’ 
(Galtung, 1969).  
Ho (2007) argues that when agency is constrained to the extent that fundamental human 
needs cannot be attained, structural violence becomes a violation of human rights and thus 
constitutes a structural violation of human rights. As medical anthropologist and physician Paul 
Farmer notes, “the world’s poor are the chief victims of structural violence…the poor are not 
only more likely to suffer; they are less likely to have their suffering noticed’ (Farmer, 2005). As 
Ho (2007) says, “crucial in making the transition from violence to human rights violations is the 
recognition that structural causes are responsible for constrained agency.” Poverty means not 
only a lack of money, but also a concurrent impairment of access to adequate healthcare, 
	   194 
education and welfare services, and shelter. This often in turn affects the degree to which 
impoverished victims of structural violence enjoy their civil and political rights (Landman, 
2006). From a structuralist perspective, with a focus on interdependent relationships, there are 
clear inequalities between collectivities along social axes - race is clearly a social axis along 
which inequalities have been institutionalized. Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois contend that since 
social structures have institutionalized structural violence, social structures therein render that 
violence invisible. For them, structural violence is “everyday violence [or] part of the normative 
fabric of social and political life. Structural violence is generally invisible because it is part of the 
routine grounds of everyday life…” (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004). 
The cumulative fiscal decision-making in the City of Champaign reifies unequal and 
historically racist outcomes in state-initiated residential displacement of the lowest-income, 
minority city residents, similar to both earlier forms of urban renewal. The constrained fiscal 
decision pressures municipal governments face in the U.S. helps provide a lens to evaluate and 
understand the interacting decisions that continue to produce these results, particularly through 
the approach of government relative to housing industry stakeholders.  
This is not a new process, and depressingly, we have seen this occur in different 
historical eras and in much larger cities like George-Eugene Haussmann’s Paris and in Robert 
Moses’ New York. Haussmann deliberately engineered the removal of much of Paris’ working 
class from Paris’ city center, using powers of expropriation for supposedly public benefit, and 
did so in the name of civic improvement, environmental restoration, and urban renovation. The 
deep social consequences of these historical actions have been seen in recent years in uprisings 
and conflict in the isolated suburbs within which the marginalized immigrants and unemployed 
workers are increasingly trapped. Robert Moses “took a meat axe to the Bronx” with 
unprecedented neighborhood groups and movements protesting using Jane Jacobs’ rhetoric of 
the destruction of whole communities of residents and their long-established networks of social 
integration. But once the “brutal power of state expropriations” had been resisted and contained 
in both cases, “a far more insidious and cancerous process of transformation occurred through 
the fiscal disciplining of urban democratic governments, land markets, property speculation,” 
and the sorting of land to those “highest and best uses” that generate the highest possible 
financial rates of return on investments (Harvey, 2012).  
In heartbreakingly clear parallels to the story of the BPNP, Engels in 1872 said:  
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In reality, the bourgeoisie has only one method of solving the housing question after its own 
fashion –that is to say, of solving it in such a way that the solution perpetually renews the 
question anew. This method is called “Haussmann” [by which] I mean the practice that has 
now become general of making breaches in the working class quarters of our big towns, and 
particularly in areas which are centrally situated, quite apart from whether this is done from 
considerations of public health or for beautifying the town, or owing to the demand for big 
centrally situated business premises, or, owing traffic requirements, such as the laying down 
of railways, streets…no matter how different the reasons may be, the result is always the 
same; the scandalous alleys disappear to the accompaniment of lavish self-praise by the 
bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous success, but they appear again immediately 
somewhere else…The breeding place of disease, the infamous holes and cellars in which the 
capitalist mode of production confines our workers night after night, are not abolished; they 
are merely shifted elsewhere! The same economic necessity that produced them in the first 
place, produces them in the next place. 
… 
The growth of the big modern cities gives the land in certain areas, particularly in those areas 
which are centrally situated, an artificially and colossally increasing value; the buildings 
erected on these areas depress this value instead of increasing it, because they no longer 
belong to changed circumstances. They are pulled down and replaced by others. This takes 
place above all with workers’ houses which are situated centrally and whose rents, even with 
the greatest overcrowding, can never, or only very slowly, increase above a certain 
maximum. They are pulled down and in their stead shops, warehouses and public building 
are erected (Harvey, 2012). 
 
Being ethical in planning practice means recognizing and understanding in as much depth 
as possible the line between using information to teach or to persuade, and the institutional and 
ultimate goals behind each instance of persuasive argument. There is an immense and often 
underappreciated power that comes with an expertise in the art of information sharing with the 
American public. Only when one understands both current and historical national and local 
rhetorical frames and the contemporary implications of less than half of the entire electorate even 
voting in local elections (Champaign County’s relatively high voter turnout in local elections this 
November was only 49%), can one comprehend the potential for misuse of privileged 
information through shadow-state processes in directing the distribution of public resources in 
the land-use planning process.  
With the power to share information in different ways to inform a differentially invested 
and engaged public, there is significant potential to present information in ways that sway 
audience members to a specific conclusion. Since a few key players in every locale participate in 
the land use and distribution game, working with them will always be part of every planner’s job, 
and thus general public persuasion to justify observed outcomes in the built environment will 
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necessarily also be. There is immense power involved in presenting information fairly and 
accurately without appealing to emotive claims, and in using data to argue for a particular 
position, decision or set of actions. 
Rhetoric in my conception encompasses the practical art of turning deliberation and 
judgment into argument. Centered around the primary trait of planning – the communication of 
information through storytelling – the ethical use of rhetoric in my mind is the best possible 
means of persuasion towards redistribution of public benefits in the U.S. context. Often in 
contemporary media, rhetoric is positioned opposite to substantive analysis, usually in reference 
to political language. However, decisions about the allocation of public funds in communities 
(the traditional focus of planning activity) involve mediation between plural values, means and 
obligations. This is most often done from a position of institutional power, and as such requires 
those in planning positions to persuade the local public to agree with funding allocations and 
their outcomes. Rhetoric uses specific “topics”24 with the aim of communicating a trustworthy 
and expert character and healing the negative political emotions that result from pain at 
inequitable decisions. However, rhetorical practice in planning easily slides into deception and 
emotional manipulation, especially when one has access to “shadow planning” apparatuses and 
privileged technical information.  
An ethical use of rhetoric in planning practice involves understanding the links between 
trust and truth. The ability to discern factual and perspectival truths is only part of addressing 
irreducible differences in the interests of citizens. Democratic governance requires deliberation, 
persuasion, and compromise, all of which presume the trustworthiness of words. However, 
repeated trauma and disenfranchisement produces severe distrust, and shows us that truth is not 
just a correspondence between statement and reality, but also a relation between speaker and 
hearer. Inherently based in communication and therefore subjective interpretation, ethical 
rhetoric can direct attention using topoi, ethos (character), logos (argument) and pathos 
(emotion), with the end of establishing trust in those who sacrifice, that in the long run their 
interests will be addressed – an absolutely vital part of planning practice in order to preserve 
community-wide reciprocity when outcomes are unfair. Ethical rhetoric emphasizes accurate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Referencing Ciceronian “topoi” – the signs or pointers to proof that organize argument (analogous to indications a 
prospector uses to find gold). Often not universal, they are unique to and shared within specific communities, and 
vary by cultural norm and common beliefs.   
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articulation of information and comprehensibility, sincerity, and truth. Unethical rhetoric, on the 
other hand, can selectively persuade or disguise, depending on the user’s aims. 
 The process behind the implementation of the Bristol Place housing and land use goals 
relied on unethical rhetoric from the very beginning, and guided the conversations about what 
was possible in the public domain based on fundamentally structurally biased neoliberal market-
based growth machine coalition interests. 
 
Elegant Racism: Lovely, Monstrous 
These themes are all directly tied to the oppressive dominance of the entire system of 
costs and benefits, advantages and opportunities conferred on us as Americans by circumstances 
wholly out of our control at birth. The philosopher Barbara Applebaum in her study Being White, 
Being Good: White Complicity, White Moral Responsibility, and Social Justice Pedagogy argues 
that recognizing complicity is the necessary first step in beginning to challenge systemic racial 
oppression. She argues that not only is systemic racism often perpetuated by well-intentioned 
white people but also those who claim being morally good by virtue of religious affiliation or 
action. As James Baldwin once explained:  
…white people have been married to the lie of white supremacy too long; the effect on 
their personalities, their lives, their grasp of reality, has been as devastating as the lava 
which so memorably immobilized the citizens of Pompeii. They are unable to conceive 
that their vision of reality, which they want me to accept, is an insult to my history and a 
parody of theirs and an intolerable violation of myself (Baldwin, 2010). 
 
These new “elegant” structural and institutional forms of racism in housing and land use 
practices do not require a real estate agent “steering” black residents to specific neighborhoods, 
or telling black homeowners looking to move that they cannot buy a specific property. The 
embedded discriminatory arrangements of the law, economy, and real estate capital interests 
create an institutional web that no longer requires such overt statements, and in the process, 
renders overtly racist interactions unnecessary. The very fact of our current system’s immense 
and embedded complexity is a result of previous Jim Crow and Old Urban Renewal era blunt 
racist policy which has since experienced widespread social backlash and been manipulated into 
a more subtle series of economic and political tools. As Coates tragically and eloquently put it: 
The elegant racist knows how to injure non-white people while never summoning the 
specter of white guilt. Elegant racism requires plausible deniability. Elegant racism is 
invisible, supple, and enduring. It disguises itself in the national vocabulary, avoids 
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epithets and didacticism. Grace is the singular marker of elegant racism. Elegant racism 
lives at the border of white shame. Elegant racism was the poll tax. Elegant racism is 
voter-ID laws. If you sought to advantage one group of Americans and disadvantage 
another, you could scarcely choose a more graceful method than housing discrimination. 
Housing determines access to transportation, green spaces, decent schools, decent food, 
decent jobs, and decent services. Housing affects your chances of being robbed and shot 
as well as your chances of being stopped and frisked. And housing discrimination is as 
quiet as it is deadly. It can be pursued through violence and terrorism, but it doesn’t need 
it. Housing discrimination is hard to detect, hard to prove, and hard to prosecute. Even 
today most people believe that Chicago is the work of organic sorting, as opposed 
segregationist social engineering. Housing segregation is the weapon that mortally 
injures, but does not bruise. 
 
I am not an optimal person to speak to these issues. I am not a person of color, and I have 
never experienced those daily, lifelong oppressions. I likely have left out avenues of struggle and 
have not elucidated at all the multitude of micro oppressions experienced every day by people of 
color in the CU area community. I struggled in writing this to try and let the stories and 
experiences I uncovered speak for themselves, to be a real ally, and avoid the sentiments shared 
below by Jessie-Lane Metz: 
When a person of colour speaks to their own experiences of racism, they are speaking to 
a collective pain, and speaking truth to power. When a person with white skin privilege 
gives an anecdote about racism, whether their own or someone else’s, they are exposing 
more racialized people to this discrimination, and reasserting their own privilege. The 
narrative is no longer about Black victims of racist crimes and a deeply flawed justice 
system, it is about white feelings about Black bodies and their experiences…I don’t 
believe that when an individual holds power as part of a group over another marginalized 
group, that despite the hard work they do in an effort to be an ally, they are the ones best 
situated to quantify to what extent their racism impacts others, or whether or not they 
would be the better power holder when compared to others in any given situation. 
 
 Others will judge how successful I was at this endeavor, but what I did see, over and over 
again in the conversations between City Council, staff, and community members, were African-
American Champaign residents, speaking truth to power (as embodied by HACC commissioners, 
City Council and staff), these “truths” seen in community sentiments and historical knowledge 
were then supported and reified by white community residents who did not personally have a 
financial or political stake in the redevelopment, but spoke out in public forums and in my 
interviews regardless. And then fairly universally, local representatives framed the discussion of 
potential options to suit specific constituent interests, often constrained by financial habit, 
effectively disallowing even the idea of infill investment that might preserve historical 
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community character and make for a less violent state-led neighborhood improvement 
intervention. The end result of this is a neighborhood redevelopment plan that actively 
discourages residents from returning by stipulating developer-led rental screening requirements, 
and does not creating easy avenues for even the most vulnerable and arguably the most 
disenfranchised to return to the new neighborhood, which will have so many more amenities and 
City services than what has been there for the last two and a half decades. Given that this 
community is majority African-American, and that the City does not have protections in place 
against income-based discrimination, many community members believe that Champaign is in 
effect pushing these residents into neighboring Urbana.  
 As Reverend Barnes put it in a News Gazette article documenting the first community-
wide celebration of Martin Luther King day in the Champaign-Urbana area in 2004: “We do see 
progress. What I continue to see, however, is the great failure of white America to love people of 
color.” The University Laboratory High School counselor Sam Smith at the time commented:  
In New York, I grew up in an area with many ethnic influences, and I was quite 
comfortable in that. Living here, I sometimes think the country is more polarized around 
issues of race. There’s a lot more opportunity, a lot less overt racism. But structurally, 
where we live and where we interact with each other, we’re still so segregated. 
 
We have moved beyond the pre-Civil Rights era of racial politics defined by Jim Crow laws to a 
new period characterized by less overt institutionally enforced inequality, and more subtle forms 
of economic disenfranchisement of minority groups. But in the words of Peter Fitzpatrick, “it is 
difficult to establish the significance of racism in a society whose self-preservation denies that 
significance.” Achieving true equity requires real, actual hard work to address privilege, and 
policies and money directed at equalizing outcomes.  
Advanced global capitalism is a sinister, complex, and absolute system of domination 
whose very comprehensiveness allows very little room for expressions of anti-systemic dialogue. 
This system of capitalism began by placing restrictions on human relationships (exchange vs. use 
value), and with the invention of the “global open market” and particularly seen in financial 
market deregulation during the New Urban Renewal era, transcended national boundaries, 
making the systemic violence of market capitalism anonymous, no longer attributable to concrete 
individuals precisely as a result of its overwhelming scale and complexity. In this way, the 
normative myth of systemic objectivity can be perpetuated. Similar to advanced global 
capitalism, the complex financial machinations involved in increasingly private capital-
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dominated state services provision make it increasingly difficult to attribute to even a series of 
specific policies, but the case study presented here hopefully provides some insight into the way 
that these public-private partnerships can develop and are privileged in the public policy domain. 
And, if corrective market action is needed to mitigate the worst externalities of advanced 
global capitalism, and specifically growth machine coalition interests, the state retains the most 
power to enforce those corrections. The state institutionalized by government is often conceived 
of as the “monopoly on the legitimate use of violence” (a la Marx), and most conceive of this 
“institutional violence” in the combination of police and military power. In traditional liberal 
democratic social arrangements, the state is supposed to serve the needs of all groups equally. 
But that ideal state, as made up of members generally elected through democratic, consensus-
based pluralist processes, does not exist today. However, it is vitally important to not discount 
the power the state holds to be a corrective agent in the market system. That power of collective 
action is the only institutionalized force available today to mitigate some of the worst 
externalities propagated by capitalist economic exchange.  
The planning process here reflected a co-optation of state apparatuses by local political 
and economic interests to specifically devalue civil society’s role in its ability to direct public 
investment in the local built environment. A grassroots community-based land use planning 
intervention could have been incredibly beneficial at a bare minimum in informing the 
development trajectory, and possibly effective in preventing the forced relocation of over 70 
households and multiple community institutions. This intervention would most likely have 
looked like traditional representative organizing to enhance collective efficacy along the lines of 
classifying properties by their collective risk to the neighborhood according to both physical 
structure and vacancy status. This information could have been used by the community to 
propose reinvestment actions materially supported by the financial resources of the City but 
primarily effective as self-policing within the smaller community of desired outcomes along the 
lines of safety, increased property values for the entire area, and other common concerns related 
above. Putting together a comprehensive community-based alternative redevelopment proposal 
could have been incredibly powerful. This land use debate illustrates the limitations of state-led 
determinations of the public good, and grassroots coalitions’ potential power to change material 
outcomes. 
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Reform strategies must involve giving distressed neighborhoods a stronger voice in 
cities’ deliberations over policy, as neighborhoods with more capacity and market potential are 
better situated to take advantages of institutional representation. Local governments need to be 
held fully accountable for the displacement effects of their actions, and particularly held 
accountable for the alleged forthcoming benefits from exercising eminent domain specifically. 
This is precisely because the results of the exercise of the eminent domain authority can and has 
led to the leveling of large segments of communities, the loss of affordable housing, the loss of 
small businesses, and the destruction of neighborhood and community social infrastructure, and 
can precipitate the affects of gentrification that make communities unaffordable for existing 
working class and low-income individuals (Carpenter & Ross, 2009). 
And most importantly, as Americans, we need to become a more representative 
democracy, and we as equal citizens by law if not practice or social norms need to actually 
concern ourselves with the actions our governments take with our implicit non-votes and 
mandatory taxation laws. If our elected officials and the state systems no longer work to 
represent our collective desires and instead work to actively destroy spaces where locational 
residential collectives become or have the potential to become cohesive real community, creates 
barriers to participation, and outright lies about deal-making occurring without transparent public 
access, and if we find ourselves at the same historical junction repeatedly, we need to decide 
whether we consent to such manipulations, implicitly or explicitly. And by “we,” let me be clear, 
I mean white Americans. In this struggle for accumulation by dispossession on the part of a 
predominantly small number of male, white elites at the expense of predominantly non-male 
non-whites, recognizing our own culpability and responsibility in reifying extant arrangements 
will lead to helping to create a more equal system of opportunities for wealth creation, 
advantages in early life conferred by neighborhood location, and consequences for the use of 
blunt state power instruments that unequally affect life outcomes by race.  
We need to stop denying our collective culpability, our collective privilege at the expense 
of others, and begin to create spaces of dialogue that listen to the truths being spoken, and then 
take corrective action based directly upon those truths. I hope that I have documented the 
beginnings of these kinds of changes in Champaign, in City policies improving code compliance 
enforcement and trying to create spaces for WMBE contracting. But there is still much, much 
more that can and should be done, and “good faith efforts” are not enough to create true positive 
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change. Government entities need to begin strong-arming capital in the exact same way that 
capital has strong-armed government since the 1980s, but in order for this to happen, citizens 
need to carefully and thoughtfully re-engage with democratic apparatuses, holding systems made 
up of elected and appointed officials accountable for future community needs. 
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APPENDIX A: 
TABLES 
 
Table 1: List of community input meetings for the BPNP from 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 
Annual Action Plans 
 
Date Location Type of Meeting/Purpose
11/16/11 Human Kinetics Focus Group for Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan
12/20/11 Human Kinetics Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee
1/11/12 Shadow Wood Mobile Home Park
Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input:                        
Shadow Wood residents
1/17/12 Human Kinetics 
Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input:                
Businesses and Nonprofits in the Bristol Park 
Neighborhood
1/17/12 Human Kinetics Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input:                  Tenants in Garwood
1/23/12 Human Kinetics Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input:                        Tenants in Bristol
1/25/12 Human Kinetics Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input:                       Owners in Garwood
1/26/12 Human Kinetics Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee
1/30/12 Human Kinetics Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input:                        Owners in Bristol
2/18/12 Stratton School Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input:                                 All residents/owners in Bristol and Garwood
2/23/12 Human Kinetics Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee
3/8/12 Human Kinetics Joint NSAB & Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering 
3/29/12 Apostolic Faith Church Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee
8/14/12 Apostolic Faith Church Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting
8/23/12 Human Kinetics Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee
9/11/12 Apostolic Faith Church Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting
9/27/12 Human Kinetics Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee
10/9/12 Apostolic Faith Church Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting
10/25/12 Human Kinetics Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee
11/6/12 Apostolic Faith Church Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting
11/29/12 Human Kinetics Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee
12/11/12 Apostolic Faith Church Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting
1/8/13 Apostolic Faith Church Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting
1/24/13 Human Kinetics Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee
2/12/13 Apostolic Faith Church Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting
2/28/13 Human Kinetics Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee
3/12/13 Apostolic Faith Church Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting
3/28/13 Human Kinetics Bristol Park - LEED-ND Presentation
4/9/13 Apostolic Faith Church Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting - draft Annual Action Plan
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Table 2: City of Champaign Housing Program Assistance 
 
	  
 
 
FY10%11 FY11%12 FY12%13 FY13%14 FY14%15
$835,895 $754,153 $702,739 $645,114 $688,251
$337,438 $433,757 $295,612 $273,901 $267,632
$11,302 $11,302 $5,191 $0 $850
$1,184,635 $1,199,212 $1,003,542 $919,015 $956,733
Acquisition/Rehabilitation@Program
$241,360 $415,251 $304,015
* **
Full@Home@Improvement@Program
$162,500
No0
additional0
allocations
No0
additional0
allocations
* **
Credit@Counseling@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
(Central0IL0Debt0Mgmt0&0Credit0Education) $2,000 $2,000 $20,000 $20,000 $10,000
Emergency@Repair@Program $152,500 $122,000 $122,000 $122,000 $125,000
Senior@Home@Repair@Program@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
(Senior0Services0of0Champaign0County0&00
Regional0Planning0Commission) $60,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000
Accessory@Structure@Demolition $5,000 $2,500 $5,000 $5,000 $10,000
$623,360 $571,751 $481,015 $238,300 $234,201
Percentage0of0total0programs0expenditures: 54.6% 67.2% 63.3% 35.5% 35.0%
Investment(Property(
Assistance Rental@Rehabilitation@Program $120,000
No0
additional0
allocations
No0
additional0
allocations
* **
$120,000 $0 $0 $61,300 $59,201
Percentage0of0total0programs0expenditures: 10.5% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 8.9%
Total0City0of0Champaign0HOME0Funds
City@of@Champaign@Neighborhood@and@Housing@Programs@Funding@(FY2010%2015)
TOTAL@City@of@Champaign@Federal@CDBG@+@HOME@Assistance:
SUBTOTAL0Owner\Occupied0Assistance:
Owner4Occupied(
Assistance
Total0City0of0Champaign0CDBG0Funds
SUBTOTAL0Investment0Property00Assistance:
Total0City0of0Champaign0HOME0Administration
Renter4Occupied(
Assistance Tenant@Based@Rental@Assistance $97,500 $90,000 $90,000 $90,000 $90,000
$97,500 $90,000 $90,000 $90,000 $90,000
Percentage0of0total0programs0expenditures: 8.5% 10.6% 11.8% 13.4% 13.5%
CommUnity@Matters@Program $125,384 $104,688 $105,411 $145,767 $152,238
Home@Accessibility@Retrofit@Program $60,000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000
Neighborhood@Clean%up@Program $22,000 $25,000 $25,000 $15,000 $15,000
Ecological@Construction@Laboratory@ $14,000 Not0offered Not0offered Not0offered
Lot@Acquisition/Clearance@Program $70,560
No0
additional0
allocations
No0
additional0
allocations
* **
Contractor@Incentives@for@Lead@Training@and@
Certification $9,000 $9,000 $9,000 $9,000 $9,000
$300,944 $188,688 $189,411 $281,067 $285,439
Percentage0of0total0programs0expenditures: 26.4% 22.2% 24.9% 41.9% 42.7%
$1,141,804 $850,439 $760,426 $670,668 $668,840
96.4% 70.9% 75.8% 73.0% 69.9%
**Neighborhood0Revitalization0was0budgeted0$177,6020on0HOME0funding0in0the02014\20150AAP
*0In0the02013\20140AAP,0all0of0these0programs0were0bundled0under0"Neighborhood0Revitalization"0and0the0amount0listed0to0fund0all0of0
them0was0$183,901.
Other(Community(
Programs
SUBTOTAL0Other0Community0Programs:
TOTAL@All@Programs@Above:
***To0calculate0subtotals0for0each0category0bundled0into0NR,0$183,901/3=$61,3000was0added0as0a0proxy0calculation0for02013\2014,0and0
$177,602/3=$59,2010was0added0for02014\2015
SUBTOTAL0Renter\Occupied0Assistance:
Housing@and@Community@Programs@Listed@Above@
Proportion@of@Champaign's@Federal@CDBG@+@HOME@
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Table 3: Housing Cost Burden in the City of Champaign (2008-2013) 
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Table 4: Distribution of Champaign Police Officers by District (1992-2013) 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
City%of%Champaign%Police%Data:%Officers%by%District%(1992<2013)
Lieu. Ser. P.O. K+9- Lieu. Ser. P.O. K+9- Lieu. Ser. P.O. K+9- Lieu. Ser. P.O. K+9-
1992 + 1 11 + + + + + + + + + + + + +
1993 + 1 8 + + + + + + + + + + + + +
1994 + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + + + +
1995 + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + + + +
1996 + 1 6 + + + + + + 1 6 + + 1 6 +
1997 + 1 6 + + + + + + 1 6 + + 1 6 +
1998 + 1 6 + + + + + + 1 6 + + 1 8 +
1999 + 1 8 + + + + + + 1 8 + + 2 10 1
2000 + 1 8 + + + + + + 1 8 + + 2 10 1
2001 + 3 21 1 + + + + + 3 18 + + 6 22 +
2002 1 3 23 + + + + + + 3 19 + + 6 23 +
2003 1 3 23 1 + + + + + 3 19 + + 6 21 +
2004 1 3 23 1 + + + + + 3 19 + + 6 25 +
1/1/2005-+-6/30/2006 1 4 22 1 + + + + + 3 18 + + 7 24 1
7/1/2006-+-6/30/2007 1 4 20 1 + 5 16 1 + 3 18 + + 3 10 1
6/1/2007-+-6/30/2008 1 4 19 2 + 3 19 + + 3 12 +
6/1/2008-+-6/30/2009 1 4 21 2 + + + + + 3 18 + + 3 12 +
7/1/2009-+-6/30/2010 1 4 20 1 + + + + + 3 18 + + 3 13 +
2011 1 4 19 2 1 3 14 + + 3 18 + + 3 15 +
2012 1 4 18 1 1 3 15 + + 3 17 + + 4 15 +
2013 1 4 18 1 1 3 16 + + 3 18 + + 4 15 +
North Northwest%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
(Created%in%2006)
Southwest%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
(West%until%2006)
South
[36]
Source:-City-of-Champaign-Police-Annual-Reports
Lieu.-=-Lieutenants;-Ser.-=-Sergeants;-P.O.-=-Patrol-Officers;-K+9-=-K+9-Officers
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Table 5: Champaign Police Calls for Service by Beat (1997-2013) 	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Year
Annual)
Total:
North
Northwest)
(Created)in)
2006)
South
Southwest)
(West)until)
2006)
1997 76,651 ' ' ' '
1998 78,506 ' ' ' '
1999 73,905 ' ' ' '
2000 89,358 ' ' ' '
2001 87,758 23,000 ' 18,700 46,058
2002 86,891 35,700 ' 24,000 27,191
2003 62,026 ' ' 22,000 '
2004 64,552 33,544 ' 25,000 6,008
1/1/2005.'.6/30/2006 65,996 ' ' 21,450 '
7/1/2006.'.6/30/2007 63,764 20,000 ' 20,000 '
6/1/2007.'.6/30/2008 64,672 20,393 7,479 22,000 14,800
6/1/2008.'.6/30/2009 63,067 25,407 3,160 22,000 12,500
7/1/2009.'.6/30/2010 60,752 18,740 14,012 15,000 13,000
2011 71,709 18,915 14,495 26,956 17,000
2012 71,710 20,604 14,924 22,022 16,000
2013 74,667 20,342 16,310 24,437 15,500
Source:.City.of.Champaign.Police.Annual.Reports
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Table 6: Traffic Stop Outcomes by Race (FY2006-2007; FY2008-2010) 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Outcome(of(Traffic(Stops(by(Race:(FY2006:2007;(FY2008:2010
Citation Written(
Warning
Citation Written(
Warning
Citation Written(
Warning
Citation Written(
Warning
African:American 65.1% 34.9% 62.5% 37.5% 56.8% 43.2% ,8.3% 8.3%
Asian 67.1% 32.9% 72.7% 27.3% 63.8% 36.2% ,3.2% 3.2%
Caucasian 64.9% 35.1% 75.3% 24.7% 64.4% 35.6% ,0.5% 0.5%
Hispanic 75.9% 24.1% 78.1% 21.9% 72.2% 27.8% ,3.7% 3.7%
Native(American 63.2% 36.8% 70.8% 29.2% 76.5% 23.5% 13.3% ,13.3%
Source:5Champaign5Police5Report5IDOT5Traffic5Stop5Reporting5Data
%(Change(FY06(:(
FY09
7/1/2009(:(
6/30/2010
6/1/2008(:(
6/30/2009
7/1/2006(:(
6/30/2007
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Table 7: Summary Table of Property Values and City Revenue Capture in Bristol Place  
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Table 8: Owner-Occupied Property Assessment and Sale History 
Address Street Year Sold 
Sale 
Price 
Equalized 
Assessed 
Value 
(2013 pay 
2014) 
Market 
Value 
(from 
assessed 
value)  
City 
Property 
Tax 
Revenue 
(based on 
2014 rate of 
1.3152%) 
212 E Bradley 
1990 $13,000 
$12,060 $36,180 $158.61 
1979 $7,200 
1201 N Clock - - $9,920 $29,760 $391.40 
1204 N Clock 2002 $31,000 $15,260 $45,780 $200.70 
1306 N Clock - - $18,700 $56,100 $245.94 
1311 N Clock 
2006 $40,500 
$4,020 $12,060 $52.87 
2005 $18,000 
2005 $17,814 
1980 $23,500 
1979 $9,660 
108 E Garwood - - $12,640 $37,920 $166.24 
1406 N Market - - $14,620 $43,860 $192.28 
117 E Roper 1979 $26,500 $13,580 $40,740 $178.60 
119 E Roper 
2011 $27,500 
$8,790 $26,370 $115.61 
2007 $55,000 
2006 $62,873 
2003 $82,426 
1991 $1,000 
202 E Roper 
2005 $45,000 
$13,580 $40,740 $178.60 
2005 $42,000 
206 E Roper - - $14,620 $43,860 $192.28 
211 E Roper 1981 $21,000 $20,620 $61,860 $271.19 
104 E Bellefontaine 1972 $10,000 $18,170 $54,510 $238.97 
106 E Bellefontaine - - $10,660 $31,980 $140.20 
107 E Bellefontaine 1986 $35,000 $1,530 $4,590 $20.12 
109 E Bellefontaine 
1995 - 
$13,070 $39,210 $171.90 
1994 $15,000 
204 E Bellefontaine 
1989 $24,000 
$12,680 $38,040 $166.77 
1988 $20,000 
206 E Bellefontaine 1983 $15,650 $14,100 $42,300 $185.44 
208 E Bellefontaine 
2004 $89,137 
$30,240 $90,720 $397.72 
1968 $9,500 
212 E Bellefontaine - - $12,400 $37,200 $163.08 
TOTAL: $271,260 $813,780 $3,828.55 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Source: Champaign County Assessor's Office Records 
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APPENDIX B 
CHAPTER 3 FIGURES 	  
Appendix B.1: Interview Consent Forms for current landlords and other stakeholders 
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!
Forced!Out?!Measuring!the!Household!Impacts!of!
Urban!Renewal=Based!Forced!Displacement!in!the!
Bristol!Place!Neighborhood!in!Champaign,!IL!
Consent'for'Participation'in'Research'(Current'
landlords'and'other'stakeholders)!! !
Version!2.0!(7/18/2014)! ! Page!1!of!4!
Why$am$I$being$asked?!You!are!being!asked!to!take!part!in!a!research!study!looking!at!what!happens!to!households!currently!or!recently!facing!a!residential!move!because!of!the!City!of!Champaign’s!Bristol!Place!redevelopment!plan.!!The!researchers!would!like!to!conduct!a!short!interview!with!you!to!learn!more!about!your!experience.!During!the!interview,!you!will!be!asked!how!long!you!have!had!a!stake!in!the!Bristol!Place!area,!what!your!perceptions!are!about!the!local!community,!and!your!thoughts!and!opinions!about!the!Bristol!Place!redevelopment!plan.!!The!research!is!being!conducted!by!a!University!of!Illinois!at!UrbanaNChampaign!faculty!member!Dr.!Andrew!Greenlee!with!the!help!of!his!research!assistant!Natalie!Prochaska.!Your!participation!is!completely!your!own!choice.!You!may!choose!not!to!answer!any!questions!that!we!ask,!and!may!stop!the!interview!at!any!time.!If!you!do!participate,!you!will!help!us!learn!more!about!how!individuals!and!households!respond!to!moves!that!are!not!a!result!of!their!own!choice,!and!may!help!structure!policies!to!better!support!those!experiencing!similar!forced!moves!in!the!future.!The!results!of!this!study!are!likely!to!be!shared!in!academic!journal!articles,!and!with!your!local!community!in!the!form!of!recordings!made!available!on!a!public!website!(but!only!with!your!permission).!
Why$is$this$research$being$done?!We!want!to!have!conversations!with!a!broad!range!of!people!about!their!experiences!with!the!Bristol!Park!redevelopment!process.!!Specifically,!we!want!to!have!conversations!with!property!owners!and!other!stakeholders!to!understand!how!the!current!redevelopment!plan!will!affect!personal!and!professional!outcomes.!
What$is$the$purpose$of$this$research?$This!research!is!being!done!to!try!and!understand!the!shortNand!longNterm!results!of!this!kind!of!redevelopment!project!for!both!individual!people!and!the!communities!they!move!to!and!from.!
What$procedures$are$involved?$If!you!agree!to!participate!in!this!research,!we!would!ask!that!you!do!the!following!things:!1.!Fill!out!a!short!(10Nminute)!written!demographic!survey!(answer!questions!about!your!age,!gender,!marital!status,!education,!employment,!etc.).!2.!Participate!in!a!45Nminute!interview!where!a!researcher!will!ask!you!questions!about!your!experiences!and!opinions!about!the!Bristol!Place!redevelopment!plan!and!your!involvement!in!the!neighborhood!prior.!
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Appendix B.1 cont’d 
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!
Forced!Out?!Measuring!the!Household!Impacts!of!
Urban!Renewal=Based!Forced!Displacement!in!the!
Bristol!Place!Neighborhood!in!Champaign,!IL!
Consent'for'Participation'in'Research'(Current'
landlords'and'other'stakeholders)!! !
Version!2.0!(7/18/2014)! ! Page!2!of!4!
3.!Preferably!be!willing!to!have!your!interview!audio!recorded!and!photographed;!but!the!interviewer!will!only!take!notes!if!you!are!uncomfortable!with!your!voice!being!recorded!or!your!picture!being!taken.!!
What$are$the$potential$risks$and$discomforts?$Are$there$any$benefits$to$taking$part$in$this$
research?$No!risks!or!discomforts!come!with!this!research!beyond!the!risks!that!exist!in!daily!life,!although!we!would!like!to!make!an!audio!recording!of!your!interview!and!take!photographs!of!you.!We!would!like!to!ask!you!potentially!sensitive!questions!about!your!job!status,!income,!and!your!professional!history,!but!you!may!choose!not!to!answer!any!questions!that!we!ask,!and!may!stop!the!interview!at!any!time.!All!audio!transcripts!from!the!interviews!will!remain!secure!and!confidential,!unless!you!tell!us!it!is!okay!to!identify!you!and/or!your!responses.!!This!research!will!benefit!academic!researchers!and!policymakers.!!
Who$should$I$contact$if$I$have$questions?$Please!contact!either!Dr.!Greenlee!or!his!assistant!Natalie!Prochaska!with!any!questions!or!concerns!about!the!research.!You!may!also!call!Dr.!Greenlee!or!Natalie!if!you!feel!you!have!been!injured!or!harmed!by!this!research.!!Dr.!Andrew!Greenlee!!
!
Natalie!Prochaska!
!
agreen4@illinois.edu!! prochask@illinois.edu!!(217)!333N9069!! (217)!419N6868!If!you!have!any!questions!about!your!rights!as!a!participant!in!this!study!or!any!concerns!or!complaints,!please!contact!the!University!of!Illinois!Institutional!Review!Board!at!(217)!333N2670!(collect!calls!with!be!accepted!if!you!identify!yourself!as!a!research!participant)!or!via!email!at!irb@illinois.edu.!The!Institutional!Review!Board!is!the!office!at!the!University!of!Illinois!responsible!for!protecting!the!rights!of!human!subjects!involved!in!studies!conducted!by!University!of!Illinois!researchers.!!
$
$
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!
!
Forced!Out?!Measuring!the!Household!Impacts!of!
Urban!Renewal=Based!Forced!Displacement!in!the!
Bristol!Place!Neighborhood!in!Champaign,!IL!
Consent'for'Participation'in'Research'(Current'
landlords'and'other'stakeholders)!! !
Version!2.0!(7/18/2014)! ! Page!3!of!4!
Signature$of$Subject!I!have!read!(or!someone!has!read!to!me)!the!above!information.!I!have!been!given!an!opportunity!to!ask!questions!and!my!questions!have!been!answered!to!my!satisfaction.!I!agree!to!participate!in!this!research.!I!understand!that!by!signing!below,!the!audio!recording!of!this!interview!may!not!be!confidential!unless!I!request!that!it!be!so.!I!have!been!given!a!copy!of!this!form.!!______!Yes! ______!No! I!am!at!least!18!years!of!age!or!older!and!do!not!have!a!guardian!______!Yes! ______!No! I!agree!to!participate!in!this!research!process!______!Yes! ______!No! The!researcher!may!audio!tape!my!interview!______!Yes! ______!No! The!researcher!may!take!pictures!of!me!during!my!interview!!
If!you!agree!to!participate!in!this!research!and!agree!to!have!your!interview!audio!recorded,!please!
select!one!of!the!following!options!regarding!the!use!of!your!interview!audio!recording:!______!Yes! ______!No! The!researcher!may!use!my!responses!in!educational!or!public!settings!–!this!may!include!playing!or!sharing!via!the!internet*!audio!recordings!and/or!pictures!(based!upon!my!consent!above)!from!my!interview!without!my!further!approval!or!review!of!the!edited!audio.!______!Yes! ______!No! The!researcher!may!use!my!responses!in!education!or!public!settings!–!this!may!include!playing!or!sharing!via!the!internet*!audio!recordings!and/or!pictures!from!my!interview!(based!upon!my!consent!above)!only!after!I!have!
reviewed!the!edited!audio!and!provided!written!approval.!*audio!will!be!hosted!by!the!researcher’s!website!
If!you!agree!to!participate!in!this!research!and!agree!to!have!your!interview!audio!recorded,!please!
select!one!of!the!following!options!regarding!the!use!of!your!interview!audio!recording:!______!Yes! ______!No! The!research!team!may!identify!me!by!name!in!educational!or!public!settings!!
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!
Forced!Out?!Measuring!the!Household!Impacts!of!
Urban!Renewal=Based!Forced!Displacement!in!the!
Bristol!Place!Neighborhood!in!Champaign,!IL!
Consent'for'Participation'in'Research'(Current'
landlords'and'other'stakeholders)!! !
Version!2.0!(7/18/2014)! ! Page!4!of!4!
Signature:!___________________________________________! ! Date:!_____________________!!Name:!______________________________________________!!Signature!of!Researcher:!________________________________!!
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Appendix B.2: Interview Consent Forms for Bristol Place Residents 
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!
Forced!Out?!Measuring!the!Household!Impacts!of!
Urban!Renewal=Based!Forced!Displacement!in!the!
Bristol!Place!Neighborhood!in!Champaign,!IL!
!
! Consent'for'Participation'in'Research'(Current'
Residents)'
! !
Version!2.0!(7/18/2014)! ! Page!1!of!3!
Why$am$I$being$asked?!
You!are!being!asked!to!take!part!in!a!research!study!looking!at!what!happens!to!households!currently!or!
recently!facing!a!residential!move!because!of!the!City!of!Champaign’s!Bristol!Place!redevelopment!plan.!!
The!researchers!would!like!to!conduct!a!short!interview!with!you!to!learn!more!about!your!experience.!
During!the!interview,!you!will!be!asked!how!long!you!have!lived!in!the!Bristol!Place!area,!when!you!
received!notice!that!you!would!be!required!to!move,!what!you!like!and!dislike!about!your!local!
community,!and!your!thoughts!and!opinions!about!your!moving!experience!as!a!result!of!the!Bristol!
Place!redevelopment!plan.!!
The!research!is!being!conducted!by!a!University!of!Illinois!at!Urbana=Champaign!faculty!member!Dr.!
Andrew!Greenlee!with!the!help!of!his!research!assistant!Natalie!Prochaska.!Your!participation!is!
completely!your!own!choice.!You!may!choose!not!to!answer!any!questions!that!we!ask,!and!may!stop!
the!interview!at!any!time.!If!you!do!participate,!you!will!help!us!learn!more!about!how!individuals!and!
households!respond!to!moves!that!are!not!a!result!of!their!own!choice,!and!may!help!structure!policies!
to!better!support!those!experiencing!similar!forced!moves!in!the!future.!The!results!of!this!study!are!
likely!to!be!shared!in!academic!journal!articles,!and!with!your!local!community!in!the!form!of!recordings!
made!available!on!a!public!website!(but!only!with!your!permission).!
Why$is$this$research$being$done?!
We!want!to!have!conversations!with!a!broad!range!of!people!about!their!experiences!with!the!Bristol!
Park!redevelopment!process.!!Specifically,!we!want!to!have!conversations!with!homeowners!and!renters!
to!understand!how!moving!from!one!home!to!another!changes!or!has!changed!their!lives.!
What$is$the$purpose$of$this$research?$
This!research!is!being!done!to!try!and!understand!the!short=and!long=term!results!of!this!kind!of!
redevelopment!project!for!both!individual!people!and!the!communities!they!move!to!and!from.!
What$procedures$are$involved?$
If!you!agree!to!participate!in!this!research,!we!would!ask!that!you!do!the!following!things:!
1.!Fill!out!a!short!(10=minute)!written!demographic!survey!(answer!questions!about!your!age,!gender,!
marital!status,!education,!employment,!etc.).!
2.!Participate!in!a!45=minute!interview!where!a!researcher!will!ask!you!questions!about!your!
experiences!and!opinions!about!being!forced!to!move.!
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!
!
Forced!Out?!Measuring!the!Household!Impacts!of!
Urban!Renewal=Based!Forced!Displacement!in!the!
Bristol!Place!Neighborhood!in!Champaign,!IL!
!
! Consent'for'Participation'in'Research'(Current'
Residents)'
! !
Version!2.0!(7/18/2014)! ! Page!2!of!3!
3.!Preferably!be!willing!to!have!your!interview!audio!recorded!and!photographed;!but!the!interviewer!
will!only!take!notes!if!you!are!uncomfortable!with!your!voice!being!recorded!or!your!picture!being!
taken.!!
What$are$the$potential$risks$and$discomforts?$Are$there$any$benefits$to$taking$part$in$this$research?$
No!risks!or!discomforts!come!with!this!research!beyond!the!risks!that!exist!in!daily!life,!although!we!
would!like!to!make!an!audio!recording!of!your!interview!and!take!photographs!of!you.!We!would!like!to!
ask!you!potentially!sensitive!questions!about!your!job!status,!income,!and!your!residential!history,!but!
you!may!choose!not!to!answer!any!questions!that!we!ask,!and!may!stop!the!interview!at!any!time.!All!
audio!transcripts!from!the!interviews!will!remain!secure!and!confidential,!unless!you!tell!us!it!is!okay!to!
identify!you!and/or!your!responses.!!
This!research!will!benefit!academic!researchers!and!policymakers,!and!you!will!be!compensated!for!your!
time!with!a!$20!Visa!gift!card!if!you!complete!both!the!interview!and!demographic!survey.!!
Who$should$I$contact$if$I$have$questions?$
Please!contact!either!Dr.!Greenlee!or!his!assistant!Natalie!Prochaska!with!any!questions!or!concerns!
about!the!research.!You!may!also!call!Dr.!Greenlee!or!Natalie!if!you!feel!you!have!been!injured!or!
harmed!by!this!research.!!
Dr.!Andrew!Greenlee!
!
!
Natalie!Prochaska!
!
agreen4@illinois.edu!
!
prochask@illinois.edu!
!
(217)!333=9069!
!
(217)!419=6868!
If!you!have!any!questions!about!your!rights!as!a!participant!in!this!study!or!any!concerns!or!complaints,!
please!contact!the!University!of!Illinois!Institutional!Review!Board!at!(217)!333=2670!(collect!calls!with!
be!accepted!if!you!identify!yourself!as!a!research!participant)!or!via!email!at!irb@illinois.edu.!The!
Institutional!Review!Board!is!the!office!at!the!University!of!Illinois!responsible!for!protecting!the!rights!of!
human!subjects!involved!in!studies!conducted!by!University!of!Illinois!researchers.!!
$
$
$
$
	   227 
Appendix B.2, cont’d 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
!
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!
! Consent'for'Participation'in'Research'(Current'
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Signature$of$Subject!
I!have!read!(or!someone!has!read!to!me)!the!above!information.!I!have!been!given!an!opportunity!to!ask!
questions!and!my!questions!have!been!answered!to!my!satisfaction.!I!agree!to!participate!in!this!
research.!I!understand!that!by!signing!below,!the!audio!recording!of!this!interview!may!not!be!
confidential!unless!I!request!that!it!be!so.!I!have!been!given!a!copy!of!this!form.!!
______!Yes! ______!No! I!am!at!least!18!years!of!age!or!older!and!do!not!have!a!
guardian!
______!Yes! ______!No! I!agree!to!participate!in!this!research!process!
______!Yes! ______!No! The!researcher!may!audio!tape!my!interview!
______!Yes! ______!No! The!researcher!may!take!pictures!of!me!during!my!interview!
!
If!you!agree!to!participate!in!this!research!and!agree!to!have!your!interview!audio!recorded,!please!select!
one!of!the!following!options!regarding!the!use!of!your!interview!audio!recording:!
______!Yes! ______!No! The!researcher!may!use!my!responses!in!educational!or!public!
settings!–!this!may!include!playing!or!sharing!via!the!internet*!
audio!recordings!and/or!pictures!(based!upon!my!consent!
above)!from!my!interview!without!my!further!approval!or!
review!of!the!edited!audio.!
______!Yes! ______!No! The!researcher!may!use!my!responses!in!education!or!public!
settings!–!this!may!include!playing!or!sharing!via!the!internet*!
audio!recordings!and/or!pictures!from!my!interview!(based!
upon!my!consent!above)!only!after!I!have!reviewed!the!edited!
audio!and!provided!written!approval.!
*audio!will!be!hosted!by!the!researcher’s!website!
If!you!agree!to!participate!in!this!research!and!agree!to!have!your!interview!audio!recorded,!please!select!
one!of!the!following!options!regarding!the!use!of!your!interview!audio!recording:!
______!Yes! ______!No! The!research!team!may!identify!me!by!name!in!educational!or!
public!settings!
!
Signature:!___________________________________________! ! Date:!_____________________!
Name:!______________________________________________!
!
Signature!of!Researcher:!________________________________!
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APPENDIX C 
CHAPTER 4 FIGURES 
 
Appendix C.1: Champaign-Urbana Shack Images 
Taken by Kenneth Stratton and Romeo Green, Jr., from Doris K. Wylie Hoskins Archive for 
Cultural Diversity, “Drawer 6: Healthcare and Housing” housed in the Champaign County 
Forest Preserve District’s Museum of the Grand Prairie in Mahomet, IL 
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Appendix C.1, cont’d	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Appendix C.2: Taylor Thomas, of Champaign, IL Portrait Photo 
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Appendix C.3: Maps of Old Urban Renewal Area in Champaign, IL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   234 
 
 
Appendix C.3, cont’d 
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Appendix C.3, cont’d 
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Appendix C.3, cont’d 
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Appendix C.4: Old Urban Renewal in Champaign, IL Citizens Advisory Committee Membership 
List 
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APPENDIX D 
CHAPTER 5 FIGURES 
 
Appendix D.1: City of Champaign Governmental Organizational Structure Matrix 
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Appendix D.2: Map of Champaign City Council Districts 
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Appendix D.3: Neighborhood Wellness Classification Categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HEALTHY
Basic&City&services&are&adequate&to&maintain&a&high&quality&of&life.&Housing&and&infrastructure&
conditions&are&sound,&property&ownership&is&stable&and&investments&are&steady.&No&significant&
threats&to&public&safety&and&citizens&participate&actively&in&neighborhood&or&community&issues.&
Residents&have&the&ability&to&maintain&their&neighborhood&in&a&healthy&state,&with&little&or&no&need&
for&outside&assistance.
CONSERVATION
City&attention&may&be&needed&in&some&aspects&to&maintain&neighborhood&stability&and&prevent&
future&deterioration.&May&experience&some&slight&increases&in&City&maintenance&and&service&needs,&
which&should&be&expected&as&a&normal&result&of&neighborhood&aging.&Housing&and&infrastructure&
conditions&are&essentially&sound,&with&minor&deterioration&limited&to&spot&locations.&Residents&are&
likely&to&reinvest&in&their&neighborhood&and&participate&actively&in&issues&that&affect&them.
PRESERVATION
Requires&an&increased&level&of&City&involvement&to&maintain&and/or&restore&a&high&quality&of&life.&
Deteriorated&infrastructure&cannot&be&addressed&through&regular&City&maintenance&programs&and&
the&housing&stock&may&need&signifi&cant&rehabilitation.&May&also&experience&increased&incidents&of&
crime&or&other&public&safety&problems.&Population&trends&may&include&a&decline&in&ownerFoccupancy&
and&decreasing&household&incomes.&This&could&make&it&more&difficult&for&residents&to&invest&in&their&
neighborhood&or&to&be&active&in&problemFsolving&efforts.
RESTORATION
A&Restoration&neighborhood&requires&a&signifi&cant&level&of&City&intervention&to&address&
neighborhood&problems&and&restore&a&positive&quality&of&life.&In&many&cases,&basic&services
cannot&keep&up&with&needs,&and&parts&of&the&area&require&major&reinvestment&to&prevent&further
decline.&Property&maintenance&is&a&significant&problem&and&major&infrastructure&improvements&may
be&necessary.&Levels&of&private&reinvestment&are&low,&and&citizens&may&face&significant&obstacles
when&trying&to&address&neighborhood&problems&on&their&own.
Neighborhood7Analysis7Report7Classification7System
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Appendix D.4: Maps Comparing Planning Area Classifications: 1990, 2006, 2008 
 
1990 & 2006: 
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Appendix D.4, cont’d 
2008: 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 - 2010 Neighborhood Wellness Action Plan3
Introduction
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Appendix D.5: Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Conceptual Future Land Use Map 
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Appendix D.6: Comment Card Summary Responses 
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D.7: Bristol Place Master Plan Proposed Land Use Plan 
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Appendix D.8: Figure of Champaign Housing and Community Programs Funding by Type, 
FY2010 - FY2015 (corresponding to Table 3 in Appendix A) 
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Appendix D.9: Figure of Renting Households Spending More then 30% of Income on Housing, 
by Household Income Category (2007-2013) 
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Appendix D.10: Figure of Owner-Occupied Households Spending More then 30% of Income on 
Housing, by Household Income Category (2007-2013) 
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Appendix D.11: Figure Comparing Cost Burden of Renters to Owners in Champaign (2007-
2013) 
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Appendix D.12: Bristol Park Steering Committee Survey Results (from survey conducted March 
10-12, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3   
Table 1: Length of Residence in Current Residence 
Renters Owners Total
N % N % N %
Less than 1 year 8 29% 1 7% 9 21%
1-2 years 5 18% 0 0% 5 12%
2-5 years 9 32% 0 0% 9 21%
5-10 years 4 14% 4 27% 8 19%
> 10 years 2 7% 10 67% 12 28%
Total 28 100% 15 100% 43 100%
Length of Residence
 
 
Table 2: Tenure by Bedrooms 
Renters Owners Total
N % N % N %
Studio 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
1 Bedroom 0 0% 2 13% 2 5%
2 Bedrooms 15 54% 5 33% 20 47%
3 Bedrooms 8 29% 7 47% 15 35%
4+ Bedrooms 5 18% 1 7% 6 14%
Total 28 100% 15 100% 43 100%
Bedrooms
 
 
Table 3: Head of Household Age by Tenure 
Renters Owners Total
N % N % N %
20-30 7 25.0% 1 6.7% 8 18.6%
30-40 3 10.7% 1 6.7% 4 9.3%
40-50 1 3.6% 4 26.7% 5 11.6%
50-60 6 21.4% 2 13.3% 8 18.6%
60-70 2 7.1% 2 13.3% 4 9.3%
70-80 3 10.7% 1 6.7% 4 9.3%
> 80 1 3.6% 3 20.0% 4 9.3%
No Response 5 17.9% 1 6.7% 6 14.0%
Total 28 100.0% 15 100.0% 43 100.0%
Age
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Table 4: Households by Number of Adults Present 
Renters Owners Total
N % N % N %
1 12 43% 5 33% 17 40%
2 9 32% 6 40% 15 35%
> 2 6 21% 4 27% 10 23%
No Response 1 4% 0 0% 1 2%
Total 28 100% 15 100% 43 100%
Adults
 
 
Table 5: Households by Number of Children Present 
Renters Owners Total
N % N % N %
0 6 21% 8 53% 14 33%
1 6 21% 0 0% 6 14%
2 6 21% 1 7% 7 16%
> 2 7 25% 2 13% 9 21%
No Response 3 11% 4 27% 7 16%
Total 28 100% 15 100% 43 100%
Children
 
 
Table 6: Reported Monthly Household Income 
Renters Owners Total
N % N % N %
< $2,000 17 61% 4 27% 21 49%
$2,000 - $3,000 3 11% 1 7% 4 9%
$3,000 - $4,000 2 7% 1 7% 3 7%
> $4,000 1 4% 1 7% 2 5%
No Response 5 18% 8 53% 13 30%
Total 28 100% 15 100% 43 100%
Monthly Income
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Table 7: Households with Income Below 80 Percent of Area Median Income 
Household Size MFI Standard HHs Below HH Total Percent
1 $38,100 5 5 100%
2 $43,550 6 7 86%
3 $49,000 6 7 86%
4 $54,400 3 3 100%
5 $58,800 4 4 100%
6 $63,150 1 1 100%
7 $67,500 1 1 100%
8 $71,850 1 1 100%
Total 27 29 93%
Note: Responses to the income question were not recorded 
for 14 households.  
Table 8: Summary of Employment and Benefits 
Characteristic Renters Owners Total
Employed Adults 23 7 30
Retired Adults 4 13 17
Adults Receiving Social Security Benefits 6 10 16
Adults Receiving Federal Disability Benefits 11 2 13
Adults Receiving a Pension Disbursement 2 3 5
Adults Receiving Unemployment Compensation 1 0 1  
 
Table 9: Public Benefits Received 
Public Benefit Renters Owners Total
Food Stamps 10 5 15
TANF 3 0 3
WIC 1 0 1
Other 1 0 1  
 
Table 10: Households with Children by Number of Children in the Champaign School System 
Renters Owners Total
N % N % N %
1 3 16% 0 0% 3 14%
2 4 21% 1 33% 5 23%
> 2 4 21% 2 67% 6 27%
No Response 8 42% 0 0% 8 36%
Total 19 100% 3 100% 22 100%
Number
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 6   
Table 11: Schools Currently Attended by Bristol Place Children 
Elementary
Busey 3
Garden Hills 5
South Side 4
Middle
Edison 7
Jefferson 1
High School
Academic Academy 1
Alternative High School 1
Central High 9
Other
Other 3
Total 34  
Housing Characteristics 
The majority of responding households in Bristol Place rented their housing (65 percent), with 33 
percent owning their housing and 2 percent renting to own (Table 12). Of the 15 households who 
reported being homeowners (or in a rent-to-own contract), 11 households reported owning their home 
outright. None of the households with loans shared information regarding their estimated equity in their 
home. For those homeowners who owned outright, equity reported ranged from $37,000 to $75,000, 
with an average reported home equity of $56,000. For those households with a mortgage or in a rent-
to-own contract, the average reported monthly payment towards their mortgage was $508 (Table 13). 
Three quarters of households renting in Bristol Place reported having 12-month rental agreements with 
their landlords. Several households had longer rental contracts, rented on a month-to-month basis, or 
rented from a friend or family member without a rental agreement (Table 14). The average monthly rent 
reported was $536 (Table 15). Six of 28 rental households received a rental subsidy via the Champaign 
County Housing Authority’s Housing Choice Voucher Program. Renters were asked whether they had 
renewed their lease for another year, and if not, whether they planned to renew their lease. Six 
respondents (21 percent) reported that they had already renewed their lease for another year. Of those 
respondents who had not yet renewed their lease, twelve (55 percent) stated that they planned to 
renew their lease, with another four respondents (18 percent) who were not yet sure whether they 
would renew their lease (Table 16). 
Thinking about housing costs, the average monthly housing cost (average rent/mortgage plus average 
utility costs) was $968 for renters and $1,069 for those homeowners with a mortgage (excluding rent, 
the average is $561 in utilities costs for owners, which provides some insight into costs incurred by 
households who own outright). Comparing the ratio of individual housing expenses (rent plus utilities) to 
reported household income, an estimated 60 percent  of renters and 7 percent of owners were housing 
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Table 15: Monthly Rent 
Monthly Rent N %
<$ 400 4 14%
$400 - $500 1 4%
$500 - $600 9 32%
$600 - $700 8 29%
> $700 4 14%
No Reponse 2 7%
Total 28 100%  
 
Table 16: Plans to Renew Lease at Contract Expiration 
Renewed Lease? Plan to Renew Lease?
N % N %
No 15 54% 4 18%
Yes 6 21% 12 55%
Not Sure --- --- 4 18%
No Reponse 7 25% 2 9%
Total 28 100% 22 100%
Response
 
 
Table 17: Housing Cost Burden for Owners and Renters 
Rent /Mortgage Only Rent/Mortgage  and Utilities
Renters Owners Renters Owners
N % N % N % N %
Not Cost Burdened 8 28.6% 6 40.0% 3 10.7% 5 33.3%
Cost Burdened 12 42.9% 0 0.0% 17 60.7% 1 6.7%
Not Calculated 8 28.6% 9 60.0% 8 28.6% 9 60.0%
Total 28 100.0% 15 100.0% 28 100.0% 15 100.0%
Housing Cost Burden
(1) Cost burden reflects the ratio of housing expenses to total income. The Federally defined standard for 
housing cost burden is 30 percent of household income spent on rent plus utilities.  
 
 
Community Sentiment 
In addition to questions about household and housing attributes, respondents were asked about the 
qualities of Bristol Place which they liked, and qualities which they would like to see change. Responses 
are summarized below: 
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Likes 
• Family connection and history to the 
neighborhood 
• Central location and proximity to parks and 
other amenities 
• Neighbors and sense of community 
• Recent improvements in terms of safety, sense 
of peace and quiet 
 
Changes 
• Reduce troublemaking: drugs, fighting, and 
violence 
• Increase community activities for children and  
youth 
• Improve infrastructure- lighting, sidewalks, etc. 
• Improve external perception of neighborhood 
 
 
Although redevelopment plans have not yet been formulated, residents were also asked about their 
desire to return to a redeveloped Bristol Place neighborhood, should relocation be necessary for 
redevelopment. Fifty-seven percent of renters and 47 percent of owners stated they desired to return to 
a redeveloped Bristol Place community. Residents were also asked whether they would prefer to return 
as renters or as homeowners. All current owners who responded to the question wished to return as 
homeowners, and 32 percent of renters desired to transition from renting to owning in a redeveloped 
community. 
Table 18: Desire to Return to a Redeveloped Community 
Renters Owners Total
N % N % N %
Yes 16 57% 7 47% 23 53%
No 5 18% 5 33% 10 23%
Maybe 4 14% 1 7% 5 12%
No Response 3 11% 2 13% 5 12%
Total 28 100% 15 100% 43 100%
Desire to Return
 
 
Table 19: Desire to Return by Returning Tenure 
Renters Owners Total
N % N % N %
Renter 9 32% 0 0% 9 21%
Homeowner 9 32% 6 40% 15 35%
Both 4 14% 0 0% 4 9%
No Response (1) 6 21% 9 60% 15 35%
Total 28 100% 15 100% 43 100%
Desired Tenure
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Appendix D.13: Bristol Park Plan Area Spatial Reference Maps 
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How to save  
a neighborhood
In addition to addressing 
the workforce and financial 
needs of Bristol Park resi-
dents, city oﬃcials also think 
some infrastructure changes 
can help to improve home 
values and deter crime in 
one of Champaign’s most 
troubled areas. Bristol Park 
includes three neighbor-
hoods: Bristol Place, Gar-
wood and the Shadow 
Wood mobile home park.
Bristol Place will be over-
hauled — the city plans to 
purchase the properties, 
tear down the buildings and 
make them available for 
new development.
The approach to the Gar-
wood and Shadow Wood 
neighborhoods is diﬀerent. 
Community Development 
Specialist Greg Skaggs said 
Garwood has yet to reach 
the point of no return, like 
Bristol Place already has. 
The homes in Garwood 
can still be maintained, but 
their owners will need some 
help.
The strategy is “kind of a 
replace Bristol (Place), repair 
Garwood,” Skaggs said.
Oﬃcials are working with 
local banks to make low-
interest loans available for 
those residents, and Skaggs 
said city funds may be made 
available, too.
“We’re looking at trying to 
create local funds to assist 
property owners to make 
improvements to their 
homes,” Skaggs said.
Workforce development 
for residents of all three 
neighborhoods is a longer-
term goal, but city oﬃcials 
see the surrounding areas of 
the entire Bristol Park area 
as opportunities. 
Neil Street just south of 
Interstate 74 and the inter-
section of Market Street and 
Bradley Avenue could be a 
key areas for business devel-
opment. The area around 
Human Kinetics on North 
Market Street could become 
an “employment center,” 
with an emphasis on light 
industrial and oﬃce jobs.
1. Human Kinetics and Parkland College training facility — City oﬃcials hope 
these two facilities will be a force in helping 
to provide job opportunities and training for 
Bristol Park residents in the future.
2. Interstate 74 overpass — Shadow Wood residents are without any base-
ments or storm shelters and typically use 
the overpass as a safe haven when severe 
weather is approaching. Bridges like these, 
however, are among the worst places to take 
shelter, and oﬃcials think moving Fire Sta-
tion 3 to the Bristol Park area could address 
a strategic fire coverage concern and provide 
shelter during a storm.
3. Boneyard Creek — The city already owns a number of properties along the 
creek, and oﬃcials see the drainage channel 
as an opportunity for future improvements.
4. North Fourth Street — Workers will extend the street 500 feet this year. City 
oﬃcials believe the small extension could 
open up big opportunities for future develop-
ment.
5. Church of the Living God expansion — The first development spurred by the 
Fourth Street extension is expected to be the 
expansion of the religious institution.
6. Completed redevelopments — Some-what similar to the planned Bristol 
Place overhaul, the Oakwood Trace, Douglass 
Square and Taylor Thomas subdivisions have 
already been completed and hailed by city 
oﬃcials as successes for removing blight-
ridden areas and promoting mixed-income 
housing.
7. Market and Bradley — An opportunity for future development, the intersection 
of Market Street and Bradley Avenue is prime 
for what city oﬃcials call “neighborhood 
commercial” buildings, which in turn gener-
ate jobs. Family Dollar has been in operation 
on the northeast corner.
8. Neil Street corridor — According to city documents, this segment of Neil Street 
could be part of redevelopment plans in the 
future.
SOURCE: City of Champaign
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APPENDIX E 
CHAPTER 6 FIGURES 
 
Appendix E.1: Champaign Police District Map before 2006 
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Appendix E.2: Figure of Champaign Police Calls for Service by Beat (2001-2013) 
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Appendix E.3: Figure of Champaign Police Misconduct Allegations (1989-2000) 
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Appendix E.4: Champaign Police District Map after 2006 
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Appendix E.5: Champaign Police Beats Map after 2006 
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Appendix E.6: Champaign Police North District Zoom after 2006 
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Appendix E.7: Infographic of Champaign Police Residency (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BEYOND CITY LIMITS
Race, Residency and the Champaign Police Department
UrbanaChampaign
Rantoul
Tolono
Fisher
St. Joseph
Mahomet
Gifford
Ogden
PhiloSidney
Sadorus
Seymour
Villa Grove
Savoy
Royal  
Champaign Police Officers
(Number by Town)
Number
1 - 2
3 - 5
6 - 11
12 - 25
RACE & RESIDENCY BY THE NUMBERS
In 2010, the Champaign Police Department 
employed a total of 121 police officers. 
More than 90% of Champaign police officers 
are white. Only six African Americans and two 
Latino/a officers serve on the force.
Three-quarters of Champaign police officers live 
beyond Champaign city limits in predominantly 
white towns and bedroom communities.
Champaign Police Officers (Place of Residence)
WHY POLICE LIVE BEYOND CITY LIMITS
Until 1970, the City of Champaign required that 
all police officers reside within the city limits. 
However, in the aftermath of the fierce school 
integration battles of the late 1960s, the pre-
dominantly white police force and their families 
lobbied to change this policy. It seems that while 
many white police officers were willing to per-
form their law enforcement duties in a racially 
diverse community they were not willing to live 
and participate in it as equals.
The Champaign city council voted to expand 
the existing residency perimeter twice in 1970 
and, eventually, handed decision-making power 
to the police department and the police union. 
Today, there are no restrictions on the residency 
of Champaign police officers.
THE IMPACT OF RACE & RESIDENCY
The city should reinstate the residency require-
ment because it will ensure that officers are in-
vested in the local community, that our financial 
investment in police salaries is returned through 
tax revenue, and that skilled employment op-
portunities are opened up to local people. In 
addition, reinstating the residency requirement 
will help change the culture of the Champaign 
Police Department and improve our chances of 
recruiting a racially diverse workforce.
Mapping Residential Patterns in Champaign County
	   266 
Appendix E.8: Hate Crimes in Illinois (1999-2013) 
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Appendix E.9: Hate Crimes in Champaign County (1999-2009) 
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Appendix E.10: Hate Crimes in Illinois by Bias Type (1999-2013) 
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Appendix E.11: Racial Hate Crimes in IL by Race (1999-2013) 
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Appendix E.12: Illinois Hate Crimes by Offender Race (2000-2013) 
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Appendix E.13: Champaign County Jail Population by Race (January-September 2014) 
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Appendix E.14: Open Champaign Tenant Inspection Requests (FY2006-FY2014) 
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Appendix E.15: Champaign Tenant Inspection Requests (FY2006-FY2014) 
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Appendix E.16: Average Days to Resolution for Champaign Tenant Inspection Request 
(FY2006-FY2014) 
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APPENDIX F 
CHAPTER 7 FIGURES 
 
Appendix F.1: Bristol Place Master Plan Concept Images 
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Appendix F.2: Maps from Impediments to Fair Housing Report of income and race distribution 
in Champaign 
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Appendix F.2, cont’d 
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Attachment B 
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Appendix F.2, cont’d 
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Attachment C 
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Appendix F.2, cont’d 
 
 	  	  
2014 Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing/page 46 
Attachment D 
 
 
  
